I made a woodcut T206 Honus Wagner replica. I’m considering making a limited number of these available. Interested? What do you think is a fair price? This is a single solid piece of wood, stained and then cut to make the reveal.
Sorry for the site outage. I don’t know the cause but our ISP has fixed things.
Going forward, we are going to change some things here. Within the week, I will be changing to a new streamlined theme that will eliminate ads and other bells and whistles that slow things down.
Without ads, the site will no longer pay for itself. If someone has a good no-cost hosting option, please let me know. Otherwise, I’ll have to revisit options down the road to cover costs.
In the next several months, I will be adding new writers to the site. These will be different voices than we’ve heard from in the past and should lead to some new interesting conversations.
Sorry again and thanks for your patience.
I am about to change over the website to a new theme that will run substantially faster and resolve some of the bugs that folks have been seeing. I will be getting rid of advertisements and also using fewer plugins.
Please bear with me on Monday evening as I get these changes in place.
Yesterday, I got to talking to former MLB pitcher Danny Graves on Twitter. He’s part of the team at the newly-launched 120Sports, a brand new sports network. It’s a cool concept, focusing on video analysis that is typically about 2 minutes long for each story, getting you up-to-the-minute updates on everything that’s going on.
Anyway, I asked Danny about his unusual career:
@HighHeatStats I liked to pitch to contact. Unless runner on 3rd w/ less then 2 outs. Formula was to try and throw max, 3 pitches per batter
— Danny Graves (@dgravy32) July 7, 2014
He did, in fact, average 3.41 pitches per plate appearance over his career, during which time MLB had an average of 3.73. That’s an 8% difference.
If we focus down on just one year, we can see a bit more detail. Take 2000, when Danny averaged 3.65 pitches per batter. He was the Reds’ closer that year, and one of 24 pitchers to save at least 20 games that season. The other 23 closers averaged 3.85 pitches per plate appearance, about 5% more than Graves. In fact, John Rocker, Armando Benitez, Troy Percival, and Dave Veres all averaged over 4 pitches per batter, while only 4 of the closers averaged fewer pitches than Danny (Antonio Alfonseca, Jeff Shaw, Jose Jimenez, and Steve Karsay).
So, it’s clear that Danny’s assertion that he tried to pitch to contact and limit pitches per batter is correct. This had another effect, though, which was first pointed out to me yesterday by Adam (@baseballtwit). Throwing fewer pitches per batter allowed Graves to face more batters and pitch more innings. Looking again at 2000, Graves threw the most pitches among those 24 closers. He tossed 1418 times against 388 batters. Compare that to Benitez, who tossed 1313 times against 304 batters. That’s only 105 fewer pitches, but against 84 fewer batters, which explains why Benitez averaged about 2/3 of a pitch more per batter.
In that 2000 season, the 388 batters that Graves faced produced 274 outs, meaning that he pitched 91.1 innings, and these were spread over 66 games. Benitez (who, remember, threw nearly as many pitches as Graves), produced only 234 outs. His 78 IP were spread over only 77 games. Benitez was the very model of the modern closer, tossing exactly one inning per appearance just about as surely as the sun came up every day. Graves, though, was used frequently in the 8th inning to record a 4, 5, or even 6-out save.
Did Graves’ desire to pitch to contact lead to more hits? Not in 2000, no. He allowed 7.98 H/9, whereas the other 23 closers allowed 8.06 H/9, and NL-wide average in 2000 was 9.20. So Graves was similar to other closers, who as a group were a lot better than league average. It did, however, affect his walks. In 2000, he issued 4.14 BB/9, as compared to 3.45 BB/9 from the other 23 closers. And if you throw out John Rocker, who issued 48 walks in 53 innings himself, the other 22 guys averaged 3.29 BB/9, putting Graves 25% above their average. This had a dramatic effect on his FIP, which was 4.59 as compared to his actual ERA of 2.56. That difference of 2.03 was by far the largest of the 24 closers, with the other 23 averaging a 0.44 difference (3.35 ERA, 3.79 FIP).
What, then, was Graves’ formula for success? For starters, in 2000, only 19% of the balls put in play vs. him, were line drives, as compared to the NL average of 25%. This is consistent with the notion that he tried to pitch to contact, presumably trying to be on the edge of the strike zone. This would tend to lead to poorer contact, but also more walks, both of which were true for Danny. He also induced double plays in 13% of opportunities, well above the NL average of 10%. The lack of good contact by batters also limited his extra base hits allowed to just 28% of total hits, as compared to 35% NL-wide and 30% among the other 23 closers.
It’s interesting that come 2001, Graves dropped his walk rate considerably, from 4.1 per 9 in 2000 to 2.0 in 2001 and 2.3 in 2002. The cost? More hits. His strike percentage jumped from 59.4% in 2000 to 68.1% in 2001 and 67.7% in 2002. As he was around the strike zone more, batters made better contact, with their line drive percentage climbing to 24% each season, and his H/9 rose from 8.0 in 2000 to 9.3 in 2001 and 9.0 in 2000. Thanks to the reduction in walks, his FIP over 2001-2 was 3.66, much closer to his actual ERA of 3.62, as opposed to the huge gap in 2000.
In his final years of 2004-2006, Graves was used like a modern reliever, averaging exactly 1 inning per appearance (121 games, 121 IP). He kept his walk rate down at 2.8 per 9, but his K rate stayed low, at 4.7 per 9. His extra-base hit percentage soared to 38% as a lot of balls left the yard (11.6% of his fly balls allowed were homers, well above league average). I’m not sure why Danny’s approach changed. In might have been out of necessity, but clearly as he threw more strikes, he was hit harder. Issuing fewer walks did not benefit him, and in fact led to more hits and a higher overall WHIP.
@HighHeatStats BB bother me more now that I don’t play. When I was playing, I didn’t mind BB. Confident I could get ground balls.
— Danny Graves (@dgravy32) July 7, 2014
As Adam pointed out to me, Graves was pretty much the last MLB closer who consistently averaged over 1 inning pitched per appearance. In his prime, he wasn’t afraid of walking people and made up for it by getting double plays and not allowing extra-base hits very often. By the end of his career, when he pitched more like a modern closer (strictly 1 inning pitched, low walk rate) he was actually less successful. Maybe this is a sign that today’s relief pitching isn’t as optimized as many folks think.
I am aware of the problem with comments and am working to resolve it.
Run scoring and such have dropped since the peak of the Steroid Era, but at least for now, the face of the game remains unchanged. Although homers have dropped off some, three other events–triples, intentional walks, and sac bunts–continue to hurtle towards extinction.
Here’s the simple ratio of HR per game to the sum of those other three events. Suddenly, 2013 is looking more like the offensive peak years of 1999-2000.
Here’s a simple plot showing, by year, the percentage of all plate appearances given each year to any non-starter, as well as the percentage given to pinch-hitters specifically.
The pinch-hitter data goes back only to 1945 (the limit of full play-by-play availability) and happens to coincide with a dramatic increase in the use of the pinch-hitter in baseball. From 1945 until 1960, nearly 3% more of all plate appearances went to pinch-hitters, singlehandedly accounting for the same increase among all non-starters.
Since that time, pinch-hitter use has tapered off slowly, falling about 1 percentage point over the 50 or so intervening years, while overall non-starter plate appearances have dropped by more than double that amount. The reason is likely a drop in defensive substitutions. It’s clear that defense is better now than ever and fewer teams carry defensive specialists, instead opting in most cases to keep good reserve bats on the bench. The effect may also be due to the overall emphasis on offense, with teams seemingly more likely to keep a good player in the game because of his bat, rather than removing him for a better glove man.
Hey, remember me? I own this joint
Now that the season’s over and I’m mostly done with our commitments to USA Today Sports, I’ve been working on a side project that I expect a lot of you will enjoy–Quantum Leaf.
It’s a game for 1 to 4 players that uses a single tessellating shape–a leaf–to tile a surface. I’ve developed prototypes and will be running a Kickstarter campaign in early 2014 to roll out the product version.
Click on the image above to check out the game. Over on the Quantum Leaf site, to can submit your email address if you want to be updated on when our Kickstarter launches.
Have you been keeping up with our podcast? You can get to it on the podcast page, listed above, or just click here.
On Episode 11, Gary Thurman Family Reunion, Adam and I sit down to discuss the Veterans Committee Hall of Fame voting process, the SABR Overlooked 19th Century Baseball Legends commitee, the Gary Thurman 1988 Topps blog post I made 5 years ago, playoff format and timelines, as well as delve into a bit of trivia about Rockies and Marlins managers.
Enter in our free contest by doing this:
– Listen to Episode 11 of the HHS podcast
– In between the segments, there are some brief audio clips from a historical game or series. Listen to those clips, and identify the game or series the clips are from.
– Email in the answer to firstname.lastname@example.org
We’ll randomly pick one winning entry to receive a $15 iTunes giftcard!