John Hiller, ace reliever of the ’70s (part 2)
(Click here if you missed Part 1.)
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“Justify my WAR”
How can we reconcile John Hiller‘s high WAR value — 4th among career relievers, #2 on the 3-year and 6-year lists — with his 125 career saves, the fewest by far of the top 16 in reliever WAR? Saves don’t factor into WAR, of course, but there is a correlation for the top closers. Out of 9 RPs with 15+ WAR who can match his WAR-to-IP ratio, 8 had more than twice his saves.
Focusing on Hiller’s peak of 1973-78, we can see that he pitched very well, and often, averaging a 161 ERA+ and 114 innings. He was 5th in relief innings, and 1st in ERA+ among all pitchers with 400+ IP in that span. He averaged just over 2 IP per relief game, a close 2nd to Goose among the 66 guys with 200+ relief games, well ahead of Fingers (1.73) and Lyle (1.77).
But why does that 6-year span rate the second-best WAR ever by a reliever?
One word sums it up: Leverage. It doesn’t take a save chance to make a high-leverage situation. A tie game with men on base has far more leverage than starting the 9th clean with a 2- or 3-run lead.
Besides his workload and overall effectiveness, John Hiller had the highest average leverage index (aLI) of the 54 relievers with 300+ IP from 1973-78.
We’ll get to those details in a moment. But first, the circumstances that put Hiller on the spot so often.
Working without a net
Detroit from 1967-72 ran 1st or 2nd five times, ending with a division crown under Billy Martin. But their stable core had grown old together; by ’73 the lineup averaged 33, the rotation 32, and they faded fast. From 1973-78, the Tigers averaged 22 games behind (never less than 12), which kept Hiller out of the national spotlight in his peak years.
The talent drain hit the bullpen hardest. A thin rotation meant that anyone who had a good month in relief soon found himself starting.
So from 1973-78, Hiller was the Detroit bullpen — to a degree that’s hard to compass. In a nutshell:
- 2.37 ERA in 619 relief innings for Hiller, with 8.6 SO/9
- 3.87 ERA in all other Detroit relief innings, with 5.5 SO/9
- While Hiller averaged a 2.37 ERA in 103 relief innings, their #2 guy in relief IP each year averaged a 4.14 ERA in 74 IP.
- Just once did any bullpen mate reach 0.9 WAR — one solid season from Steve Foucault, 1977 (3.15 ERA, 74 IP, 1.8 WAR).
With no good setup man or second finisher, any tight spot was Hiller time.
In relief games with an aLI of 1.5 or higher — B-R’s standard for high leverage — Hiller amassed 58% of Detroit’s innings from 1973-78. That’s a greater percentage than the 3 contemporary HOFers over their best 6-year spans: Fingers 52% (1973-78), Gossage 47% (1975 and ’77-’81), and Sutter 45% (1977-82).
In games with very high leverage — an unofficial term I’ve coined for aLI 2.5 and up — Hiller took an amazing 78% of Detroit’s innings. Fingers had 59% of such innings in his best span, Sutter 55%, Gossage 49%.
Among all RPs from 1973-78, Hiller was #1 with 166 very-high-leverage innings, 11 more than #2 Fingers; just 3 others had 115+. He was #2 with 362 high-leverage innings (Fingers #1 with 399, Marshall #3 with 354, no others over 300). And he had the highest percentage of his total innings comprised by hi-lev IP — Hiller 47.2%, Fingers 45.2%, Marshall 43.1%, Lyle 42.8%.
The tighter the spot, the better he pitched
Here’s everyone with 200+ high-leverage innings from 1973-78 (games with aLI of 1.5 or higher), ranked by ERA in those innings. Hiller was #2 in both IP and ERA:
| Rk | Player | #Matching | W | L | SV | IP | H | ER | HR | BB | SO | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Rich Gossage | 136 | Ind. Games | 30 | 30 | .500 | 2.06 | 49 | 288.2 | 199 | 66 | 15 | 141 | 286 | 1.18 |
| 2 | John Hiller | 166 | Ind. Games | 40 | 36 | .526 | 2.41 | 65 | 362.1 | 292 | 97 | 23 | 188 | 348 | 1.32 |
| 3 | Sparky Lyle | 164 | Ind. Games | 34 | 28 | .548 | 2.46 | 63 | 296.2 | 273 | 81 | 12 | 105 | 166 | 1.27 |
| 4 | Dave LaRoche | 158 | Ind. Games | 20 | 24 | .455 | 2.72 | 61 | 241.2 | 193 | 73 | 12 | 136 | 202 | 1.36 |
| 5 | Steve Foucault | 131 | Ind. Games | 27 | 30 | .474 | 2.84 | 35 | 250.2 | 232 | 79 | 18 | 105 | 153 | 1.34 |
| 6 | Gary Lavelle | 147 | Ind. Games | 27 | 24 | .529 | 3.04 | 32 | 219.1 | 234 | 74 | 8 | 102 | 147 | 1.53 |
| 7 | Terry Forster | 105 | Ind. Games | 13 | 21 | .382 | 3.06 | 44 | 200.0 | 194 | 68 | 9 | 99 | 155 | 1.47 |
| 8 | Bill Campbell | 147 | Ind. Games | 33 | 28 | .541 | 3.22 | 49 | 288.1 | 270 | 103 | 18 | 143 | 194 | 1.43 |
| 9 | Charlie Hough | 124 | Ind. Games | 23 | 35 | .397 | 3.24 | 35 | 225.1 | 179 | 81 | 14 | 155 | 164 | 1.48 |
| 10 | Al Hrabosky | 184 | Ind. Games | 39 | 24 | .619 | 3.26 | 53 | 251.1 | 224 | 91 | 14 | 101 | 225 | 1.29 |
| 11 | Tug McGraw | 127 | Ind. Games | 27 | 32 | .458 | 3.42 | 32 | 234.1 | 210 | 89 | 13 | 107 | 138 | 1.35 |
| 12 | Rollie Fingers | 226 | Ind. Games | 44 | 45 | .494 | 3.43 | 97 | 399.0 | 394 | 152 | 22 | 126 | 329 | 1.30 |
| 13 | Pedro Borbon | 143 | Ind. Games | 26 | 21 | .553 | 3.47 | 30 | 210.1 | 245 | 81 | 13 | 66 | 71 | 1.48 |
| 14 | Randy Moffitt | 164 | Ind. Games | 22 | 29 | .431 | 3.49 | 51 | 227.0 | 232 | 88 | 17 | 89 | 140 | 1.41 |
| 15 | Mike Marshall | 179 | Ind. Games | 42 | 46 | .477 | 3.56 | 50 | 354.0 | 377 | 140 | 15 | 142 | 224 | 1.47 |
| 16 | Gene Garber | 142 | Ind. Games | 29 | 28 | .509 | 3.67 | 42 | 228.1 | 231 | 93 | 19 | 79 | 167 | 1.36 |
Hiller’s hi-lev ERA was 23% better than the aggregate of the other 15 guys on the list (2.41 vs. 3.12).
Now the leaders in very-high-leverage innings for 1973-78 (aLI 2.5+), ranked by ERA. Hiller is #1 in IP, #2 in ERA:
| Rk | Player | #Matching | W | L | SV | IP | H | ER | HR | BB | SO | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dave LaRoche | 89 | Ind. Games | 7 | 12 | .368 | 1.94 | 37 | 106.2 | 83 | 23 | 3 | 79 | 107 | 1.52 |
| 2 | John Hiller | 88 | Ind. Games | 20 | 18 | .526 | 2.01 | 38 | 165.2 | 136 | 37 | 8 | 105 | 148 | 1.45 |
| 3 | Rich Gossage | 60 | Ind. Games | 11 | 17 | .393 | 2.28 | 23 | 106.2 | 89 | 27 | 3 | 62 | 108 | 1.42 |
| 4 | Bill Campbell | 80 | Ind. Games | 17 | 16 | .515 | 2.85 | 28 | 142.1 | 136 | 45 | 5 | 84 | 87 | 1.55 |
| 5 | Steve Foucault | 63 | Ind. Games | 12 | 14 | .462 | 2.86 | 17 | 113.1 | 109 | 36 | 5 | 61 | 58 | 1.50 |
| 6 | Sparky Lyle | 91 | Ind. Games | 18 | 18 | .500 | 2.86 | 35 | 148.0 | 154 | 47 | 4 | 69 | 85 | 1.51 |
| 7 | Tug McGraw | 63 | Ind. Games | 7 | 20 | .259 | 3.31 | 18 | 100.2 | 109 | 37 | 4 | 62 | 53 | 1.70 |
| 8 | Tom Murphy | 68 | Ind. Games | 6 | 22 | .214 | 3.40 | 25 | 98.0 | 123 | 37 | 2 | 68 | 38 | 1.95 |
| 9 | Charlie Hough | 62 | Ind. Games | 12 | 19 | .387 | 3.44 | 16 | 96.2 | 88 | 37 | 2 | 79 | 62 | 1.73 |
| 10 | Darold Knowles | 82 | Ind. Games | 13 | 16 | .448 | 3.50 | 15 | 90.0 | 95 | 35 | 2 | 59 | 50 | 1.71 |
| 11 | Rollie Fingers | 107 | Ind. Games | 19 | 24 | .442 | 3.84 | 45 | 154.2 | 177 | 66 | 8 | 72 | 133 | 1.61 |
| 12 | Al Hrabosky | 88 | Ind. Games | 20 | 14 | .588 | 3.92 | 22 | 98.2 | 99 | 43 | 5 | 63 | 84 | 1.64 |
| 13 | Mike Marshall | 83 | Ind. Games | 12 | 25 | .324 | 4.56 | 27 | 134.1 | 173 | 68 | 3 | 71 | 87 | 1.82 |
In very-hi-lev innings, LaRoche, Hiller and Gossage were on a separate plane of ERA — and Hiller had 55% more such innings than both. His very-hi-lev ERA was 38% better than the aggregate of the other 12 on this list (2.01 vs. 3.24).
And that’s the biggest reason why Hiller was the runaway relief WAR leader for 1973-78, with only Gossage within 10 WAR.
Of course, that only shows his dominance for that 6-year peak, whereas others surely peaked at different times. OK, but he also dominated in reliever WAR for the ’70s in total: #1-Hiller, 26.5 WAR; #2-Gossage, 20.1; #3-Lyle, 17.0; #4-Fingers, 15.1. His ERA+ was #1 among the 58 RPs with 400 innings in the decade.
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A simpler measure
Since there is some controversy over how the WAR methods gauge relief work, let’s try a simpler measure of effectiveness: ERA+.
Closers often have better ERA+ than the old-time firemen, but they work fewer innings under less pressure. Hiller from 1973-78 logged 683 innings with a 161 ERA+. Dozens of relievers have topped 600 IP in a 6-year span, but how many did that with at least a 150 ERA+? Hiller is one of five:
- Wilhelm, 1960-65 through 1964-69 (best ERA+ of those spans was 182)
- Quisenberry, 1979-84 through 1982-87 (best ERA+ was 172)
- Hiller, 1970-76, 1972-77 and 1973-78 (best ERA+ was 165)
- Lyle, 1972-77 (160)
- Gossage, 1975-80 (150)
Suppose we knock the innings down to 450 (75 per year over 6 years) but raise the bar to 165 ERA+. That yields 10: Wilhelm, Goose, Sutter, Eck, Hiller, Quiz, Rivera, Keith Foulke, Jeff Montgomery and Tom Burgmeier.
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“Those ’70s Saves”
By current standards, Hiller’s 125 saves and 66% conversion rate seem piddling. Even with the big year, his 1973-78 peak averaged 17 saves. How quaint!
But the times were so different. There were just seven 30-save seasons in those 6 years. League leaders averaged 27 saves (outside of Hiller), with a low of 21. The average AL team had 28 saves, and many teams used tandems; 20% of all team-years from 1973-78 had two or more guys with 10+ saves. Just one guy had significantly more saves than Hiller in that span: #1-Fingers, 156; #2-Lyle, 106; #3-Marshall, 101; #4-Hiller, 100; #5-LaRoche, 89.
Cy Young Award voting shows that the save had not yet come to define the relief ace. The 22 relief seasons getting CYA votes in this span averaged 23 saves, 11 wins and 129 innings. Sparky Lyle won the CYA with 26 saves (5 behind the leader) and a modest 76% conversion rate — but he also had 13 wins, 137 IP and a 2.13 ERA. Mike Marshall won his CYA with just 21 saves, and he “blew” 12 chances — but he also had 15 wins, 208 IP and a 2.42 ERA. The six who got 1st-place votes averaged 26 saves and 13 wins. Others got CYA votes with save totals of 6, 9, 10, 12 and 13.
Since ace relievers weren’t defined by saves — nor was strategy devised to maximize both their save totals and success rates — what save chances they did get were much different than those of today, mooting any cross-era comparisons. And that’s especially true of Hiller:
They lasted longer — In half of his career blown saves (32/63), Hiller entered in the 7th inning or before, including 9 times in the 6th; just 13 of them began in the 9th or later. And when he blew the save, he usually stayed on a while. Hiller averaged 5.3 outs in saves (about the same as the top 10 in saves for the period), but 6.4 outs in blown saves (0.7 more). Last year’s MLB rates were exactly 3 outs in saves, and 2.4 outs in blown saves.
They usually began with someone on base — Hiller inherited 1 or more runners in 69% of his save chances, 2 or more runners in 43%(!) and bases full in 8%, averaging 1.2 inherited runners. Just 23% of last year’s save chances inherited any runners; they averaged 0.4 inherited runners overall, and less than 0.3 for the 20-save men.
And this I had to triple-check before I could believe it. In actual saves:
- Average inherited runners — 1.2 for Hiller / 0.26 for all saves in 2012
- 1 or more runners — 69% for Hiller, 15% for all saves in 2012
- 2 or more runners — 45% for Hiller, 9% for all saves in 2012
- Bases loaded — 8% for Hiller, 2% for all saves in 2012
- Average aLI — 2.38 for Hiller, 1.94 for all saves in 2012
- Average WPA — 0.20 for Hiller, 0.10 for all saves in 2012
Blown saves weren’t all disastrous — 29% of Hiller’s blown saves scored positive on the WPA scale, either because the situation was so stacked against him that holding the lead was unlikely to begin with, or because he pitched on after losing the lead. Last year, just 5% of blown saves scored positive WPA.
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Could he have been a stud closer?
Lots of guys have one big year in saves. Jeff Brantley, Antonio Alfonseca, Derek Lowe, Jose Jimenez, Mike Williams and others had one year of 40+ saves and no more of 30+. Could Hiller have kept it up after ’73, if he’d been used that way?
I can’t see what would have stopped him. His career relief ERA was 2.76, but 2.23 in save tries; that works in any era. What does a good closer need? Cool under pressure. A strikeout pitch. No platoon weakness. Can work back-to-back days. Check, check, check, and mate.
Pressure? Few in the ’70s were better in the clutch. Among all pitchers in the decade with at least 250 IP in these situations, Hiller’s OPS ranked 10th with men in scoring position (1st among relievers), and 12th in high-leverage spots (6th among RPs).
You want strikeouts? From 1973-78, Hiller led all relievers in strikeouts, SO/9 and SO%, his SO% a whopping 81% above the AL average. Compare to Jonathan Papelbon, the whiff leader among the top closers for the last 6 years: his SO% was 71% above his leagues’ average. For the ’70s in total, Hiller’s SO/9 was 5th of 236 pitchers with 500+ innings, well ahead of Gossage and Fingers. His SO% was 62% above the AL average, his SO/9 was 3 full Ks above (8.02-5.02). Plenty of firepower, no matter how you slice it.
Platoon balance? His splits were almost identical, and both excellent — .229/.228 BA, .651/.646 OPS. Among the 63 southpaws in his contemporary group, Hiller ranked 5th in OPS vs. RHBs.
Back-to-back? Hiller didn’t do that as much as Marshall, Fingers or Campbell, partly because of his longer stints. But he did it often enough, and with better results than those “Everyday Eddies”. Out of 46 pitchers with 40+ relief games on zero rest from 1973-78, Hiller ranked 6th in ERA (2.08) and 8th in OPS (.627) in those games.
In his career, Hiller pitched on no rest 89 times, 147 innings, 146 Ks, 2.20 ERA, covering 15% of his relief innings. Modern closers get about 25% of their innings on no rest, but then, they’re usually coming off a shorter stint than Hiller was. Here’s the top 150 in no-rest innings since 1946; Hiller’s 9th in ERA.
A sampling of his short-rest feats:
- A rare case of “closer” usage: 8 saves in 8 days, no runs, stranded all 9 inherited. (1973-6-26 to 7-3) He had saves in 10 straight appearances, still a Detroit record.
- 3-inning saves on consecutive days, the second one high-leverage. (1974-4-27 to 28)
- 3 straight days, 27 batters, all high-leverage, stranded all 6 inherited. (1975-5-17 to 19)
- 3 games in 2 days, 35 batters. Faced 17 for a win, sidestepping 2-on/1-out to preserve a tie. The next day, 5 outs to close the first game of a doubleheader. Wouldn’t you know, he was needed in the nightcap, facing the tying run in the 7th and 13 batters overall for the save. (1976-7-24 to 25)
- 31 batters over 2 days. First he entered with 1 out in the 7th, a man on 2nd and a 1-run deficit. He throttled that threat, then put up 6 more zeroes, facing 23 batters in a no-decision worth 0.700 WPA. (Detroit won in the 16th.) The next day, he was summoned for a 2-inning save, facing 8 batters. (1978-5-16 to 17)
- 21 batters over 2 days. Tied in the 7th, bags juiced, 1 out? Cue the lefty! Two Ks killed that rally, and 3 more scoreless innings got him the win, escaping his own bags-full, 1-out jam in the 10th. Worked 7 batters the next day for another win. (1978-9-22 to 23)
- 4 straight days, 27 batters, 1 unearned run, stranded both inherited. (1973-9-1 to 4)
- 3 straight days, 27 batters. Faced 18 for a win, then 4 and 5 batters for saves the next 2 days. (1975-4-26 to 28)
- 3 games in 2 days, 19 batters. Faced 14 in a doubleheader, winning both (Eduardo Rodriguez lost both on walk-offs, a wild pitch and then a HR). Faced 5 batters the next day, stranding 2 inherited to hold a 1-run lead. (1976-6-1 to 2)
- 3 straight days, 16 batters, no runs, stranded all 5 inherited. The first 2 games were mega-leverage, each preserving a 1-run lead in the 8th with 2 aboard — 3rd-and-2nd with 1 out, then 2nd-and-1st with no outs. The 3rd game was, I dunno, just “getting in some work” in the season finale, nailing the last 2 outs with a man aboard in a 2-run loss. (1978-9-29 to 10-1)
- On 2 days’ rest after a 1-hit shutout, he relieved and went another 9 scoreless innings. With 1 day’s rest, he came on to strand the bases loaded with a strikeout in a 1-run game. Another rest day, then he pitched 8.1 innings, losing 2-1 on an unearned run let in by a reliever in the home 9th. All this in a late-August pennant race. (1968-8-20 to 27)
I counted 18 times that Hiller had 2+ IP on consecutive days, with several back-to-backs of 3+ innings. When’s the last time someone went 3+ two days in a row? Nobody did it last year. Thirty-four times he went 2+ IP after pitching the day before, and 10 times he went 3+.
I think he would been a terrific closer. But I’m glad he wasn’t.
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* END OF PART 2 *
You deserve a medal for making it this far, even if you just skimmed. Still to come: The loneliness of the long-distance closer; how Hiller was passed over for All-Star recognition; and various odds & ends.
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Fantastic work John. You argue your case for greatness so well I’m sure you could convince me that Armando Benitez is a first-ballot Hall of Famer.
Thanks, RJ. If there were no such thing as leverage, Armando’s first 2 years with the Mets would rank among the all-time greatest.
But there is … and they don’t.
John, this is great. I’ve long felt Hiller is the most underrated reliever in the history of the game and you’re uncovering more than I found when coming to that conclusion.
Just for fun, here are some reliever by Hall Rating:
126 Mariano Rivera
122 Dennis Eckersley*
107 Hoyt Wilhelm
89 Rich Gossage
69 Tom Gordon*
66 Bobby Shantz*
65 John Hiller
65 Billy Wagner
63 Trevor Hoffman
62 Ellis Kinder*
62 Lee Smith
57 Dan Quisenberry
56 Stu Miller
56 Lindy McDaniel
55 Kent Tekulve
54 Bruce Sutter
54 Firpo Marberry*
54 Joe Nathan
53 Don McMahon
53 Jesse Orosco
52 Rollie Fingers
52 Tom Henke
52 John Franco
50 Keith Foulke
50 Doug Jones
* Started a significant number of games
There is a clear line after Gossage, so that’s typically where I draw my Hall of Fame line. But Hiller just might be the best reliever outside of the Hall of Fame. He, Smith, Wagner, and Hoffman will compete for that title. I like Quiz and Sutter, but not as Hall of Famers. Great peaks. Just didn’t last long enough for the Hall. It’s crazy that one’s in and one’s not.
Adam, thanks. I did draw some courage from his Hall rating … but I also agree with the clear line after Goose.
FWIW, I don’t think of those asterisked guys as relievers. Eck logged 75% of his innings in starts; Marberry 65%; Shantz 64%; Gordon 60%; and Kinder 59%. Hiller wasn’t bad in that role, but only 22% of his IP came in starts.
I know you know this, I’m just stating it for the record.
Lets keep in mind the post season resume’s of some of those relief pitchers. Gossage had quite a post season career. People remember the ’78 WS with Gossage (3G, 6IP, 1H, 0R) and his post season ERA of 2.87 is slightly below career average in a significant 31.1 IP. Eck was similar with 3.00 ERA in 36 IP though I’m sure the 88 and 90 world series skew people’s memories. Anyway, those are plus value that you don’t have with Hiller.
Obviously MO’s ranking there with no post season accounted for is insulting, but sufficient.
Mariano’s postseason record is unequaled.
It is ironic, though, that the one WS game 7 that he ever pitched in turned into his most glaring failure.
Out of 25 times that he appeared in a postseason series finale (6 of them WS), that’s the only one where he didn’t register positive WPA. But the negative WPA of that one game surpasses the total WPA of his other 6 WS finales.
Which I guess shows that we shouldn’t be looking to cumulative WPA as a useful measure of much. After all, as bad as someone might be in a single game, the most they cost their team is just that one game.
Just wondering aloud here, but maybe the ratio of #games with positive WPA to #games with negative WPA might be a particularly good way of looking at reliever effectiveness. This nullifies the fact that most good relief performances don’t actually rank that highly on the WPA scale, whereas most bad ones score catastrophically.
RJ, I’ll respectfully disagree with you on the value of cumulative WPA. Unless all you meant is that we shouldn’t draw conclusions from a 7-game sample like Mo’s World Series finales.
It just so happens that the other 6 of those didn’t have much leverage — none of them involved a 1-run lead in the 9th.
But if we look at his 96 postseason games (!) totaling 141 IP, that’s roughly 2 years’ work for a modern closer. The cumulative WPA is 11.71, which is more than twice the best reliever season in the last 5 years.
So I think WPA does a nice job of capturing Mo’s postseason impact, as long as you look at a significant sample.
Respectfully disagree away John! I don’t expect my musings in the shower to hold up to much scrutiny. To be honest I’ve never looked too deeply into WPA, but it does seem the relievers at the top of the leaderboards each year correspond to what we would expect – Clippard 2011, Bell 2010, K-Rod 2006, Nathan 2004, Gagne 2003 etc. But these guys basically never made mistakes. Would a couple more disaster games not wipe out a disproportionate amount of that player’s WPA, in the same way that a starting pitcher’s ERA can become hugely inflated by one disaster start?
Here’s a little curio I found: of all the previous WPA leaders in the NL, only the last four are active, and one of those only pitched thrice last year. I can’t imagine there are many other stats with so few previous leaders still active.
Just to fan the flames a little, in a recent post Bob Turley’s 1958 CYA season came up for discussion, and I took a look at his game log. I remembered how he and Whitey were almost unbeatable for the first half—Bullet Bob started with a pair of shutouts—but the thing I noticed that’s relevant here is this: going into his last start out of 31 with over 240 IP his ERA was 2.75. In the last start he was bombed for 7 ER in 3 innings and finished at 2.97, which dropped him to 6th in the league. If he hadn’t pitched that game he would have ranked 3rd, close behind Billy Pierce’s 2.68.
So one bad outing can, I think, color the retrospective picture in darker tones than it actually was in the flesh. Similarly, one great outing, like a perfect game in the WS, for example, can artificially brighten the portrait of an otherwise dull career.
I always find it amusing when the acronym CYA is used for Cy Young Award. In my workaday life at the intersection of government/business/law/technology, CYA is a common acronym for something else entirely.
nsb — I hope Turley thanked Mickey & pals for getting him off the losing hook in that finale! Could’ve made the difference in a very tight CYA race.
In terms of ERA, there’s always more to lose than to gain from any given start. A 9-IP shutout there would have trimmed Turley’s ERA by less than 0.07.
P.S. It’s funny how 2 of the first 4 CYA’s were won by the MLB leader in walks (Turley, then Wynn). That hasn’t since then, I’m pretty sure.
#47/birtelcom -
SO “CYA” means:
- Cover Your Assets
or
- Change Your Attitude
or
- Cover Your Answer(s)
or
- Call Your Attorney
or
- Challenge Your Assumptions
or
- Catch You Afterwards
or
- Cover Your Assets
??????????????????????
Yeah, I do know what you are actually referring to.
#1 – I want my medal.
#2 – The thing that shocks me is that, neutralizing his W-L record, I get a record of 88-50 (+38). MUCH better than his actual record, but still just not that many decisions (in other words, “innings”). Rollie Fingers neutral W-L record is 112-77 (+35). Trevor Hoffman’s is 80-31 (+49). Lee Smith, 98-55 (+43). Basically, all of these guys are right there with him or better in games above .500, which is interesting because I don’t think that people would have guessed that about Hiller. But looking at those records… well, it just makes me question relievers in the Hall of Fame at all.
Doc D — I’ll see if I can find my old Croix de Candlestick for you.
I’m not sure what method you’ve used for those neutralized W-L records — it doesn’t seem to be the B-R “neutralized pitching” method. Anyway, I note that, by your figures, Hiller’s W% is .638, about the same as Smith, way above Fingers.
I do it with a Pythagorean record, using an average offense and the inverse of the pitcher’s ERA+ (in other words, 100/ERA+). Such that 100^2/(100^2+(100/ERA+)^2)=W%, and IP/9=Decisions. It works pretty amazingly, I think.
Tigers fans always knew Hiller was a good one.
I am wondering where another early multiple innings reliever is on these lists. I watched redsox gmes in the early 60′s ‘The Monster’ Dick Radatz. for 3 years he seemed unhittable.
Ron — Yeah, Radatz was unhittable for 3 years, and immensely valuable — totaling 17.0 WAR, #1 in reliever WAR for a 3-year span.
Sadly, that was it for Monsieur Monster. He pitched 4 more years, compiling -1.5 WAR, a 4.54 ERA and 81 ERA+.
That 17.0 mark for Radatz 1962-64 is tenth all-time in WAR for both starters and relievers for their first three years in the league. The next-highest ranked reliever on the list? Bruce Sutter at #91.
For his first three years Radatz accumulated a WAR of 17.0, the highest ever for a relief pitcher. That three year total is also the highest for any three consecutive years of any relief pitcher. Gossage is second with 16.6 and Hiller is third with 14.8.
JA:
I read this part 2 before I read part 1 so I was unaware that you already had a list of the the top WAR for a three year period. My results were slightly different from yours because I used an 80% cut-off, not 90%. Besides I already posted that data last Sept. 18 so I should have known the answer about the mystery pitcher right away.
Richard — I did put Gossage on the 3-year list, but I deducted the 2.6 WAR he had as a full-time SP in 1976 — i.e., I listed him with 14.0 WAR for 1975/77.
It’s hard to find a “one-size-fits-all” definition of “reliever” over a short span of years. I felt that the 80% standard was too liberal for that purpose, as it would let in guys who actually had the majority of their innings as starters in a given span.
What I did was run the searches twice, once at 80% and again at 90%. Then I looked at the specific years of each pitcher who met the 80% but not the 90% standard, to assess how much of their total WAR for a span came from time as a regular SP. Of those guys, Gossage was the only one whose relief WAR alone qualified him for the leaderboard, so I put him in.
BTW I just discovered that you have already written an article about Hiller on 2/12/2012. It was mentioned there that Hiller holds the record for most decisions by a relief pitcher with 31 in 1974. I don’t know if you mentioned that in these two recent blogs.
Hmm … apparently I mean to make it annual feature?
Thanks for reminding me, Richard. I guess I’d better switch to the Alzheimer’s-prevention diet.
BTW, I did not revisit this time his record of 31 relief decisions, since “decisions” are not all good things. I did mention his 17 relief wins in ’74, which is #2 all-time — Roy Face had 18 in ’59, and Bill Campbell had 17 in ’76. Four guys have had exactly 16 relief wins.
The season high in relief wins in the ’80s was 14 (last by McDowell & Eichhorn in ’86).
The most since then is 12, last by Jesse Crain in 2005. Clippard had 11 in 2010.
JA, Another thing that I think came up in your 2/12/12 article but not here on 3/13/13 is the background explanation for Hiller’s exceptional profile that we all knew well in the early ’70s (whether it was the real explanation or not): the attitude he took to high pressure pitching after he recovered from his heart attack (mentioned by Max@8). I know you’re familiar with this, since you were growing up in Detroit at the time.
When I was in college, we had a poker game, and one member was different from the rest: he had some money. While everyone else was playing to win and fearful of losing, he played for the society. He never lost money, ever – not even once; sometimes he seemed to lose hands on purpose just to avoid winning a disturbing amount. He finally quit the game because, he said, it was unfair and no fun. He’d been an ordinary player back home, where everyone had some money, and it was clear he was winning because he was free of the distraction of feeling the outcome was paticularly crucial. From his perspective, the game was serious but the stakes really were not. I thought of that all the time a few years later when Hiller would attribute his success under pressure to the tremendous edge that the perspective of near-death had given him on what was at stake in a baseball game.
I don’t think this is a universal truth about people who survive near-fatal encounters, but I think it was true for Hiller, and adds a level of meaning to the exquisite case for his greatness that you’ve built here.
So John, I guess we can expect another Hiller article on 4/14/14.
Richard @40 — What I’d really like to know is, how did I drop the ball on 1/11/11?
Richard – That three year peak for Gossage includes one year in which he started 29 times and only relieved twice. So I wouldn’t really classify that as “three consecutive years of any relief pitcher”.
Amazingly, his 1971 heart attack doesn’t seem to have negatively impacted his durability or his career development (although it does seem to have ended the experiments with him starting). A truly great player… not a Hall of Famer, but really excellent.
Was looking for seasons since 1961 where a relief pitcher (80% relief games, 50+ IP) had very-high aLI. Not surprisingly, very few. But surprising that all have been since 1991, and mostly with the Angels and Mets.
Generated 3/13/2013.
Tom Burgmeier’s 167 era+ over six years were the last six years of his career.
In his eleven previous years his number was 99.
The ’82 BoSox had one of the deepest bullpens ever assembled:
- Burgmeier, 190 ERA+ in 102 IP
- Bob Stanley, 140 ERA+ in 168 IP
- Mark Clear, 145 ERA+ in 105 IP
- Luis Aponte, 137 ERA+ in 85 IP
They’re one of 6 teams with three 100-IP, no-start pitchers. Also one of 5 teams with four 80-IP, no-start pitchers.
Stanley had one of the most distinctive relief years ever: just 48 games, but 168.1 IP, an average of 3.5 IP/game. No pure reliever has come within a million miles of that average — none with 40+ games has averaged even 2.6 IP/G.
Just 3 guys with 40+ games averaged 2.5 IP/G. One was Burgmeier that same year. Another was Hiller ’74. The other was wartime replacement Jittery Joe Berry in 1945.
Those ’82 BoSox had 81 relief outings lasting 3+ IP, which is the all-time record. And while that’s usually a sign of a bad team, those Sox won 89 games and were in the race in September.
I just looked at Stanley’s game log from that 1982 season. He saved 14 games and 11 of them were 3 innings or more! None were one inning or less. He also won 14 games, one by pitching 8.1 innings in relief and another pitching 7.2 innings in relief.
Good stuff there, Chris.
Bob Stanley is one of 3 pitchers to have an 8-inning relief game in the midst of a 30-save season.
The others are Hiller and Marshall. Naturally.
Hiller and Marshall are relievers, but wasn´t Naturally a first baseman?
Well quipped, Luis!
By the way, Watt‘s a reliever, too. But guess where he played for 1 game in the minors….
Watt hit .304 with 2 HRs as a rookie. Could he have played a position for real? I DON’T KNOW!
David Schoenfield’s SweetSpot blog today has a short piece on Gossage vs. Mariano (picking up on something by JoePos).
Out of curiosity, I ran Gossage’s relief stats through 1985 — the point at which he had almost exactly the same relief innings as Mariano has now (1,165 and 1,170). It also happens to be the Goose’s last good year; his remaining 9 seasons averaged 0.3 WAR and never above 1.
Some points of comparison on their regular-season numbers:
ERA — Gossage 2.43, Mariano 2.05
Innings per game — Gossage 1.81, Mariano 1.12
Pct. of total innings from games of 1 IP or less — Gossage 16%, Mariano 65%
High-leverage games — Gossage 2.15 ERA in 686 IP; Mariano 2.93 ERA in 615 IP
Very-hi-lev (aLI 2.5+) — Gossage 2.45 ERA in 272 IP; Mariano 3.34 ERA in 334 IP
Inherited runners — Gossage 601 total, stranded 68%; Mariano 352 total, stranded 71%
I’m not trying to prove anything one way or another. My conclusion would be the same as David’s — it’s very hard to compare relief stars of different eras.
Actually, all this Goose vs. Mo stuff came not from Joe P but from Gossage running his mouth again about how he had to pitch 2-3 innings and Mo only has to pitch 1.
http://www.newsday.com/sports/baseball/yankees/goose-gossage-thinks-mariano-rivera-is-a-great-guy-but-greatest-of-all-time-1.4785507
JA, why not include Gossage’s down years also? Aren’t they part of the picture as well?
bstar — I find the Goose’s self-promotion unseemly, yet I think he makes some valid points.
As to why I cut him off at 1985, I said it up front — that’s when he had as many relief innings as Mo has now. Suppose Mo were to change his mind and pitch another 10 seasons at barely above replacement level — would that change anything about how we assess him against the other great relievers?
I think we expect the industry to tell a player when his time is up. That didn’t happen with Gossage, partly because of his fame and partly because bullpens were expanding rapidly at the very moment he started just “hanging on”. I don’t think those years really mean anything in assessing his greatness.
John – How the heck did you get those stats for Gossage???
You can get at least some of them from the PI, Player Specific Tools (type in Rich Gossage), click on Pitching Game Finder, click on Go To Page, click on Most Matching Games in Multiple Years, set years from 1972 to 1985, click on reliever, click on Get Report.
Ed — Richard correctly said how I gathered almost all the data, i.e., P-I Pitching Game Finder.
For the “high-leverage” and “very-hi-leverage”, I set a criterion of “aLI equal or greater than 1.5″ and “…2.5″, respectively.
For the IP/G and “Pct. of games from 1-IP…” figures, I collected the relevant numbers and then used a calculator.
Inherited runners came from the player pages, “More Stats” link, scroll down to Reliever Pitching.
The Mariano stat that gets me more than anything is the 44 OPS+ for hitters against him (that’s regular season — it would be lower if post-season were included). 44! That’s hitting that’s worse than Moe Berg’s, worse than Hal Lanier’s, it’s about the level of Warren Spahn as a hitter. Yeah, I know Mariano had the great advantage of facing batters only once a game and with the knowledge that he could go all out for one innning with his cutter. But still, the OPS+ for AL hitters facing relief pitchers for the first time in games in 2012 was about 90 or so, compared to that 44 for Mariano’s career. To me that’s an uncanny number — until of course you look at how he was even substantially better than that with his 527 batters faced in the post-season. There’s no OPS+ for the post-season, but we know Mariano’s OPS against in the regular season has been .552 and has been .439 in the post-season, so you can just imagine the OPS+ that would be associated with that.
We could take a reasonable stab at it, b-com, by looking at the greatest reliever seasons of the one-inning-at-a-time era and get a reasonable estimate of what Mo’s postseason OPS+ against might be. Here’s some of those seasons:
Kimbrel 2012 1! OPS+ against / .358 OPS
E Gagne 2003 4 OPS+ against / .374 OPS
MRivera 2008 10 OPS+ against / .423 OPS
BWagner 1999 10 OPS+ against / .420 OPS
Eckersley 1990 13 OPS+ against / .397 OPS
Here’s the two seasons that are closest to Mo’s postseason OPS against:
Eckersley 1989 22 OPS+ against / .432 OPS
BJ Ryan 2006 17 OPS+ against / .444 OPS
The fact that we have to use 1989 instead of steroid-era numbers might be a problem. Also, Mo was facing better teams on average than in the postseason, which makes this estimation even tougher.
I’d guess Mo’s postseason OPS+ against “might” be between 10-20.
FWIW, here’s the career leaderboard for OPS+, given 499+ IP (Papelbon is at 499.1):
1. Mariano Rivera 44
2. Billy Wagner 49
3. J Papelbon 52
4. Troy Percival 58
5. Rafael Soriano 62
Kimbrel’s career OPS+ against is 25, but he’s only 160 innings into his career.
JA, those years may not much to do with Gossage’s greatness and how he’s remembered, but they are certainly relevant if we are going to try and compare him to Mo.
One of the huge differences between the two pitchers is that Mo has never declined. Not including those years doesn’t allow us to see that, but I understand better the qualification you used before showing your numbers.
bstar, I hear you. Mo has few greater admirers outside of Yankee Universe than I. His consistency, through age 41, is truly remarkable. And since this year is his last, he obviously won’t have much decline phase, if any.
But we’ll never know how long he could have borne a workload of 100-130 IP per year, like the first wave of closers.
It has to be a little easier to stay healthy and productive when throwing 70-90 IP per year (including postseason), right? Mo has pitched 100 innings just once, way back in 1996.
That’s why I don’t hold the Goose’s decline phase against him. If he had retired after, say, his first bad year, 1986 — his last year as the #1 guy on the team — he’d have cost himself about 3 WAR but would have saved 0.14 on his ERA and 5 points on ERA+. And his place in the popular memory wouldn’t have been diminished at all.
Ultimately, I do rank Mo ahead of Gossage, because of his ERA+ and his longevity, and his incredible postseason stats. And I’m glad I got to see Gossage used in the way he was used. But it would be very interesting to see their careers played out with the roles reversed.
Comparing Mo to Gossage may be akin to trying to compare a Cobb to a Ruth; different eras, different expectations about what was expected of them, both great. To use an artistic analogy, Gossage is a giant canvas, like Washington Crossing the Delaware, a little clumsy in some spots, a little cruder, but big look, big impact. Rivera is a nearly perfect small Vermeer.
It’s not so much “not holding Goose’s decline against him” as it is ignoring Mo’s lack of decline.
You’re suggesting that one-inning guys are less likely to decline than the ’70s guys. Tom Henke hung it up after his age 37 season. Joe Nathan is finally starting to fade. Robb Nen succumbed to injury after age 32. Lee Smith never posted an ERA under 3.00 after age 33. John Franco wasn’t the same post-age 35. It’s happened to everyone but Mo and Billy Wagner (Wags voluntarily hung it up after a stellar age-38 season). Trevor Hoffman gets a nod here as well.
One thing to consider is that even though they’re often throwing only one inning at a time, today’s closers are reaching back with everything they’ve got for every pitch. The ’70s guys couldn’t do that if they knew they were going to pitch three innings, so I disagree. I think the wear and tear on the arm is about the same.
Can you do that for their postseasons, or career including postseason?
Goof — Gossage’s postseason sample — 19 games, 31 IP — doesn’t seem big enough to make any meaningful comparisons. But here goes:
ERA — Gossage 2.87, Mariano 0.70 (141 IP)
IP per game — Gossage 1.65, Mariano 1.47
Pct. of total IP from games of 1 IP or less — Gossage 20%, Mariano 25%
High-leverage games — Gossage 3.95 ERA in 14.2 IP, Mariano 0.26 ERA in 70.1 IP (that’s 2 ER and an 0.87 WHIP)
Very-hi-lev (aLI 2.5+) — 0.00 ERA in 1 IP, Mariano 0.81 ERA in 22.1 IP
Inherited runners — Gossage 10 total, stranded 70%; Mariano 53 total, stranded 81%
It’s no secret that (a) Mo has been used more aggressively in the postseason and (b) he’s been incredible — e.g., 2 HRs in 141 IP.
This stuff says that Mo’s been the greatest postseason reliever in history, by miles and miles. But to me, it doesn’t really say anything about Mo vs. Goose.
It’s equally easy to say he’s been the greatest post season pitcher in history, reliever OR starter.
John:
Two things:
I saw Gossage pitch for the ’77 Pirates at Veterans Stadium and he looked unhittable (imagine Nolan Ryan pre-6th inning). He threw hard and was intimidating with a big windup. He had talent and ability – and lots of it. Certainly more “initimidating” than Rivera….and, he had wondeful things to say about Dick Allen when he was inducted into the HoF (“the greatest player I ever played with”)….sorry, Reggie, Wilver Dornel, etc…
Unfortunately, if you didn’t live in an AL city or watch the Tigers on local TV in Detroit (God bless Joe Falls), someone couldn’t say the same thing about Hiller. I may have seen him pitch in the ALCS in 1972, however, I can’t recall. If you tell me he looked the part, I’ll “believe” WAR, etc…
On a 3rd note, with national games of the week on ESPN and MLB 3 or 5 times a week, we surely don’t need interleagueplay (IMJO).
Worthy points, Paul. I certainly don’t remember Hiller looking the part of an intimidator.
Today’s media saturation raises an interesting angle on Hiller’s comeback from a 1971 heart attack that kept him out for 1.5 years, reaching in ’73 a performance that no one would have predicted even before the crisis.
Imagine the attention that story would get today. I think of Josh Hamilton, but with some differences:
1. We tend to be more captivated by those like Hamilton who had it all, blew it all, but then made it back to the top. But Hiller’s path is even more unusual, I think: pretty good but nondescript swingman suddenly becomes the best fireman around.
And his amazing ’73 season did happen mostly in the heat of a pennant race — the defending division champs were alone in 1st place as late as August 14, coming out of the All-Star break with a 17-4 burst to rise from 4th place, and Hiller was dominant right along the way.
2. It’s an odd thing: In our reaction to guys who contribute to their own downfall, there is more sympathy for an illegal-drug addict like Hamilton than for someone like Hiller, who was overweight and smoking 2 packs a day when felled by the heart attack.
I’m not sure why that is, but I’d guess that since Hiller’s unhealthy habits are ones that millions struggle with, our sympathy is muted by guilt we feel from not mastering those things in ourselves.
Hamilton’s addictions, and the down-and-out life that resulted, seem more exotic to most of us. A romantic “outlaw” cachet may even attach to a Hamilton story that is simply not available for a fat smoker.
I really don’t think there’s a quantum difference between addiction to cigarettes and addition to cocaine, either psychologically or physiologically. But today’s society finds it easier to forgive the crack smoker than the Marlboro smoker.
Even so, I think Hiller’s story would have gotten a thousand times more attention had it happened 30 years later.
Great job, JA. I think after almost a half century of reliever usage (though with great changes in those roles over that time as well) we can see whom was a dominant and valuable reliever in their era and whom is a cut below. I think about two to three relievers per “generation” isn’t unreasonable and in my mind Hiller is one that should be enshrined.
What I really hope is that Kimbrel’s amazing dominance leads back to a relief ace role (like Hiller) instead of this inefficient get the last three outs nonsense. I am not that hopeful, though.
It WILL happen, someday. We might just have to wait a generation for the old guard to quit managing.
I’m surprised someone like Joe Maddon hasn’t tried this. I think reliever usage in baseball has a good counterpart in football – when to punt on 4th down. The tides are changing there; (e.g. the HS coach who didn’t punt all year, Rocky Long at SDSU doesn’t punt inside midfield), and baseball will catch up eventually. It just makes too much sense- you’ve got to at least try use your best reliever in the biggest spot, whether that’s inning 7, 9, or 14.
Pete Rose will turn 72 next month. Old number 14 was born 4-14-41. Pete pretty much is a pile. He’s not lived a very honest and decent life, nonetheless he’s reached an age many a generation before his would have happily been satisfied reaching. A great man like Lou Gehrig gets taken away early and Pete lives in Las Vegas with an oriental gal with giant melon boobs. Makes me sure more than ever about the existence of God.
We seem to idolize the competitive fire that fuels athletic greatness but then stick up our nose at the other completely obvious side effects. People with that kind of attitude don’t think the rules apply to them. They have to or how else would they try to jump higher, run faster, last longer, or train harder than they are told is possible? It’s a social deficiency to lock yourself in a hitting cage all winter year in and year out through your childhood. The developmental impacts of that will last a lifetime. Baseball as a profession is also a difficult introduction into the world the rest of us live in. Michael Jordan’s will to win was obvious to see and did not go away when he left the basketball court. Put him at a card table and he still thinks he’s the greatest player to ever live.
I look at Rose and say more shame on us.
Using an analogy to another sport, it’s similar to the contradiction of when writers praise successful football players for their competitive spirit, then act all outraged when some of them – OMG – commit violent acts in real life.
What’s so hard to understand? You’re encouraging large strong young men to engage in a series of violent hits and collisions – then you are SURPRISED when they cannot turn off their ingrained sports instincts when they are off the playing field? The disconnect here is monumental.
I’m not saying this gives athletes any justification to breakthe law, but it should come as no surprise when a few of them can’t turn off their instincts when they leave the field of play.
I love your take on Jordan. In my mind there is nothing as stupid as a degenerate gambler. Although I’ve struggled with vices myself, gambling’s never been one. That long drive home from a casino after dropping a lot of cash must be the worst. In Rose’s case, when he was betting on baseball, he actually had some inside information. If he would have known what he was doing and showed some discipline, he wouldn’t have been gambling, he would have had an edge.
Getting back to Jordan, I don’t understand the thrill you get knowing the house has a built in 6 percent advantage. Year after year of heavy loses. I don’t think it’s a coincidence a degenerate gambler will go down in history as the worst executive in the history of sports in North America.
I’ll be shocked if Jordan ends up worse than Elgin Baylor in his time overseeing the LA Clippers. The Clippers were 607-1153 during Baylor’s 22-year reign of terror, including one postseason series win.
I think Jordan’s gonna have to get up pretty early in the morning every day to match that futility.
Yeah but Baylor was set up by Sterling, he wanted to lose.
John A – Not sure if you’re aware of this, but the great Tom Tango gave you a “shout out” for your Hiller posts:
http://tangotiger.com/index.php/site/comments/john-hiller-the-reliever-that-time-forgot…-but-not-leverage-index#comments
Thanks, Ed! I did not know that.
And now I’m re-energized to complete volumes 3 through 7.
“The Decline and Fall of the Multi-Inning Reliever” by Edward Gibbon John Autin.
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