Josh Donaldson, one of the best two-way players in baseball, has been dealt to Toronto.
With 15.4 WAR in 2013-14 (second to Mike Trout), Donaldson ties Chuck Knoblauch for the most age 27-28 WAR of any player who changed teams going into or during age 29. Even if you don’t buy his top-notch defensive metrics, Donaldson ranked 6th in offensive WAR for the last two years. He’s a player.
Ninety-one modern players tallied 12+ WAR for age 27-28. Here are the 11 who changed teams going into or during age 29, with their WAR totals for 27-28, and then 29-30 and 29-32. The rankings are among MLB position players during the years the player was in a certain age group; they are not age-group rankings.
| Player | Age 27 | Age 28 | 27-28 | Rk 27-28 | 29-30 | Rk 29-30 | 29-32 | Rk 29-32 |
| Josh Donaldson | 8.0 | 7.4 | 15.4 | #2 | ??? | ??? | ??? | ??? |
| Chuck Knoblauch | 8.6 | 6.7 | 15.4 | #3 | 6.3 | #70 | 7.5 | #124 |
| Mike Piazza | 5.4 | 8.7 | 14.1 | #7 | 10.5 | #29 | 20.0 | #26 |
| Chuck Klein | 6.6 | 7.5 | 14.1 | #4 | 6.2 | #35 | 8.9 | #42 |
| Fred Lynn | 8.8 | 4.7 | 13.5 | #5 | 4.8 | #76 | 10.1 | #61 |
| Johnny Mize* | 7.4 | 5.4 | 12.8 | #3 | 12.3* | #4* | 26.0* | #4* |
| Mark Teixeira | 4.6 | 7.8 | 12.4 | #6 | 9.4 | #23 | 16.6 | #25 |
| Dave Winfield | 8.3 | 3.9 | 12.2 | #8 | 6.0 | #46 | 13.7 | #32 |
| Manny Ramirez | 7.3 | 4.8 | 12.1 | #12 | 11.2 | #17 | 20.7 | #16 |
| Bobby Bonds | 7.8 | 4.3 | 12.1 | #10 | 7.1 | #40 | 16.5 | #30 |
| Carl Crawford | 5.0 | 7.0 | 12.0 | #9 | 0.6 | #335 | 4.7 | #190 |
* Mize played at 29, then missed age 30-32 in the service and returned at 33. The totals and rankings shown in his “29-30” and “29-32” columns simply skip the missed years, and so cover 1942/’46 and 1942/’46-48. No one else on this list missed a full year during age 27-32.
If we don’t count my fudged rankings for Mize, none of the others ranked in MLB’s top 15 during the years they were age 29-30 or 29-32. But that’s a different topic.
_____
Besides Knoblauch and Donaldson, ten other players changed teams after logging 15 WAR in any two-year span:
- Rogers Hornsby — 18.9 WAR, age 31-32, 3rd in MLB for 1927-28. Dealt for players and $200,000. Gave the Cubs one more MVP year at 33, but was rarely healthy after that. All you need to know about The Rajah’s personality: Traded three years in a row, each time carrying a 2-year total of at least 14.5 WAR.
- Eddie Collins — 18.1 WAR, age 26-27, 2nd in MLB for 1913-14. Connie Mack sold the reigning MVP for $50,000 due to salary inflation caused by the Federal League and by four pennants in five years. Collins remained a superstar for many years, ranking 5th in total WAR for the 10 years after the sale.
- Babe Ruth — 17.6 WAR, age 23-24 (14.5 as a player, 1st in MLB for 1918-19, and 3.1 as a pitcher). Sold for $100,000. Did all right afterwards.
- Jimmie Foxx — 17.3 WAR, age 26-27, 2nd in MLB for 1934-35. Dealt for players and $150,000. Foxx had six more good years with Boston, but never reached his 8.1 WAR average for seven full years in Philly. (The dispersal of Mack’s second dynasty was slower than the first. Al Simmons was moved after 1932’s distant 2nd-place finish; Lefty Grove, Mickey Cochrane and Maxie Bishop followed after ’33. But Mack kept Foxx until the A’s finally hit the cellar in ’35.)
- Alex Rodriguez — 15.1 WAR, age 23-24, and 17.2 WAR, age 26-27, both 2nd in MLB, for 1999-2000 and for 2002-03. Left Seattle as a free agent, then dealt to the Yankees after three MVP-caliber years in Texas. Remained a top player for five years in the Bronx (two MPVs, 2nd in total WAR) before age and injury took hold.
- Tris Speaker — 17.0 WAR, age 26-27, 2nd in MLB for 1914-15. Traded for players and $55,000 after his second title year with Boston, when he wouldn’t take a big salary cut. (Player pay fell sharply when the Feds folded.) Third in total WAR for his seven years as a BoSox starter (after Collins and Cobb), and third for the 10 years after the trade (trailing Hornsby and Ruth).
- Barry Bonds — 16.9 WAR, age 26-27, 1st in MLB for 1991-92. Left Pittsburgh as a free agent after his 2nd MVP in three years. Bonds won five more such crowns with the Giants, not without some growing pains. (Barry’s 84.1 WAR for age 24-33 — presumably “clean,” although who really knows — rate 5th all-time.)
- Jason Giambi — 16.9 WAR, age 29-30, 3rd in MLB for 2000-01. If you can’t beat ’em, join ’em. Giambi had one top-flight year with the Yanks, but the title still eludes him.
- Robinson Cano — 16.0 WAR, age 29-30, 2nd in MLB for 2012-13. Trying a new tack, New York let a perennial MVP candidate get away over bushels of money.
- Home Run Baker — 15.2 WAR, age 27-28, 3rd in MLB for 1913-14. Sat out all of 1915 in a salary fight. Finally sold for $37,500 to the Yanks, where he had four good years (11th in total WAR for 1916-19) but never approached his A’s peak.
Including Donaldson and Knoblauch, all 12 of these players ranked 3rd or better in total WAR for the prior two years.
The 12 prior transfers of these 15-WAR players were all centered on money. The only player going the other way in these deals who totaled 15 WAR afterward was Sad Sam Jones (in the Speaker deal), with 40 WAR over 20 years. Players at this level don’t get put into challenge trades.
But Donaldson is still cheap, expected to earn less than $5 million in 2015, his first year of arbitration eligibility. Billy Beane has a tight budget, but he’s not dealing a top player just to save $5 million. He must think this will make the A’s better at least by 2016, and for years after that.
Could that reflect Bean’s private view of Donaldson, or of late-bloomers in general? Donaldson’s sudden emergence at age 27 was very unusual. He had just a half-year’s experience in MLB, and a so-so career in the minors. Two related measures reflect this rarity:
(1) Out of 98 players whose age 27 yielded either 7+ WAR or 6+ offensive WAR, only Ichiro Suzuki and Jose Abreu were less established through age 26 than Donaldson, and that was only because they had yet to sign with a big-league team. Three others had less than 1,000 PAs through age 26, but all were regulars at 26:
- Josh Hamilton debuted at 26 (after a self-inflicted delay) with a 131 OPS+ in 337 PAs.
- Matt Carpenter got his first steady gig at 26 with a 125 OPS+ in 340 PAs.
- Jim Gentile broke through at 26 with a 145 OPS+ in 464 PAs.
Donaldson’s half-year at age 26 brought a mere 91 OPS+. And all three above had better bush-league numbers.
(2) Out of 91 players who totaled 12+ WAR for age 27-28, only Donaldson was not a regular by age 26. All but John Valentin had over 1,000 PAs by age 26, and Valentin at 26 played 144 games and logged 5.2 WAR.
So in this sense, Donaldson is unique in modern baseball. And although he was a late-1st-round pick at age 21, his minor-league record is spotty. His two good offensive years were both about 50 games — his pro debut, at the lowest levels, and then his third turn at triple-A.
It’s well established that players who break through in their late 20s tend to have shorter peaks. Donaldson’s second big year tends to mitigate that factor, but Beane still might be playing those percentages.
What do you think? Will Donaldson be a long-term star for the Blue Jays? Did the A’s get enough in return?
I think that Donaldson will be a long-term star for the Jays and the A’s definitely did not get enough in return. It’s important to keep in mind that Donaldson was a catcher his whole career through 2011, then learned 3rd base. Lesser wear on his body, specifically hips, translated directly to more success at the plate. Sad to see him go.
Most analyses of this trade that I have seen tend to treat the three minor league players as non-factors, when every one of them has some upside, so this is a wait and see trade.
The linked piece by Nick Ashbourne had some interesting insights from the “baseball as a business” vantage point, particularly the view that the Blue Jays are “all in” to win now (as they have been for the past two years) because Joey Bats and double-E are: (a) not getting any younger; and (b) are only under contract through 2016. One quote I would take issue with is this:
The Jays have made two impact acquisitions this offseason, and neither of them have been at positions of dire need.
Seems ludicrous to me to say that acquiring Russell Martin was not filling a dire need. Navarro may hit will enough for a catcher and his defensive metrics are okay, but watching a lot of him, I felt he really hurt his pitchers with his pitch selection and where he set the target: things like allowing hitters back into counts by setting up so far off the plate that even the most anxious hitter wouldn’t likely chase; or “high risk” pitch and location, where the pitcher had to hit the spot precisely or the natural movement on the pitch would take it into the heart of the plate instead of away from it. Just didn’t seem to me to be a very savvy catcher.
Yeah, I don’t get it. I really don’t get it. Maybe his hitting will fall off but he’s controlled for 4 years at arbitration rates. He plays worse, you get him cheaper. You don’t have to sign him ever (as a FA) and you can let him go if you want with little fuss before his age 33 season. His power is legit and his glove is spectacular. 158 games in two straight years also locks in some value.
I think if you burnt every contract and arb/pre-arb rule in the books making every player a free agent, Donaldson is right up there in value. Probably #1 would be Kyle Seager but I have a hard time giving somebody else #2 and is there really that much between them? Donaldson is 25 months older than Seager and has a few less PA’s 2201 to 1493 but Donaldson’s the better glove and his 2013 rbat was 37! Beltre’s going to be 36 years old and doesn’t have the same defensive reach he used to. I have a hard time thinking Sandoval or Headley would be anywhere near as desirable if Donaldson were miraculously a free agent.
Maybe we’re looking at this wrong. It’s not that Donaldson isn’t so good, it’s that Brett lawrie isn’t bad either. They have 4 years between them but on the free agent timeframe, Lawrie’s actually got LESS control. That said, the only thing stopping him seems to be injury. He’s played 2B/3B extremely well when healthy and has flashed a pretty hefty right handed power bat of his own. Are you going to bet over the next three years that the age 25-27 kid starts fewer games than the age 29-31 kid? Donaldson has a gaudy 20 RFIELD on his resume, Lawrie’s got his own back in 2012. Still, I think both teams would rather have Donaldson hence the prospects changing hands.
Really, they’re not terribly different players either so if you’re the Jays why would you give up that much more than a straight swap?
This is mildly troubling: Lawrie has a large home/away split — .286 BA/.815 OPS at home, .248/.683 away. It’s the 10th-largest home OPS edge among active non-Rockies.
I think Lawrie’s “floor” to “ceiling” is one of the biggest spreads among current players. His first two seasons combined (2011-12) look quite a lot like one of Donaldson’s two full years, in total value — but with more of the value packed into his extreme (and controversial) dWAR. His past two seasons were at about half that value pace.
I can’t see how this makes the A’s better in 2015, but I do see this as a major harbinger of things to come. There’s something interesting going on in the trade market–it’s not consistent and not always applicable to each team, but we may be moving towards more of an NBA-style approach, where cost can be more important than talent/performance. Teams like the A’s have limited budgets and have to find ways to monetize their assets or find values that aren’t currently as highly priced. But the market is starting to see those higher priced assets differently than the owners of contracts would like to value them at. The Phillies are a prime example of this, being apparently unable or unwilling to sell fully priced contracts for anything less than maximum value. This is an older way of thinking–because it presumes that the present value of player performance, regardless of cost, is the only thing that has to be equalized. But that’s no longer true. With such a gigantic economic disparity between good players with service time and those who are younger and more cost controlled, the incremental value of, say, a Cole Hamels, is less than people think it is when you have to commit to $110M plus several top-tier inexpensive prospects. The fact that Hamel’s contract may be fair to him (as Byrd, or even Papelbon’s might be) doesn’t necessarily mean he’s worth that much in excess of that. Viewed in that light–trading a high quality player, one-off though he may be–who is going to get increasingly, and perhaps unaffordably expensive for less expensive with a hope for a prospect lottery ticket may make sense.
Another thought….perhaps Lawrie might benefit from a change of scenery. A few years ago he looked like he could be the face of the Blue Jays for the next decade. He was considered 100% untouchable. Things obviously haven’t worked out the way he and the Jays expected. But he’s still young and could conceivably turn things around.
Heck, even with his offensive struggles of the past 3 years, he’s averaged 3.9 WAR per 600 PAs. If he can stay healthy and make some improvements to his hitting, I could see him putting up 4-6 WAR per year for the A’s.
Here’s the discussion on Lawrie from Doug’s post two years ago:
http://www.highheatstats.com/2012/05/is-brett-lawrie-one-of-the-greatest-fielders-ever/
I wonder looking back at that now if we can more easily answer the question of how much of that DWAR came from the shift and how much of it was the player. I still think defensive metrics are terrible and barely even give a decent indication of below average/average/above average even over large sampling size but even in conventional times things are complicated. The shift makes it even more difficult to separate player’s ability from the manager’s placement of them pre-pitch.
I would wager that the percentage of played fielded by a third basemen has increased in recent years as they are regularly shifted towards the left handed batter’s spray chart. Lowrie was unique even in that because they would take advantage of his instincts at second and leave the shortstop between second and third instead swinging him all the way around to cover short right between the second basemen and the first basemen. Lowrie in that situation, against say McCann or Texeria or Ortiz or similar, is going to see a lot more baseballs his way than he would sitting on his hands at a conventional third base positioning.
I still feel like the magnitudes of defensive contributions are exaggerated. I feel like the variance at short is reduced by these third basemen and the shift. Maybe some of that is in the changing nature of the game. Your shortstop’s glove isn’t that significantly more important than your third basemen’s anymore. Thoughts?
The problem with Lawrie’s defensive rating was that DRS wasn’t taking into account his extreme positioning on shifts. The discussion on High Heat Stats took place in May. By July, the guys behind DRS had changed the formula to ignore plays made on shifts for individual players, whilst accounting for it at a team level. Lawrie still figured to be the best defensive third baseman in baseball that year, but not by a never-before-seen margin:
http://www.billjamesonline.com/brett_lawrie%E2%80%94best_defensive_third_baseman_in_baseball_/
@mosc: I realise my comment doesn’t address your broader points, I just wanted to make clear to those reading the old discussion that Lawire wasn’t as game-breakingly good as the numbers at the time suggested.
mosc, I just checked on 3B chances as a percentage of balls in play. It’s been 10.1% each of the last six years. Assists by 3B have varied only from 7.0% to 7.2% of balls in play, and last year’s 7.13% was virtually the same as the 6-year average. So, while your theory sounds plausible, the superficial data don’t support it.
Interesting. Thanks JA
Best example of a challenge trade of players of the magnitude that John discusses who played the same position and were in or close to their primes? Probably Frankie Frisch and Rogers Hornsby being swapped aged 29 and 30 respectively. Frisch turned in a 9 WAR season in his first year with the Cardinals while the Giants got 10 WAR out of Hornsby before shipping him (and especially his excess baggage) to the Braves.
Doug, I’ve always wondered if Hornsby for Frisch qualifies as a challenge trade. I don’t know what Branch Rickey and John McGraw really expected. But from this vantage point, it doesn’t seem likely that Rickey really thought he was getting an equal talent return.
Rajah had an off year in ’26, by his standards — but then, so did Frisch. And the just before that was Hornsby’s famous .400-over-5-years span, not to mention six straight years leading the NL in BA, OBP and SLG. Frisch was a better glove, but it’s hard to imagine anyone rating them close to even at that time. And Frisch was only 16 months younger. (Jimmy Ring, who came over with Frisch, already seemed on the way down, and he was.)
On top of that, Hornsby had just led the Cards to their first modern pennant and championship, in his first full year as skipper. Yet many of his players hated Hornsby as manager. I think Rickey was in a bind: Relieving Hornsby of managerial duty, while keeping him as a player, would have put Rajah in a snit, plus it would have been a tough PR sell.
It happened that McGraw and Frisch also were on the outs. So they traded their troubles, and Rickey accepted the short end on talent in exchange for dumping the bigger headache. Or so it seems, from here.
Does anyone know a good written account of Rickey’s take on the Hornsby deal?
Right here.
Start it at page 146:
http://books.google.com/books?id=jbMS6Mev-sAC&pg=PA176&lpg=PA176&dq=branch+rickey+hornsby&source=bl&ots=CJZD_P_t6_&sig=j4tCNNos9wRFqTiMfWRjzJjfJVA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=mzN9VOX1L4bDiALB-YH4Cg&ved=0CD0Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=branch%20rickey%20hornsby&f=false
But, long story short, it wasn’t Rickey.
Owner Sam Breadon did it.
Thanks, Voomo! Good source.
I see your point, John.
Not a challenge trade in the sense of when that mostly pointless practice was briefly in vogue in the late 50s and early 60s. As you say, both teams had some trouble to deal with and the timing worked out just right. Trouble and good timing seldom go together, usually resulting in inequitable swaps (see Frank Robinson). But, in this instance, each party got far more value in the deal (on paper) than they could have reasonably hoped for.
No doubt, the Cardinals were delighted with their coup. But, not so much for the Giants who ended up with Jimmy Welsh and Shanty Hogan (who did provide some value) as consolation prizes after learning the hard way “better the devil you know”.
But, if you just look at the deal on paper and leave out the motivations, I think you’d have a hard time finding a comparable swap of players of that caliber, at that point in their careers, and playing the same position.
The biggest challenge trade in the history of baseball was clearly the one involving Mike Kekich and Fritz Peterson. For those who don’t know what I’m taking about, the details are here:
http://www.hardballtimes.com/tht-live/40th-anniversary-kekich-peterson-wife-swap-story/
Here’s an interesting thing I found out by accident: Hornsby and Frisch were teammates on the Cardinals in 1933 up until July 26th, when Rajah was released and signed by the crosstown Browns. Frisch was the regular at 2B, Hornsby the backup. Around that same time Frisch was named manager of the team. Hornsby became manager of the Browns.
@19/nsb;
Hornsby is obviously one of the all-time great hitters and position players, but he had relatively few Games Played (2,259) and PA (9,480), for such an ‘inner-circle’ type. He was done as a great player by age 33 (1929), and as a regular (sort of) by age 35 (1931/ 100 G).
Closest comparison in those stats may be Gehrig: 2,164 G/ 9,963 PA, but much different career trajectories.
As an indication of how quickly Rajah’s production fell off, after the 1929 season Bill James’ Favorite Toy estimates a career hit total for the 34 year-old Hornsby of 3656 and a 97% chance of reaching 3000. Hornsby ended up at 2930 hits, missing the projection by about 4 full seasons worth of knocks.
For age 34+, Hornsby batted for a .300/.400/.500 slash and a 137 OPS+. So, he was still effective, just wasn’t penciling himself into the lineup very often. Given that he was poison in the clubhouse, it would seem that team owners would want to get as much as possible from him on the field. But, it didn’t happen.
Just looking at career totals, Gehrig is a good comp for age 34+ as is Heilmann and Ed Delahanty. But none of those were at all similar to Hornsby’s pattern of limited use for an extended number of seasons.
Another oddity I noticed on Hornsby’s page is that he was fired as the Browns manager in 1952 and hired as the Reds manager in the same season. And he wasn’t just hired as a caretaker manager, as he managed the Reds for almost the whole of the 1953 season, before being fired again. Can anyone think of a similar thing happening with another manager?
How about Mickey Mantle as a comp for Rajah? At least through age 30, they were very close:
— WAR, 90.4 to 90.2
— OPS+, 178 to 176
(Hornsby ahead on both scores. Mantle had about 500 more PAs at that point, most of that coming from their age-19 years.)
Hornsby had three more huge years age 31-33, while Mantle had already settled into his (moderately productive) decline phase.
Last year as a regular was age 35 for Hornsby, age 36 for Mick (who then retired). Hornsby probably would have retired by 36 or 37 if roster spots had been as valuable then as they would become. For instance, the Browns whom he rejoined in mid-’33 would use just 27 players all year, including one pitcher with 8 IP and four catchers with 107 PAs or less. The Browns would have more roster spots than talent for the rest of Rajah’s tenure.
Regarding Hornsby’s relatively short career but inner-circle credentials: his WAR per Plate Appearance is second only to Babe Ruth. Even Mike Trout, whose career thus far has consisted of nothing but record-breaking awesomeness, is not quite accumulating WAR at the same level as Hornsby did.
This highlights why WAR as a rate stat isn’t really worth much.
It’s not that Rajah was a better player than Bonds, or Willie Mays, or Ty Cobb, etc. so much as it is that he had very limited plate appearances in his decline phase. Here’s the 8 position players ahead of Hornsby in career WAR.
PA from age 34 on:
5507…Honus Wagner
4729…Hank Aaron
4560…Stan Musial
4506…Barry Lamar
4494…Willie Mays
4302…Ty Cobb
3775…Tris Speaker
3067…Babe Ruth
844….Rogers Hornsby
Even Lou Gehrig (1422) had more PAs after that age than Hornsby did.
bstar @30 — I view WAR rate as a necessary but not sufficient stat for rating top players. As you know, I like to cross career WAR with WAR/650 PAs. The method has flaws — I think it’s too kind to great players with careers even shorter than Hornsby’s. But it’s useful.
Wasn’t Rajah a “better player” than Cobb in at least one sense? In years of 10+ WAR, it’s Hornsby 6, Cobb 3. For 9+ WAR, it’s Hornsby 8, Cobb 6. If you line up their 10 best years by WAR, Hornsby wins 8, Cobb one, with one tie.
Yes, Cobb had six good years from 34 on, to one for Hornsby. But Hornsby’s the all-time leader through age 33, 6% ahead of Cobb in slightly fewer PAs.
If all we had was career WAR, we’d see Cobb ahead by 19% (151-127). A more nuanced take would be that Cobb leads Hornsby by about 5 full seasons at 4.3 WAR per year.
But using the product of their WAR totals and rates ranks them much closer — Cobb 4th, Hornsby a close 5th (among all-time WAR leaders) — solidly behind Ruth, Bonds and Mays, and solidly ahead of Williams, Speaker, Wagner and Aaron, with another level drop to #10 Gehrig.
That seems like a decent balance of peak value and longevity.
John, I have never seen Rogers Hornsby ranked as the 5th-best position player ever. Have you? That to me is a red flag.
This feels strange to me, because I remember arguing with you that Hornsby was the greatest second baseman ever and you were arguing for Eddie Collins. It’s perfectly fine if you have switched positions on that, but would you mind clarifying where you stand there before I write a long comment?
Hornsby had 9480 PA.
He are the top 20 in WAR, ranked by
WAA per PA (PaWaa) through the season closest to 9500 PA:
80.2 …. Babe
97.2 …. Rajah
98.3 …. Willie Mays
101.8 … Ted Williams
106.0 … Bonds
111.3 … Tyrus
112.4 … Honus
120.0 … Mickey
122.0 … Speaker
122.2 … Gehrig
127.6 … Schmidt
128.3 … Stan the Man
131.2 … Hank Aaron
132.2 … Alex the Rod
134.7 … Nap Lajoie
137.9 … Rickey Henderson
143.8 … Cocky Collins
152.2 … Ott
159.9 … Frank Robinson
163.9 … Joe Morgan
232.3 … Frankie Frisch
I would rather talk about WAR in a period of time rather than per PA. PA’s don’t talk about injury. Larkin looks like Cal Ripken if you turn things into rate based, maybe better, but it discounts the value of consistently being in the lineup.
Rajah’s best 7 year peak was 66.1 WAR (9.4 average). 10 year was a very similar 93.1 (9.3). Going out to 14 gets you a near unbeatable 120 (still 8.6 a year).
Laying out a formula of “Best N consecutive years” with a value looking like Best 1 year + Best 2 + Best 3 year +… Best N year / N! which favors peak heavily but has the deceptive benefit of averaging longer periods, Hornsby is hard to beat for N’s around 7-14 I’d imagine but when you get further out to N’s around 20 won’t look as spectacular. I compared him to Mays just to get a taste. I pretended Willie’s 51 and 52 were really 52 and 53. I’m also eyeballing best consecutive years so apologies for the inevitable errors:
Career 127 vs 156.1
Rajah avg Willie avg
1 12.1 12.1 11.2 11.2 Rajah 0.9
2 22.3 11.2 22.3 11.2 tie 0.0
3 30.4 10.1 32.9 11.0 Mays 0.8
4 39.7 9.9 43.4 10.9 Mays 0.9
5 49.9 10.0 52.4 10.5 Mays 0.5
6 59.5 9.9 61.6 10.3 Mays 0.4
7 66.1 9.4 70.6 10.1 Mays 0.6
8 74 9.3 79.6 10.0 Mays 0.7
9 83.6 9.3 88.6 9.8 Mays 0.6
10 93.1 9.3 96.9 9.7 Mays 0.4
11 99.8 9.1 104.5 9.5 Mays 0.4
12 105.2 8.8 115.1 9.6 Mays 0.8
13 115.2 8.9 124.1 9.5 Mays 0.7
14 120 8.6 128.4 9.2 Mays 0.6
15 120.3 8.0 134.7 9.0 Mays 1.0
16 125.6 7.9 137.7 8.6 Mays 0.8
17 125.7 7.4 142.9 8.4 Mays 1.0
18 126.9 7.1 149.3 8.3 Mays 1.2
19 127.2 6.7 150.5 7.9 Mays 1.2
20 127.1 6.4 154.4 7.7 Mays 1.4
21 127.2 6.1 156.2 7.4 Mays 1.4
22 127.4 5.8 156.2 7.1 Mays 1.3
23 127 5.5 156.2 6.8 Mays 1.3
We’ll see if that spaces out. It gives a pretty clear picture of who had the better N peak.
FYI over 25 seasons, Hornsby gets every N year groupin vs Collins by an average margin of 0.8 WAR/season, same margin Mays has over Hornsby over 25.
Rajah avg Collins avg
1 12.1 12.1 10.5 10.5 Rajah 1.6
2 22.3 11.2 20.2 10.1 Rajah 1.1
3 30.4 10.1 27.4 9.1 Rajah 1.0
4 39.7 9.9 36.2 9.1 Rajah 0.9
5 49.9 10.0 44.5 8.9 Rajah 1.1
6 59.5 9.9 53.5 8.9 Rajah 1.0
7 66.1 9.4 62.9 9.0 Rajah 0.5
8 74 9.3 69.9 8.7 Rajah 0.5
9 83.6 9.3 74.9 8.3 Rajah 1.0
10 93.1 9.3 78 7.8 Rajah 1.5
11 99.8 9.1 83.1 7.6 Rajah 1.5
12 105.2 8.8 91 7.6 Rajah 1.2
13 115.2 8.9 95.5 7.3 Rajah 1.5
14 120 8.6 99.3 7.1 Rajah 1.5
15 120.3 8.0 105.7 7.0 Rajah 1.0
16 125.6 7.9 110.9 6.9 Rajah 0.9
17 125.7 7.4 116 6.8 Rajah 0.6
18 126.9 7.1 120.1 6.7 Rajah 0.4
19 127.2 6.7 122.4 6.4 Rajah 0.3
20 127.1 6.4 123.7 6.2 Rajah 0.2
21 127.2 6.1 123.9 5.9 Rajah 0.2
22 127.4 5.8 124 5.6 Rajah 0.2
23 127 5.5 124 5.4 Rajah 0.1
24 127 5.3 123.9 5.2 Rajah 0.1
25 127 5.1 123.9 5.0 Rajah 0.1
average 0.8
bstar @33 — Good questions. No, I have not changed my preference for Collins over Hornsby. But here I’ve just been talking about the measurable value of the player’s performance. My “product” rankings (still in development) put Collins 12th all-time among position players. The gap between him and Hornsby is small enough that I feel justified in preferring Collins on grounds of personality and consistency.
I don’t intend to make “personality” a big part of my rankings, but Hornsby has to be seen as an extreme case. When an all-time great is traded three years in a row while at the top of his game, with diminishing returns, I think we have to accept that — along with the many first-hand accounts — as some measure of his true value to a team.
FWIW, the Hall of Stats ranks Hornsby 6th among position players. The top 13 there are:
1 — Ruth
2 — Bonds
3 — Mays
4 — Cobb
5 — Aaron
6 — Hornsby
7 — Wagner
8 — Williams
9 — Speaker
10 — Musial
11 — Collins
12 — Gehrig
13 — Mantle
My “product” has the same 13 players and the same top 4:
1 — Ruth
2 — Bonds
3 — Mays
4 — Cobb
5 — Hornsby (+1 spot)
6 — Williams (+2)
7 — Speaker (+2)
8 — Wagner (-1)
9 — Aaron (-4)
10 — Gehrig (+2)
11 — Musial (-1)
12 — Collins (-1)
13 — Mantle
Also, Hornsby has the 6th-best JAWS rating among position players. I’m not sure if those numbers are meant to be used for cross-position comparisons, but anyway … they have the same top 4 as I do, same top 7 as HOS, with Aaron 5th just ahead of Hornsby. Their top 13 is the same players as listed above, except with A-Rod inserted at #12.
Or fun with my new widget, Mike Trout vs Jim Rice:
Trout average Rice average
1 10.8 10.8 7.5 7.5 Trout -3.3
2 19.6 9.8 13.9 7.0 Trout -2.9
3 27.5 9.2 19.1 6.4 Trout -2.8
4 28.2 7.1 21.4 5.4 Trout -1.7
5 28.2 5.6 24.3 4.9 Trout -0.8
6 28.2 4.7 27 4.5 Trout -0.2
7 28.2 4.0 32.1 4.6 Rice 0.6
8 28.2 3.5 34.6 4.3 Rice 0.8
9 28.2 3.1 37.4 4.2 Rice 1.0
10 28.2 2.8 42.1 4.2 Rice 1.4
11 28.2 2.6 44.4 4.0 Rice 1.5
12 28.2 2.4 47.4 4.0 Rice 1.6
13 28.2 2.2 47.5 3.7 Rice 1.5
14 28.2 2.0 48.1 3.4 Rice 1.4
15 28.2 1.9 48.1 3.2 Rice 1.3
16 28.2 1.8 47.4 3.0 Rice 1.2
Rice 0.04030
So just a fractional WAR from trout in 2015 (0.5 WAR to be exact) would make him a better all time great according to this than Jim Rice but he’s not QUITE there yet. Lobbing off a couple years from Rice would already give trout the win. Forcing it out to some more common 25 year reference Would make Trout’s life harder but not as much as you might think. If trout has 4.7 WAR in 2015 he’d match Rice in the average of averages over 25 years.
Perhaps Lawrie replaces the immortal Sogard at 2B and provides more value?
SAW THIS ON ANOTHER BLOG:
……those (arbitration) projections get Donaldson alone in the $40M range over the next four seasons. “Lawrie, who projects to earn about $1.8 million in the first of his three arbitration years, will account for some of that. But the other three players from the Blue Jays will be minimum-salary types for three years once they reach the majors. The deal, then, was not simply a 4-for-1. From the Athletics’ perspective, it could be a 6-for-1, 7-for-1 or even bigger by the time they finish redistributing Donaldson’s money.”
With Lawrie’s arm, it would be a tremendous misuse of his talent to play him at second base. He was used there last season by the Blue Jays because Maicer Izturis missed almost the whole season due to injury and Toronto didn’t have an obvious backup. Also, with Lawrie himself missing a good chunk of the season to injury, Toronto used Juan Francisco at 3rd and he provided some power early on; enough that, when Lawrie returned, the Blue Jays continued to use Francisco at 3rd base against right-handers before moving Lawrie from second to third in the late innings for defensive reasons.
Doug, I dunno … A strong arm helps a 2B turn double plays. I watched a few Orioles games last year and was dazzled by Jonathan Schoop’s ability to turn DPs I never thought he’d get.
It’s a small sample, but Lawrie had a terrific DP rate at 2B last year — well above the league average, and way above that of other Toronto 2Bs. He also turned a lot of DPs in his last year as a minor-league 2B.
I haven’t seen enough of Lawrie to have an opinion on what his best spot is, but it wouldn’t shock me if he winds up at 2B at least part-time.
Good point, John.
I guess I’m just figuring that the arm strength and accuracy to play 3rd is a scarcer commodity than the arm strength to play 2nd (though, the other skills needed to play second may be scarcer still). But, a stronger arm at any position is obviously an advantage over a weaker one.
Yeah, he doesn’t JUST have a good arm. I think you’re right doug if he was less athletic and rangy. You’d say “he’s got a great arm for third and the range for it” but really he’s got enough range for an above average middle infielder. The arm is maybe of more use at third than second but the range is of much use at second than third.
I suspect this could be a win-win trade.
Donaldson can help the Jays right now and is an upgrade over Lawrie, according to the statistics and his HR numbers would be expected to improve playing 81 games in the Skydome. (I refuse to call it the other name they’re using these days.) Defensively, Donaldson’s dWAR is better than Lawrie too. My conjecture is that Lawrie’s hyper-ra-ra kineticism wore thin with a lot of teammates, and I recall one commented that his slapping and fist bumping antics actually hurt. So I am not sad to see Lawrie go, and obviously quite happy to see Donaldson in a Jays uniform.
With the bigger foul grounds in Oakland, Lawrie is less likely to go crashing into immoveable objects and hurt himself. I have no feel for how his offensive game would translate to Oakland.
Nolin will, in all likelihood, have a decent major league career and being a lefty will help him stay around. Plus for Oakland.
Barreto has been a stud so far in the minors, but is likely still 2 or 3 years away. I suspect that Oakland will be happy they got him in the long run.
I suspect that the nugget in the deal could be Graveman. I have a gut feeling that this kid is going to be really good.
http://sports.nationalpost.com/2014/08/29/blue-jays-prospect-kendall-graveman-finds-a-new-pitch-by-accident-and-surges-through-the-minors/
bjsg, that’s an interesting story on Graveman. His K rate seems dangerously low — his success last year was built on control and an outrageously low HR rate (2 HRs in 171 total innings). I’d love to see him keep that up. Don’t know that I’d bet on it.
How about some Didi to the yanks discussion?
I think this is a more clear cut win for all teams involved. Much less proven players than the last time these three teams made a deal (Granderson, Kennedy, Jackson, Scherzer shuffle). I think this deal’s a little easier to figure out who wanted what from. Detroit had the prospects that Arizona wanted for Didi and the yankees had a pitcher Detroit valued but Arizona didn’t particularly like. The Tigers got an arm with flexibility for very little.
My guess is the diamonbacks wanted a swingman type pitcher with lots of control as well as a SS prospect. The yankees weren’t going to give up Jorge Mateo so they got someone else involved. I have a hard time seeing Robby Ray and Domingo Leyba as better than Greene and Mateo but I guess the detroit version was close enough from the Arizona point of view and keeping Mateo made the deal much more palatable for the yankees.
The yankees get the slick fielding Gregorious for a team controlled 5th starter. Didi did hit, just not in the MLB last year. His 2014 AAA line is .310/.389/.447/.836 in 260 PA’s and contrasts nicely with his .226/.290/.363/.653 MLB slash line over 299 PA’s. He’ll only be 25 on opening day. At the very least, he’s shown good patience at the plate. He’s actually contributed 2.5 WAR and positive WAA in his short MLB career and is still pre-arb for the 2015 season making him at the very worst a cheaper alternative to Stephen Drew. I’m surprised there wasn’t more the Diamondbacks could get for him honestly. The mets not offering a stud pitcher doesn’t make sense to me from either side. Didi is an extremely valuable piece of roster due to his defense, youth, and control even if he struggles to reach a .700 OPS.
I would have figured the mets give up Noah Syndergaard (21 SP, 4.60 ERA 133.0 2014/AAA IP) with a more distant SS prospect like Franklin Barreto (18 SS, .311/.384/.481/.865 in 328 2014/A- PA’s). If I’m the mets I jump at that but I guess it was too much for them and the Diamondbacks didn’t like Rafael Montero enough. Though I’m not sure Ray + Lebya is better than Montero + Barreto for them either so kind of a head scratcher that they didn’t prefer what the mets had.
Do you remember the Yankees’ last Dutch-born infielder?
Robert Eenhorn.
Another 3-way deal between the Yanks, Tigers and D-backs seems timely, now that Austin Jackson’s been dealt away and Max Scherzer may walk. I only hope this one turns out so well for my Bengals.
P.S. Reno is a hitter’s haven — even Mike Jacobs hit .300 there last year. I don’t think Didi has a high offensive ceiling, but he’ll still help the Yankees.