I imagine it must have made a splash at the time, but I completely missed Brandon Crawford‘s 7 hit game last August, only the fifth time since 1913 (and first since 1975) that a player has rolled a lucky seven (or more). But that wasn’t the only remarkable aspect of Crawford’s game; he also posted the 3rd highest recorded single game WPA score.
After the jump, more on baseball’s best WPA games and why Crawford’s is especially unusual.
Here’s the list of games with 7 or more hits, led by Johnny Burnett’s ridiculous 9 hit game in a losing cause more than 80 years ago.
| Rk | Player | Date | Tm | Opp | Rslt | PA | AB | R | H ▼ |
2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | WPA | RE24 | aLI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Johnny Burnett | 1932-07-10 | CLE | PHA | L 17-18 | 11 | 11 | 4 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0.909 | 4.886 | 2.124 |
| 2 | Brandon Crawford | 2016-08-08 | SFG | MIA | W 8-7 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1.444 | 5.576 | 2.692 |
| 3 | Rocky Colavito | 1962-06-24 | DET | NYY | L 7-9 | 11 | 10 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.561 | 2.511 | 1.676 |
| 4 | Cesar Gutierrez | 1970-06-21 (2) | DET | CLE | W 9-8 | 7 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.488 | 3.206 | 1.496 |
| 5 | Rennie Stennett | 1975-09-16 | PIT | CHC | W 22-0 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0.082 | 4.177 | .190 |
Like three of the other four games in the list, Crawford’s heroics came in a close contest, resulting in some impressive WPA scores, especially Crawford’s, enabling him to become the 49th player to crack the top 50 WPA games. The only player to make it twice … Hank Aaron at game no. 16 (1971-09-10) and game no. 28 (1959-08-18).
The highest recorded WPA games are led, of course, by Art Shamsky’s famous heroics in a losing cause for the Reds.
| Rk | Player | Date | Tm | Opp | Rslt | PA | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | BB | WPA | RE24 | aLI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Art Shamsky | 1966-08-12 | CIN | PIT | L 11-14 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 1.503 | 4.614 | 2.510 |
| 2 | Kiki Cuyler | 1932-08-31 | CHC | NYG | W 10-9 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 1.447 | 5.291 | 2.525 |
| 3 | Brandon Crawford | 2016-08-08 | SFG | MIA | W 8-7 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1.444 | 5.576 | 2.692 |
| 4 | Dolph Camilli | 1941-09-01 (1) | BRO | BSN | W 6-5 | 8 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1.398 | 4.722 | 2.610 |
| 5 | Jimmie Foxx | 1932-07-10 | PHA | CLE | W 18-17 | 10 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 1.307 | 7.227 | 2.212 |
| 6 | Jim Pagliaroni | 1965-09-21 | PIT | NYM | W 6-5 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1.287 | 3.915 | 2.124 |
| 7 | Brian Daubach | 2000-08-21 | BOS | ANA | W 7-6 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 1.253 | 3.479 | 2.796 |
| 8 | Nelson Cruz | 2014-09-07 | BAL | TBR | W 7-5 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 1.220 | 5.800 | 2.142 |
| 9 | Bobby Grich | 1979-07-15 | CAL | NYY | W 5-4 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 1.211 | 4.687 | 1.886 |
| 10 | Mel Hall | 1984-06-27 | CLE | MIN | W 6-4 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 1.206 | 4.505 | 2.448 |
| 11 | Carlos May | 1973-09-03 (1) | CHW | TEX | W 8-7 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1.204 | 5.944 | 2.403 |
| 12 | Willie Mays | 1962-05-26 | SFG | NYM | W 7-6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1.204 | 3.686 | 1.858 |
Shamsky’s 3 homers in only 3 PAs came about because he entered the game late, as part of an eighth inning double switch; no other substitute player has matched that home run total in any game, regardless of WPA. This game is also notable for the efforts of Pirate third baseman Bob Bailey who posted a 0.969 WPA that included a tie-breaking two run, two out double in the 11th that set the stage for Shamsky’s last dinger, a two out, game-tying shot in the bottom of the inning. Two players recording .900 WPA in a game has been recorded only one other time, in the A’s 18-17 win over the Indians (game no. 5 on the list above) that featured Jimmie Foxx’s 6 hits and three home runs for the victors, and Johnny Burnett’s remarkable 9 hits (game no. 1 on the first list) for the losers.
But, I said Crawford’s game was unusual among high WPA games, so let me explain why.
- Eleven of the top twelve WPA games featured two 0.400 WPA events during the game or one of 0.500 WPA. As you have likely guessed, Crawford was the exception with a top WPA event of only .333. Only Dante Bichette at WPA game no. 18, and Mike Greenwell at game no. 48 (when he drove in every Red Sox run in a 9-8 win) also do not have a .400 WPA event, but both had multiple .300 WPA events compared to just one for Crawford. Instead, Crawford steadily built up his WPA total with four more PAs that each improved Giant winning prospects by 18% to 27%. In fact, Crawford may have bested Shamsky for the top WPA game had he not twice run into the final out of an inning, in the 4th and 14th frames (and assuming that not doing so the first time would not have ultimately resulted in an earlier decision in the contest).
- Three of Crawford’s 8 plate appearances came with the bases empty (including on both of his extra-base hits) and two more with only a runner at first base. Of the other three PAs with RISP, one was his lone out of the game, an inning-ending strikeout. Not your typical setup for a high WPA/high LI game.
- Crawford recorded his WPA feat as a shortstop. Next shortstop on the WPA game list is the Mets’ Jerry Buchek, checking in at WPA game no. 43 (1.063).
- Crawford neither scored nor drove in 3 runs. You have to go down to WPA game no. 45 (1.059 by the Twins’ Eric Soderholm) to find another such game.
- Crawford did not hit a home run. Only three more of the top 50 WPA games were also homerless (Ryan Langerhans no. 25, Willie Montanez no. 41, Joe Garagiola no. 50).
- Crawford’s 7 hits came off 6 of the 9 Marlin pitchers who worked in the game. It’s a different era now, of course, but that’s more pitchers than any of the other 7 hit games (Colavito had hits against 4 of 6 Yankee pitchers, and Gutierrez and Stennett had hits against all 5 of the opposing pitchers in their games), and especially more than Johnny Burnett’s 9 hits that came off only two A’s pitchers, including 8 hits against reliever Eddie Rommel*.
*Rommel pitched 17 of the 18 innings against the Indians (his 14 runs and 29 hits allowed are both the most recorded by any winning pitcher), likely because of a short bench owing to the contest being a one game Sunday “road trip” to Cleveland (local law in Philadelphia did not permit Sunday baseball, so A’s manager and owner Connie Mack saved on travel costs by taking a much reduced roster on these enforced singleton road swings during home stands, a penny-pinching tactic that was particularly surprising given that the A’s were a top flight team in the early 1930’s, so losing one or two games because of a short bench might ultimately cost his team a pennant). If you’re wondering, Rommel’s outing is not the longest recorded relief appearance; that distinction belongs to Zip Zabel of the Cubs, who relieved starter Bert Humphries in the first inning of a June 17, 1915 contest and went the rest of the way (as did 36 year-old catcher Roger Bresnahan in his final season) in Chicago’s 4-3 win in 19 innings over Brooklyn’s Jeff Pfeffer who went the distance for the Robins (Pfeffer is the only pitcher since 1913 with a pair of 18+ IP CG losses).
The Giants reached the All-Star break last season with the majors’ top record of 57-33 but stumbled badly the rest of the way at 30-42, including 2-11 to start the second half. Did a win in this historic game right the ship, at least temporarily? In a word, no. San Francisco lost the next game and 6 of the next 8; only a 6-2 finish allowed them to sneak into the wild card game against the Mets.
As for Crawford, there was nothing to indicate a game like this might be in the offing. Nor did the game set him off on a hot streak. Crawford went into this game on a 5 for 31 run and followed it with 4 for 27. Such is the nature of baseball.
This is a wonderful piece, Doug. Aside from the stealth ordinariness that characterized Crawford’s extraordinary day, there are so many terrific games to explore in this post! Look at Kiki Cuyler’s game on August 31, 1932. It’s not just Cuyler’s WPA — the entire scenario in the bottom of the 10th, with the Cubs down by four runs with two out and the bases empty. . . . I wonder how rare that is.
Stennett’s game is remarkable for the fact that by the time he comes up for the second time, his team has a 94% WP and it never decreases, so none of Stennett’s remaining six hits matter at all – he wasn’t even the WPA leader on his team for the game, and Dave Parker got on base 5 times, hit a HR, drove in 5 runs, and had a negative WPA, entirely because he hit a run scoring SF in the 1st! Thinking back to the exchange on WPA in Doom’s 1998 MVP post, I guess I’ll have to reflect harder on the significance of the stat.
Game #12 by Willie Mays shows how the game has changed. Had two HR and a triple against bonus baby Jay Hook, who went the distance in a 7-6 loss in 10 innings. The two homers came in the 8th (game-tying) and 10th (game-winning). For his career, Mays was 16 for 32 against Hook with two doubles, two triples, 6 HR and 18 RBI. So, if Hook’s pitching today, you can be pretty sure he’s doesn’t get to face Mays in the late innings of close games.
Hook’s .319 W-L% is the lowest career mark among live ball era starters with 750 IP. Part of that was playing for the Mets for their first three seasons, but Hook wasn’t a whole lot better playing for better teams in Cincinnati (in his second career start for Cincy, the 20 year-old had a no-hitter through 5 innings but was removed from the game … for a 17 year-old making the second and final appearance of his career; Dave Skaugstad kept the team no-hitter going for another 1.2 innings before coming undone with walk, double, walk, walk)
I never knew that about Hook’s ’57 no-hit start. There seems no real reason to pull Hook other than pitch count, and I didn’t realize Birdie Tebbetts kept pitch counts. It was the last game of the season and the Reds’ fourth-place finish was already locked in. Hook’s bio says that he thought Tebbetts wanted to get a look at some other youngsters and, maybe, protect Hook from blowing the no-hitter, but what Tebbetts said, apparently, was, “You’re too young to pitch a no-hitter.”
Clearly, Stengel wasn’t worrying about pitch count. But if you want some idea of why Hook might have been left in to face Mays even today, look at the performance of the rest of the pitching staff the days before and after. Would you really have wanted any of those other guys facing Mays?
In looking over the background to Hook’s day, I noticed something I’d forgotten about the ’62 Mets. I remember them as in last place from start to finish, mostly because I remember that they burst from the gate 0-9 and wound up 40-120. But there was a stretch shortly before the Mays game when they won nine of twelve games, and at that point, they were actually all the way up in eighth place. From then on, they went 28-101 (a .217 W-L percentage over 129 games!). On the day of the Mays game, they were still clinging to a half-game lead over the Cubs, although technically back in 10th place on a percentage basis. Perhaps Stengel was blinded by the prospect of glory.
But talk about things being different: On September 9, the Mets and Colt 45s played to a 7-7 tie in 8 innings. The game was called at 7pm because the Mets had to catch a plane. The game’s start time had been moved back until 4pm because the weather was too hot to bear, and the Colt 45s had league permission to postpone start times to let the afternoon heat to begin to cool. The original idea was to resume play in New York on September 20, but as it turned out, the Mets and Colt 45s had a double-header that day and finishing out the suspended game became an unrealized dream, as the 1,481 fans who showed up in the Polo Grounds apparently felt two games was more than enough – by the time the Mets finished up dropping both, writers counted 200 people in the stands. Hook lost the opener, assisted by five Met errors, including his own, which opened the gate to three unearned runs. Where are the great teams of yore?
Over the last 129 games for the 1916 Athletics, their record was 26 wins, 102 losses and 1 tie for a winning percentage of .203.
As a fan of the ’62 Mets, I always resented the ’16 A’s and ’35 Braves for having superior records of inferiority. I initially consoled myself with the majesty of the Mets’ 120 losses, and I was despondent when I discovered that the 1899 Cleveland Outcasts had lost 134 in a shorter season.
Bob Moorhead and Craig Anderson, the Mets’ top two relievers in ’62, both handled Mays pretty well over their careers. Mays was a combined 4 for 22 against them, albeit with a home run against each.
Your thinking is good, Doug, and your initial point well taken. But I think that it’s interesting to note how exceptionally poor Stengel’s options were, and that there were reasons why Stengel might have shied from those two guys or anyone else available to him on that day.
Moorhead had relieved in the third the day before, and after his 2/3 of an inning, a 1-3 deficit had become a 1-7 deficit (he relieved the following day, too, and gave up a homer in the only inning he pitched – his ERA was 5.00 as a reliever at the time, and he had never faced Mays to that point in his career – when he did for the first time, in relief of Hook on June 2, Mays welcomed him to the Bigs with a two-run HR).
Anderson had blown the game two days earlier, giving up two runs in his 1.1 innings, having entered with a tie. He next relieved the day after the Mays game, entering in the 7th with a 5-2 lead; after his 1/3 inning the game was tied (he gave Mays a single in their first meeting of the season).
If you poke around among the pitchers available on May 26 and check out how they had been performing, I think it’s clearer why Stengel might have decided not to give Hook the hook. Obviously, it didn’t work out, Given the way staffs are constructed and pitch counts headlined today, you would never find a starter pitching into the tenth after giving up five runs in the first place. But if you did I’m not certain that a 2017 manager with a team as bereft of pitching as the ’62 Mets, even realizing how hot Mays had been against Hook that day, might not feel the odds favored sticking with the man who was, at the time, his best starter, given that every member of the relief staff had been blowing up ballgames on a daily basis, on their way to a 17 game losing streak.
Well said, epm.
Even in today’s games, with stats on everything, managers still go with the guys who have been pitching well lately. If one of them lays an egg, the manager will probably come back to him, but if he has a couple more stinkers, then he’ll probably be pitching in lower leverage situations until he gets his groove back.
More generally, a lot more managing in yesteryear was done by the gut rather than by the book. Like the bullpen coach picking the reliever who would come into the game base on who “looked” the sharper of the two warming up. Managers probably also relied on their hitters and pitchers saying who they could handle or not handle well, as I doubt precise matchup stats were readily available. Some hitters and pitchers were good at self-assessment, but for many others their recollections were clouded by bravado, modesty, one good or bad AB, or whatever. I wonder how many maintained personal stats of how they did against each pitcher/batter? My guess is probably not many.
I remember reading about Ty Cobb and the trouble he had at first with batting against Walter Johnson. Thus, he was trying to come up with some different approach that could give him an edge against Johnson, but hadn’t found it yet. Then, one day, while Cobb was in the batter’s box, Johnson hit the batter at the plate, who wasn’t hurt, but Cobb noticed that Johnson visibly cringed. It occurred (correctly) to Cobb that Johnson might have some dread of hitting batters, so from that day forward, Cobb crowded the plate and started to hit Johnson much better, as Johnson was indeed reluctant to pitch Cobb inside for fear of hitting him. Today, hitters probably get overloaded with more information than they can process about pitchers’ tendencies but, in the old days, successful batters probably had to their own coach a lot of the time.
Great story about Cobb – and Johnson had good reason to worry: he holds the modern record for HBP.
Thinking further about the Mays game, one reason the Mets were on an 0-17 run was that they were facing the two old NYC teams, the class of the league that year, for the first time, with home/away series for 13 straight games, all of which the Mets naturally lost. They were hampered by the fact that when they went back to the Polo Grounds to host the Dodgers and Giants, the “home” fans rooted for the visitors with manic zeal (I can say that with confidence because I was at the first of those games, on the 30th, along with 55,000 other fans suspending our loyalties to pretend we were watching Brooklyn play – Hook lost again, this time to Koufax). The Mets were 3-15 in home games against those teams – but Hook had two of those three home wins, CG victories over Billy Pierce and Don Drysdale.
On Walter… here’s a boxscore from his 1913 (the greatest season ever?), in which he won a game in which he came in to relieve a guy who was throwing a no-hitter:
http://www.baseball-reference.com/boxes/BOS/BOS191305030.shtml
This appearance pushed his scoreless innings streak to 38.
It would go to 55.2
Weird game, Voomo! Joe Engel was allowing almost two base runners an inning with all those walks and hit batsmen, but Johnson’s rate was about the same, and he was giving up hits. Bedient pitched better than either of them and he lost.
But why would you think 1913 was even a contender for greatest season?
Weird game, Voomo. Engel was letting on almost two runners per inning with all those walks and hit batsmen, but Johnson actually was no better – his rate was about the same, but he was letting up hits. It was Bedient who pitched a great game, and he lost.
Weird double-post, too. Sorry — I thought a machine crash had wiped out the first, and in the middle I figured out you were referring to Johnson’s 1913 season, not the leagues’.
The Colavito game, Tigers losing to Yankees in 22 innings, lasted 7:00 hours. Yogi Berra at age 37 caught the entire game for the Yankees—strange, to say the least. Elston Howard pinch hit, so he wasn’t on the DL, and John Blanchard played the entire game in left field.
As for the seven hit list, three of the players had oWAR under ten for their careers. Gutierrez ended up in negative territory. But no one can take that one game away from any of them.
Other than a pinch hit appearance, Yogi got 4 days off after that, and only one start in a week.
It’s true that he got some time off, but this was only his third start as a catcher all year; he’d caught a full game the day before, and the game time was 7:00. But Howard had pinch hit in the 7th, before it was obvious the game would be long (he came up with the bases loaded, and if he’d delivered, it wouldn’t have been). Blanchard, who had become the regular Right fielder, could have been shifted to catch during the extra innings, but Mantle had been removed in the seventh, and moving Blanchard would probably have meant putting Bob Cerv in right: Cerv did pinch hit in the 16th, which brought his average down to .118; the Yankees traded him after the game and he was out of baseball a month later). I’m not sure there were other viable position players on the roster to put in the outfield to replace Blanchard by the time the excessive length of the game made Berra’s knees an issue, as those fifteen scoreless innings hobbled by.
I guess I can understand saving him to pinch-hit, but you think that would have been the cue to make the move you suggested and keep Cerv in the game (he pinch-hit for the pitcher, so it wouldn’t have meant burning another position player) and give Berra the rest of the day off. Instead, Cerv grounded out and took a seat on the bench.
But, it wasn’t the last time an older catcher got abused the same way. In 1984, 36 year-old Carlton Fisk caught all 18 innings against the Brewers before the game was suspended. Play was resumed the next day, and Fisk was back behind the plate for 7 more frames before Harold Baines finally ended the eight hour marathon with a 25th inning home run. Then they played the regularly scheduled game, which Fisk didn’t start, but was brought in to catch the last two innings. He got the next game off, but then caught 8 complete games over the next 10 days.
There’s a very rare move in that 1984 game (at least, I think it’s rare). At the start of the top of the 21st, Ron Reed came in to pitch. He was not in the batting order (since this was an AL game with DHs). In the bottom of the 21st, Chicago (mounting a three-run comeback in the 21st inning to re-tie the score – has that ever happened?) sent in a pinch runner. When the ChiSox retook the field for the 22nd, the pinch runner was replaced in the line-up by Ron Reed, who had already played an inning. I actually didn’t know that was allowed by the rules – inserting in the line-up a player who is already in the game – but now that I think about it, it’s logical enough.
As for Cerv, the Yankees were fighting to stay in the race in June ’62 and Cerv was effectively done – sold to a first-year expansion team two days later (a sad end for one of that rare breed: a Kansas City Athletics All-Star). He’d been in the field in only three games, none for a month, and had been replaced mid-game in two of those. I guess Houk simply wasn’t willing to throw in the towel to save Yogi’s legs. Maybe it was revenge for all those years Houk had sat on the bench watching his career go by, waiting for chances to save Yogi’s legs that almost never came.
It wasn’t the 21st inning, but this game, which had been scoreless, featured matching 5 spots in extras.
http://www.baseball-reference.com/boxes/SEA/SEA201306050.shtml
Great find, Doug. And look at Addison Reed. He enters the game in extras, allows 5 ER (including a grand slam) in his initial inning, and walks off with a W. (Had he allowed any other number, of course, he couldn’t have gotten the win.)
A bit of irony is that Reed did not pick up a blown save … because, with a 5-run lead, it wasn’t a save opportunity. That game is one of just 14 since 1913 where a reliever got the win allowing 5+ runs in an appearance of three innings or less, the most recent being a one-inning stint by the Braves’ Luis Avilan in 2014.
http://www.baseball-reference.com/boxes/PHI/PHI201404140.shtml?utm_source=direct&utm_medium=Share&utm_campaign=ShareTool
On 4-30-1919 the Dodgers (Robins) and Phils each scored 3 runs in the 19th inning. The game ended in a 9-9 tie of 20 innings.
I see that Joe Oeschger was the Phillie starter in that game, Richard. Both he and Burleigh Grimes went the 19-inning distance, each giving up 9 runs. One year and one day later, Oeschger took the mound against the Robins again, pitching for the Braves. This time he only allowed one run, but the result was the same, only seven innings longer still.
Responding to epm and his comment about a pitcher moving to a field position. Certainly rare as you noted, mainly because teams don’t want pitchers playing anywhere but the mound, if only to keep their bat out of the lineup. Had it been an NL game, there would then have been two pitchers in the batting order, quite a handicap deep in extra innings. Hopefully the new pitcher who was brought in did not throw with the same hand; always having the platoon advantage would be the one benefit of having two pitchers on the field.
Doug, Actually Reed didn’t move to a field position, he moved to a batting position. It’s complicated; more than I first thought.
Marc Hill had come in to play 1B for the White Sox, batting third. When he got on base in the 21st, Rich Dotson (a starting pitcher) was sent in to pinch run, placed in the number three batting slot. At the end of the inning, Dotson couldn’t play 1B, so Tom Paciorek (who, oddly, had entered the game in the 4th — why would an outfielder enter in the fourth? — Ron Kittle, whom he replaced at the end of the third, played full games the days before and after) was moved from LF to 1B, and since Dotson couldn’t play LF either, the DH, Dave Stegman, was moved to LF. But where would Dotson play – or if he couldn’t play, who would replace him? The answer is that he was replaced nowhere on the field – with the DH in LF there were already nine players on the field. So Dotson was out of the game. But although he was unneeded in the field, his batting slot needed to be filled, so Reed, who had not had a batting slot, was placed in Dotson’s, and so played part of the game out of the lineup and part in it.
The basic double switch was to move the DH into the field and the pitcher into the lineup. I don’t know why, but for some reason it seems stranger to me that a player who had been in the game but not in the lineup before should stay in the game and suddenly appear in the lineup, though I suppose it’s no stranger that a DH should suddenly emerge onto the field in the 22nd inning (actually, Stegman had only come into the game in the 8th, as a pinch runner).
The reason I noticed this is that Reed’s batting line lists him as “Ron Reed P-P,” indicating that he first entered the game as a pitcher and then was moved to pitcher. That sort of captures it: he started out as a pitcher under AL rules, and then moved into the role of a pitcher under NL rules . . .
Thanks for clarifying the play, epm. More complicated in one sense, but simpler also since, as you noted, it was really just a case of the DH taking the field and the pitcher moving into the batting order.
EPM –
Took a little digging but this article mentions that Kittle left the game early due to shin splints. Paciorek was expecting to have the day off, so he ordered a pizza and was munching away when he was ordered into the game.
http://www.pressreader.com/canada/national-post-national-edition/20140506/282037620177479
Terrific find, David. Some games are so rich that you could write a novel around them.
Cesar Guitierrez was an unlikely 7-hit getter.
1970 was his only season as a starter, and he was good for -26 RBat
After his big day, it took him 12 games and 42 AB to get his next 7 hits.
Looks like Gutierrez had the dreaded no-bat, no-glove combo.
– Walked in only 5% of PAs but his OBP was still almost as high as his slugging, thanks to .046 ISO
– In his one season as a regular shortstop, had a range factor 0.63 chances below league average, and did so on a team with three lefties among their top 4 starters