Pitchers who earn their losses
A familiar television advertisement from years ago featured the actor John Houseman as pitch man for the investment firm Smith Barney. The tag line had Houseman solemnly intoning ”Smith Barney makes money the old-fashioned way – they earn it!”.
In this post, I’ll look at pitchers who, apart from their run support, earn their losses, and can thank their defense for helping out with their wins.
Here are pitchers who did not allow an unearned run over an entire season (min. 162 IP).
| Rk | Player | Year | ER | R | IP | Age | Tm | G | GS | CG | SHO | W | L | H | BB | SO | HR | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Francisco Liriano | 2010 | 1.263 | 77 | 77 | 191.2 | 26 | MIN | 31 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 10 | .583 | 184 | 58 | 201 | 3.62 | 112 | 9 |
| 2 | Roy Oswalt | 2009 | 1.241 | 83 | 83 | 181.1 | 31 | HOU | 30 | 30 | 3 | 0 | 8 | 6 | .571 | 183 | 42 | 138 | 4.12 | 100 | 19 |
| 3 | Scott Baker | 2008 | 1.178 | 66 | 66 | 172.1 | 26 | MIN | 28 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 4 | .733 | 161 | 42 | 141 | 3.45 | 122 | 20 |
| 4 | Daisuke Matsuzaka | 2007 | 1.324 | 100 | 100 | 204.2 | 26 | BOS | 32 | 32 | 1 | 0 | 15 | 12 | .556 | 191 | 80 | 201 | 4.40 | 108 | 25 |
| 5 | Curt Schilling | 2006 | 1.216 | 90 | 90 | 204.0 | 39 | BOS | 31 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 7 | .682 | 220 | 28 | 183 | 3.97 | 120 | 28 |
| 6 | Joel Pineiro | 2005 | 1.481 | 118 | 118 | 189.0 | 26 | SEA | 30 | 30 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 11 | .389 | 224 | 56 | 107 | 5.62 | 75 | 23 |
| 7 | Kelvim Escobar | 2004 | 1.286 | 91 | 91 | 208.1 | 28 | ANA | 33 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 12 | .478 | 192 | 76 | 191 | 3.93 | 113 | 21 |
| 8 | Omar Olivares | 1992 | 1.279 | 84 | 84 | 197.0 | 24 | STL | 32 | 30 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 9 | .500 | 189 | 63 | 124 | 3.84 | 89 | 20 |
| 9 | Frank Tanana | 1990 | 1.452 | 104 | 104 | 176.1 | 36 | DET | 34 | 29 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 8 | .529 | 190 | 66 | 114 | 5.31 | 75 | 25 |
| 10 | Rick Sutcliffe | 1988 | 1.336 | 97 | 97 | 226.0 | 32 | CHC | 32 | 32 | 12 | 2 | 13 | 14 | .481 | 232 | 70 | 144 | 3.86 | 94 | 18 |
| 11 | Dick Ruthven | 1976 | 1.436 | 112 | 112 | 240.1 | 25 | ATL | 36 | 36 | 8 | 4 | 14 | 17 | .452 | 255 | 90 | 142 | 4.19 | 90 | 14 |
| 12 | Dennis Ribant | 1967 | 1.314 | 78 | 78 | 172.0 | 25 | PIT | 38 | 22 | 2 | 0 | 9 | 8 | .529 | 186 | 40 | 75 | 4.08 | 82 | 16 |
| 13 | Ted Wilks | 1944 | 1.069 | 61 | 61 | 207.2 | 28 | STL | 36 | 21 | 16 | 4 | 17 | 4 | .810 | 173 | 49 | 70 | 2.64 | 135 | 12 |
I was actually surprised there were as many of these seasons as there are. The frequency prior to the last decade was more what I was expecting. My hunch is that these seasons have become more frequent with the demise of the complete game and the unabated increase in strikeouts - ergo, the longer a pitcher stays in a game and the more balls in play there are, the more chance there will be for an error and an unearned run. Which makes Ted Wilks 1944 season quite remarkable - 16 complete games and just 70 strikeouts (although he did have that league-leading WHIP). I was thinking he also had a makeshift, wartime defense behind him, except that isn’t true. Other than rookie Emil Verban at 2B (an “experienced” rookie at 28), every Cardinal regular was a holdover from the previous season (and, except for outfielder Danny Ditwhiler, for at least two previous seasons). But, I digress.
The other thing that popped out at me was that overall this was a pretty average (or even mediocre) group of seasons – median ERA+ of 100, 5 seasons of 90 or below, 4 of 110 or above. Also, aside from Wilks and a couple of others, a pretty healthy dose of runners on base (only 4 of 13 with WHIP below 1.25) - the formula cited conventionally for putting pressure on the defense and thus inducing errors.
Going to 95% of runs allowed are earned (up to ~5 unearned runs allowed), these are the pitchers with the most seasons.
| Rk | Yrs | From | To | Age | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Curt Schilling | 7 | 1998 | 2006 | 31-39 | Ind. Seasons |
| 2 | Jamie Moyer | 6 | 1997 | 2009 | 34-46 | Ind. Seasons |
| 3 | Steve Trachsel | 5 | 1998 | 2006 | 27-35 | Ind. Seasons |
| 4 | Eric Milton | 5 | 1998 | 2005 | 22-29 | Ind. Seasons |
| 5 | David Wells | 5 | 1996 | 2005 | 33-42 | Ind. Seasons |
| 6 | Cole Hamels | 4 | 2007 | 2011 | 23-27 | Ind. Seasons |
| 7 | Ted Lilly | 4 | 2004 | 2011 | 28-35 | Ind. Seasons |
| 8 | Jarrod Washburn | 4 | 2002 | 2009 | 27-34 | Ind. Seasons |
| 9 | Mike Mussina | 4 | 1992 | 2000 | 23-31 | Ind. Seasons |
| 10 | Greg Maddux | 4 | 1992 | 2007 | 26-41 | Ind. Seasons |
| 11 | Luis Tiant | 4 | 1973 | 1978 | 32-37 | Ind. Seasons |
| 12 | Preacher Roe | 4 | 1945 | 1951 | 29-35 | Ind. Seasons |
Obviously, heavily tilted to pitchers of the past 20 years with much reduced numbers of complete games and also much higher strikeout rates resulting in fewer balls in play. Among the 29 pitchers with 3 such seasons are: Josh Beckett, Jon Lester, Jered Weaver, Matt Cain, Jeff Francis, Derek Lowe, Livan Hernandez, Freddy Garcia, Bartolo Colon, Al Leiter, Pedro Martinez, Tom Glavine, Kevin Appier, Tom Browning, Rick Sutcliffe, Tom Seaver, Don Sutton and Jim Palmer. Actually, that’s most of those 29 pitchers – as you can tell, preponderantly name pitchers.
For a career (min. 1000 IP), here are the retired players whose unearned runs are less than 6% of their runs allowed.
| Rk | Player | IP | ER | R | From | To | Age | G | GS | CG | SHO | W | L | H | BB | SO | HR | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Curt Schilling | 3261.0 | 1253 | 1318 | 1988 | 2007 | 21-40 | 569 | 436 | 83 | 20 | 216 | 146 | .597 | 2998 | 711 | 3116 | 3.46 | 127 | 347 |
| 2 | Woody Williams | 2216.1 | 1031 | 1096 | 1993 | 2007 | 26-40 | 424 | 330 | 10 | 2 | 132 | 116 | .532 | 2217 | 711 | 1480 | 4.19 | 103 | 309 |
| 3 | Jarrod Washburn | 1863.2 | 848 | 900 | 1998 | 2009 | 23-34 | 312 | 300 | 9 | 4 | 107 | 109 | .495 | 1855 | 569 | 1103 | 4.10 | 108 | 240 |
| 4 | Jose Lima | 1567.2 | 917 | 972 | 1994 | 2006 | 21-33 | 348 | 235 | 9 | 1 | 89 | 102 | .466 | 1783 | 393 | 980 | 5.26 | 85 | 267 |
| 5 | Rick Helling | 1526.1 | 793 | 842 | 1994 | 2006 | 23-35 | 301 | 234 | 10 | 4 | 93 | 81 | .534 | 1540 | 562 | 1058 | 4.68 | 101 | 247 |
| 6 | Jim Deshaies | 1525.0 | 702 | 743 | 1984 | 1995 | 24-35 | 257 | 253 | 15 | 6 | 84 | 95 | .469 | 1434 | 575 | 951 | 4.14 | 91 | 179 |
| 7 | Orlando Hernandez | 1314.2 | 604 | 641 | 1998 | 2007 | 32-41 | 219 | 211 | 9 | 2 | 90 | 65 | .581 | 1181 | 479 | 1086 | 4.13 | 110 | 177 |
| 8 | Arthur Rhodes | 1187.2 | 538 | 560 | 1991 | 2011 | 21-41 | 900 | 61 | 5 | 3 | 87 | 70 | .554 | 1033 | 516 | 1152 | 4.08 | 109 | 126 |
| 9 | Adam Eaton | 1178.2 | 647 | 688 | 2000 | 2009 | 22-31 | 209 | 201 | 3 | 0 | 71 | 68 | .511 | 1253 | 448 | 855 | 4.94 | 84 | 167 |
So, every player is from the past 30 years, and most are of the low-CG and high-K style prevalent in that period.
Going to a higher threshold for the 1961-90 period, here are are the retired players (min. 1000 IP) whose career unearned runs are less than 8% of their runs allowed.
| Rk | Player | IP | ER | R | From | To | Age | G | GS | CG | SHO | W | L | H | BB | SO | HR | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dennis Eckersley | 2815.1 | 1091 | 1181 | 1975 | 1990 | 20-35 | 604 | 361 | 100 | 20 | 169 | 140 | .547 | 2625 | 659 | 1938 | 3.49 | 116 | 291 |
| 2 | Mike Flanagan | 2637.0 | 1142 | 1240 | 1975 | 1990 | 23-38 | 420 | 403 | 101 | 19 | 165 | 136 | .548 | 2672 | 842 | 1419 | 3.90 | 100 | 242 |
| 3 | Scott McGregor | 2140.2 | 949 | 1031 | 1976 | 1988 | 22-34 | 356 | 309 | 83 | 23 | 138 | 108 | .561 | 2245 | 518 | 904 | 3.99 | 98 | 235 |
| 4 | Rick Sutcliffe | 2130.0 | 906 | 984 | 1976 | 1990 | 20-34 | 357 | 296 | 64 | 16 | 133 | 105 | .559 | 2010 | 856 | 1412 | 3.83 | 103 | 178 |
| 5 | Kevin Gross | 1469.1 | 656 | 712 | 1983 | 1990 | 22-29 | 265 | 221 | 29 | 11 | 80 | 90 | .471 | 1447 | 583 | 996 | 4.02 | 93 | 133 |
| 6 | Mike Smithson | 1356.1 | 690 | 745 | 1982 | 1989 | 27-34 | 240 | 204 | 41 | 6 | 76 | 86 | .469 | 1473 | 383 | 731 | 4.58 | 92 | 168 |
| 7 | Joey Jay | 1132.1 | 492 | 534 | 1961 | 1966 | 25-30 | 195 | 158 | 49 | 11 | 75 | 67 | .528 | 1092 | 407 | 727 | 3.91 | 97 | 120 |
| 8 | Don Aase | 1109.1 | 468 | 503 | 1977 | 1990 | 22-35 | 448 | 91 | 22 | 5 | 66 | 60 | .524 | 1085 | 457 | 641 | 3.80 | 104 | 89 |
| 9 | Sammy Ellis | 1004.0 | 463 | 503 | 1962 | 1969 | 21-28 | 229 | 140 | 35 | 3 | 63 | 58 | .521 | 967 | 378 | 677 | 4.15 | 88 | 118 |
The first four names on the list are generally well-regarded pitchers though, aside from Eckersley, do not have impressive ERA+ scores during this period.
Similarly, for the 1941-60 period, pitchers with career unearned runs of less than 9% of runs allowed (only the highlighted four were less than the 1961-90 8% threshold).
| Rk | Player | IP | ER | R | From | To | Age | G | GS | CG | SHO | W | L | H | BB | SO | HR | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Preacher Roe | 1911.2 | 726 | 795 | 1944 | 1954 | 28-38 | 332 | 261 | 101 | 17 | 127 | 84 | .602 | 1901 | 502 | 955 | 3.42 | 117 | 199 |
| 2 | Herm Wehmeier | 1803.0 | 961 | 1044 | 1945 | 1958 | 18-31 | 361 | 240 | 79 | 9 | 92 | 108 | .460 | 1806 | 852 | 794 | 4.80 | 84 | 210 |
| 3 | Carl Erskine | 1718.2 | 763 | 830 | 1948 | 1959 | 21-32 | 335 | 216 | 71 | 14 | 122 | 78 | .610 | 1637 | 646 | 981 | 4.00 | 101 | 199 |
| 4 | Jim Wilson | 1539.0 | 686 | 743 | 1945 | 1958 | 23-36 | 257 | 217 | 75 | 19 | 86 | 89 | .491 | 1479 | 608 | 692 | 4.01 | 94 | 151 |
| 5 | Tiny Bonham | 1451.2 | 507 | 556 | 1941 | 1949 | 27-35 | 219 | 181 | 100 | 18 | 94 | 69 | .577 | 1418 | 274 | 441 | 3.14 | 116 | 113 |
| 6 | Bob Turley | 1443.0 | 552 | 592 | 1951 | 1960 | 20-29 | 241 | 198 | 74 | 22 | 92 | 66 | .582 | 1111 | 891 | 1070 | 3.44 | 107 | 110 |
| 7 | Billy Hoeft | 1402.0 | 637 | 685 | 1952 | 1960 | 20-28 | 279 | 182 | 71 | 16 | 77 | 83 | .481 | 1421 | 522 | 835 | 4.09 | 97 | 138 |
| 8 | Red Munger | 1228.2 | 523 | 574 | 1943 | 1956 | 24-37 | 273 | 161 | 54 | 13 | 77 | 56 | .579 | 1243 | 500 | 564 | 3.83 | 103 | 85 |
| 9 | Hal Brown | 1147.2 | 499 | 546 | 1951 | 1960 | 26-35 | 254 | 135 | 32 | 7 | 61 | 55 | .526 | 1136 | 299 | 501 | 3.91 | 98 | 112 |
| 10 | Paul Foytack | 1094.1 | 495 | 539 | 1953 | 1960 | 22-29 | 215 | 144 | 52 | 6 | 60 | 63 | .488 | 994 | 481 | 630 | 4.07 | 99 | 116 |
| 11 | Billy Loes | 1075.2 | 460 | 503 | 1950 | 1960 | 20-30 | 290 | 121 | 39 | 8 | 74 | 58 | .561 | 1021 | 382 | 590 | 3.85 | 101 | 105 |
| 12 | Carl Scheib | 1070.2 | 581 | 634 | 1943 | 1954 | 16-27 | 267 | 107 | 47 | 6 | 45 | 65 | .409 | 1130 | 493 | 290 | 4.88 | 85 | 99 |
| 13 | Brooks Lawrence | 1040.2 | 491 | 539 | 1954 | 1960 | 29-35 | 275 | 127 | 42 | 5 | 69 | 62 | .527 | 1034 | 385 | 481 | 4.25 | 96 | 110 |
A fairly unimpressive assortment of pitchers, with only 2 of 13 with an ERA+ above 110, and two others (Wehmeier, Scheib) with attrocious scores of 85 or less.
For 1920-40, these are pitchers with career unearned runs less than 12% of runs allowed. Only the highlighted two were less than 10%, and none were below the 1941-60 threshold of 9%.
| Rk | Player | IP | ER | R | From | To | Age | G | GS | CG | SHO | W | L | H | BB | SO | HR | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | General Crowder | 2344.1 | 1072 | 1204 | 1926 | 1936 | 27-37 | 402 | 292 | 150 | 16 | 167 | 115 | .592 | 2453 | 800 | 799 | 4.12 | 105 | 137 |
| 2 | Ed Brandt | 2268.1 | 974 | 1084 | 1928 | 1938 | 23-33 | 378 | 279 | 150 | 18 | 121 | 146 | .453 | 2342 | 778 | 877 | 3.86 | 100 | 134 |
| 3 | Syl Johnson | 2165.2 | 977 | 1099 | 1922 | 1940 | 21-39 | 542 | 209 | 82 | 11 | 112 | 117 | .489 | 2290 | 488 | 920 | 4.06 | 105 | 172 |
| 4 | Bullet Joe Bush | 1725.2 | 761 | 863 | 1920 | 1928 | 27-35 | 270 | 215 | 129 | 13 | 118 | 94 | .557 | 1777 | 687 | 631 | 3.97 | 103 | 79 |
| 5 | Tex Carleton | 1607.1 | 698 | 770 | 1932 | 1940 | 25-33 | 293 | 202 | 91 | 16 | 100 | 76 | .568 | 1630 | 561 | 808 | 3.91 | 100 | 105 |
| 6 | Johnny Allen | 1545.0 | 636 | 715 | 1932 | 1940 | 27-35 | 244 | 199 | 99 | 15 | 117 | 53 | .688 | 1449 | 595 | 900 | 3.70 | 119 | 69 |
| 7 | Oral Hildebrand | 1430.2 | 692 | 781 | 1931 | 1940 | 24-33 | 258 | 182 | 80 | 9 | 83 | 78 | .516 | 1490 | 623 | 527 | 4.35 | 108 | 99 |
| 8 | Ted Blankenship | 1330.2 | 634 | 719 | 1922 | 1930 | 21-29 | 241 | 156 | 73 | 8 | 77 | 79 | .494 | 1462 | 489 | 378 | 4.29 | 94 | 63 |
| 9 | Schoolboy Rowe | 1295.2 | 580 | 649 | 1933 | 1940 | 23-30 | 216 | 166 | 88 | 16 | 96 | 56 | .632 | 1357 | 368 | 601 | 4.03 | 113 | 85 |
| 10 | Jack Knott | 1261.0 | 702 | 795 | 1933 | 1940 | 26-33 | 275 | 151 | 47 | 4 | 67 | 81 | .453 | 1441 | 524 | 397 | 5.01 | 97 | 112 |
| 11 | Bob Feller | 1105.1 | 392 | 440 | 1936 | 1940 | 17-21 | 161 | 135 | 89 | 10 | 82 | 41 | .667 | 865 | 621 | 973 | 3.19 | 140 | 44 |
| 12 | Johnny Marcum | 1099.1 | 569 | 630 | 1933 | 1939 | 23-29 | 195 | 132 | 69 | 8 | 65 | 63 | .508 | 1269 | 344 | 392 | 4.66 | 102 | 90 |
| 13 | Bill Dietrich | 1041.1 | 582 | 661 | 1933 | 1940 | 23-30 | 215 | 117 | 44 | 8 | 53 | 65 | .449 | 1113 | 540 | 387 | 5.03 | 92 | 79 |
As a group, mostly a nondescript set of hurlers, with only 3 of 13 with ERA+ above 110. Players’ equipment and field conditions probably contributed a bit to higher error rates in this period.
Finally, for the 1901-19 period, here are pitchers with unearned runs of less than 22% of runs allowed, almost double the threshold of the 1920-40 period. Only the highlighted pitchers were below 20%.
| Rk | Player | IP | ER | R | From | To | Age | G | GS | CG | SHO | W | L | H | BB | SO | HR | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Babe Adams | 2064.2 | 570 | 725 | 1906 | 1919 | 24-37 | 308 | 247 | 148 | 30 | 131 | 95 | .580 | 1848 | 326 | 790 | 2.48 | 120 | 35 |
| 2 | Bob Harmon | 2054.0 | 761 | 957 | 1909 | 1918 | 21-30 | 321 | 240 | 143 | 15 | 107 | 133 | .446 | 1966 | 762 | 634 | 3.33 | 90 | 44 |
| 3 | Dick Rudolph | 1923.1 | 548 | 699 | 1910 | 1919 | 22-31 | 253 | 222 | 167 | 26 | 116 | 97 | .545 | 1817 | 362 | 756 | 2.56 | 107 | 29 |
| 4 | Ray Caldwell | 1857.1 | 620 | 746 | 1910 | 1919 | 22-31 | 272 | 214 | 160 | 19 | 108 | 104 | .509 | 1644 | 626 | 850 | 3.00 | 101 | 43 |
| 5 | George Suggs | 1652.0 | 571 | 720 | 1908 | 1915 | 25-32 | 245 | 185 | 115 | 16 | 99 | 91 | .521 | 1722 | 355 | 588 | 3.11 | 103 | 40 |
| 6 | Dave Davenport | 1537.0 | 501 | 641 | 1914 | 1919 | 24-29 | 259 | 186 | 96 | 18 | 73 | 83 | .468 | 1399 | 521 | 719 | 2.93 | 101 | 22 |
| 7 | Pol Perritt | 1430.0 | 457 | 583 | 1912 | 1919 | 20-27 | 239 | 174 | 93 | 23 | 89 | 78 | .533 | 1372 | 377 | 532 | 2.88 | 94 | 41 |
| 8 | Erskine Mayer | 1427.0 | 469 | 600 | 1912 | 1919 | 22-29 | 245 | 164 | 93 | 12 | 91 | 70 | .565 | 1415 | 345 | 482 | 2.96 | 99 | 43 |
| 9 | Al Demaree | 1424.0 | 439 | 556 | 1912 | 1919 | 27-34 | 232 | 173 | 84 | 15 | 80 | 72 | .526 | 1350 | 337 | 514 | 2.77 | 100 | 34 |
| 10 | Gene Packard | 1410.1 | 472 | 602 | 1912 | 1919 | 24-31 | 248 | 153 | 86 | 15 | 85 | 69 | .552 | 1393 | 356 | 488 | 3.01 | 99 | 28 |
| 11 | Bob Shawkey | 1324.1 | 390 | 479 | 1913 | 1919 | 22-28 | 218 | 150 | 98 | 18 | 89 | 67 | .571 | 1132 | 453 | 572 | 2.65 | 108 | 24 |
| 12 | Jim Shaw | 1323.2 | 401 | 513 | 1913 | 1919 | 19-25 | 234 | 157 | 79 | 17 | 72 | 80 | .474 | 1102 | 584 | 675 | 2.73 | 105 | 14 |
| 13 | Stan Coveleski | 1148.1 | 302 | 376 | 1912 | 1919 | 22-29 | 176 | 132 | 86 | 17 | 82 | 53 | .607 | 1014 | 292 | 423 | 2.37 | 129 | 13 |
| 14 | Bernie Boland | 1017.2 | 340 | 406 | 1915 | 1919 | 23-27 | 198 | 110 | 58 | 10 | 67 | 47 | .588 | 868 | 390 | 354 | 3.01 | 96 | 11 |
Unearned runs are much more prominent in this period with few strikeouts, a lot of balls in play, and also lots of small-ball plays (bunts, hit-and-runs, steals) that test defenses and induce errors. Again, players’ equipment and field conditions may also have played a sizable factor in contributing to errors. As a whole, this group of pitchers are arguably the best of any of the career lists.
One initial surprise for me is how many lesser quality pitchers made these lists. But, on second thought, maybe that isn’t such a surprise. After all, poor pitchers can surrender runs quite readily, without any assistance from the defense. Also, they’re more likely to get yanked early, reducing the chances of errors behind them. Conversely, better pitchers will surrender fewer runs in total, so any unearned runs they allow will represent a higher percentage of runs than for lesser hurlers.
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Doug, This is a fascinating post, and one I’ll want to study more. The relationship between the ER:R ratio and pitching quality is something I’ve been interested in for many years – a couple of weeks ago I raised in a post of yours on relievers and Richard Chester provided interesting information on pichers with 500+ IP whose ratio approached one. (The undistinguished Gabe White was #1 on the list.) I’ve always thought of the question in terms of how much poor pitching was concealed by the limits of ERA – obviously a pitcher who allows no unearned runs beyond what ERA indicates has done better by that measure than one who allows unearned runs too (as game scores take into account), but only assuming the ERAs are identical. You’re looking from a different angle, and the lack of obvious relationship between pitching quality and the ratio is a surprise.
One statement you make doesn’t seem quite right. I’m not sure why diminished CGs would be relevant in a season record. The runs are scored in IP, and there’s no data I know of that indicate more errors occur late in a game (although that may be the case). If one pitcher starts 35 games and averages 6 innings, while another starts 30 games and averages 7, I don’t see any reason to expect more unearned runs from the second – both have pitched 210 innings, and each inning has the same chance of errors. Perhaps you could argue that BIP increases in a starter’s late innings, but that would, I think, increase earned and unearned runs at similar rates . . .
My point about CGs is that a pitcher who has a lot of CGs may have more difficulty avoiding unearned runs because he’ll have a greater chance of errors occuring behind him, whereas a pitcher who only pitches 6 or 7 innings without an unearned run can “escape” possible future damage by being relieved.
As for when in a game errors occur, I don’t have any data but I strongly suspect there are more errors later in games. I think this because most pitchers perform better the 1st and 2nd time through a lineup than in later turns. The less effective a pitcher becomes, the more baserunners there are and thus, more opportunity for errors.
I actually doubt this given the continued use of “defensive replacements” late in games. That should even out any increase in chances based on a starter’s reduced effectiveness later in a game.
Not sure if it would even things out, but might mitigate to some degree. Of course, defensive replacements most often enter very late in games, usually after the starter has been relieved – so that scenario wouldn’t really have any bearing on this point.
Intersting to indulge in a bit of educated speculation, but would be better to find out when in games errors occur more frequently – but I’m not aware of where that data could be found.
Another thought about CG is more basic. In past years, top starters with lots of CGs would get to 300 IP in a season or even well past that mark, and many would get to 250 IP. Today it seems exceptional if a starter gets to 250 IP, and even 200 IP is now seen as a high-water mark for many starters. Quite apart from anything else, that change in ptcher usage will make it easier for today’s pitchers to allow fewer unearned runs in a season.
Doug, I think the problem remains: it makes it easier to allow fewer total runs – and, I suppose, to finish a season with zero unearned runs – but I don’t see how it would otherwise affect the ratio of earned to total runs.
epm,
Agree that the ratio wouldn’t change if errors (and unearned runs) were equally likely at any point in the game. But, if those things happened more frequently later in games, then having more innings later in games would increase the unearned to total runs ratio.
I don’t have any data to support the notion that errors occur more frequently later in games, but I’ve provided my rationale for that supposition.
1) The date limits chop up careers, we have Feller, but only from 1936-1940 when he was one of the greatest K pitchers in history up to that time. But not the rest of his long career.
2) Errors doesn’t say much about the quality of defense. The number of plays made is much more important than only one of the ways to not make the play. And probably not the most numerous. (Jeter makes few errors, and gets to a lot fewer balls than the average SS. Number of balls he doesn’t field is much greater than the errors he avoids.)
3) There are many more errors per 100 ground balls than there are per 100 fly balls. This method may have just selected fly ball pitchers. (There may be a correlation between those who throw high fastballs getting lots of Ks and fly balls.
To be sure, kds. This is just a quick look, and lots of different directions for further study.
As to your point about balls in play, I agree entirely. Which is why I emphasized that the rapid increase in strikeouts (as well as a rapid increase in HR) in the past 30 years has coincided with fewer unearned runs and, most likely, with fewer errors. That being said, unearned runs do require errors, so plays not made due to range deficiency are only a secondary factor in an analysis of unearned runs, due to their contribution to increased baserunners.
I expected to see the great fielding Orioles teams of the late 60′s & 70′s represented somewhere on these lists and I wasn’t disappointed. I plan on coming back tomorrow when I’m had a bit of shuteye and giving this article the attention it deserves. Great stuff
Seems likely that higher strikeouts adds to the trend, and possibly less complete games, but I’m not sure about that one. I’ll have to think about that a bit more.
One other contributing factor might be improved defense through better equipment, better fields, better lighting.
Agree that better equipment and playing conditions make for better defense and reduced errors. See my reply #5 above for my thinking on complete games.
I did take a look, including the responses. I can see where a pitcher tossing 200 innings today might have a better statistical chance of making it through the season without allowing an unearned run than a pitcher tossing 300 innings. I can’t prove it, but it seems to make sense to at least consider it as a contributing factor.
Dennis Ribant: The Mets’leader in single-season wins (11 in 1966) until Seaver came along-the next year.
Ribant (11-9) and Bob Shaw (11-10) in that ’66 season (the Mets 5th) were the first Mets starters with a .500 W-L% in 15+ decisions. The Mets shrewdly dealt Ribant with his perceived value up after that “big” ’66 season (114 ERA+), acquiring Don Cardwell from the Pirates. Cardwell provided 62 starts with a 106 ERA+ for the next 3 seasons,though he could only manage a 20-32 mark in that time.
Ribant had one 82 ERA+ season in Pittsburgh (the season he allowed no unearned runs), then finished out his career as a reliever with 4 different teams over 2 seasons. In all, Ribant pitched for 6 teams in a 6-year career of 149 games.
Very interesting post. One comment on your introductory remarks that included, ” pitchers who…can thank their defense for helping out with their wins”. While there’s certainly truth to this, good pitching and good defense are symbiotic. A pitcher, whose defense missed a play, can help them (and himself) out with a key K or GIDP. Every guy who makes an error hopes the team can get out of that inning without it costing a run(s), and they definitely appreciate a pitcher who can bear down (or appear to do so) to work out of the jam.
JDV: I agree entirely.
A seldom mentioned skill nowadays is the pick-off. In the 1950′s, Whitey Ford was so adept at picking runners off that they simply gave up trying to steal, or when they did try they were usually mowed down. Look at Ford’s steals vs. attempts: 19 vs 51 from 1950 through 1964 plus 60 picked runners. The 10 steals he gave up in 1965 and 1966 are due mostly to the fact that Elston Howard’s arm gave out and the word got around. Up till then Berra and Howard were good at nailing runners, yeah, but when Whitey was on the mound they were sensational. Why? Because the runners hesitated the nanosecond necessary to make sure the ball was going to the plate rather than first base.
My point, as usual, comes late: baseball isn’t about stats but about play and players, how they perform, especially under duress. A man gets on base? All right—what do you do about it?
I recall reading that in the deadball era, there was a pitcher whose pickoff move was so good (Nick Altrock? Doc White?) that sometimes he would deliberately walk a batter so that he could pick a runner off of first base.
I know this sounds like a “tall tale”, has anyone else read of this?
Checking B-R, pitcher’s pickoffs have been tracked only since 1948. I do not see them listed in the Pitching Leaderboards – does anyone know the career leader is?
Checking a few obvious suspects by trial and error: Warren Spahn 87 in the 4800+ innings we know about ( 2+ years prior to 1948 not covered), Nolan Ryan 66 in 5300+ innings, Whitey Ford 64 in 3100+ innings. No one else I could find had over 47. Per inning pitched, Ford is way ahead .0206 to .0181 for Spahn.
Spahn’s stolen base stats for those years: 77 vs 67 caught. In my post above I mistook caught stealing for attempts for Ford, so he was even more dominant: 19 steals, 51 caught, through 1964. To career’s end: 29 steals, 55 caught.
His move was phenomenal: I remember it even now after 50 years—only from the TV view, but that might have been better. You literally could not tell until he released the ball which way it was going.
Andy Pettite has 101 pickoffs. With 3083 IP his ratio is 0.0328.
RC:
Outstanding!
Never thought to look at Pettite.
Pettitte, darn it, Pettitte. Two sets of double T’s!
Just think of Double D’s, but with T’s. : -)
Seriously, Pettitte has an exceptional pickoff move, although I saw some data that he’s more middle of the pack on steal attempts. In other words, he doesn’t shut the running game down entirely as a few other pitchers do. Of course, that’s why he gets so many pickoffs. Runners think they can read his move, and like the moth to the flame, they get nailed.
For some reason I’m thinking Mark Buehrle rates very high in limiting steal attempts, which is a very different stat than pickoffs.
MikeD:
Actually, Burle—Joke?— looks like the real deal. To date, Mark Buehrle:
Pickoffs—86 in 2500+ innings. 50 stolen base allowed, 68 caught stealing.
In 2003 and 2007 only five steals attempted, and generally low every year.
All these guys are lefties, of course, and that’s an advantage, but, to go back to my original point @#15, they make the most of their talents to minimize the chances of the opposition in a way that is statistically hard to measure. How do you make an accounting of a stolen base that isn’t attempted, a runner who holds at second who would have gone to third if he wasn’t staying close? A broken hit-and-run, a putout at second on a bunt attempt, a double play that would have only been a forceout if the runner had gotten a better lead?
The last update?
Steve Carlton. Of course.
163 pickoffs in 5200+ innings. 314 SBs, 226 CS.
So more like Pettitte than Ford and Buehrle, in an era of many base-stealing attempts, meaning more foolish runners, I’d guess.
On equipment and field conditions contributing to errors:
One relevant “field condition” is that approximately 10 years ago (I don’t remember exactly when) protective fencing was installed in front of all MLB dugouts. This innovation has probably had the dual effect of reducing the number of infield errors and reducing their impact. In short, far fewer batters wind up on second base as a result of an infielder overthrowing first base. It seems to me that this one change might have had a substantial effect on the number of unearned runs scored.
Good thought, Brendan.
I heard on the YES telecast tonight that Oakland still doesn’t have railings in front of their dugouts, possibly because the dugouts are so far from the field it wouldn’t make a difference.
Regardless, though, that could be a way to test your theory.