Return on Investment: Pitching WAR by Age

How is WAR contributed by major league pitchers? At what age do pitchers become most valuable to a team? I’ll be looking at those question in response to a suggestion by mosc, a regular and thoughtful contributor to our discussions here at HHS.

More after the jump.

To investigate those questions, I’ve captured total FanGraphs WAR by Age for each season since 1901. Here is how WAR has been shared by age since 1901.

Pitching WAR Share By Age Range Since 1901

Obviously some variation over the years, but more consistent for the post-war period when, with few exceptions, there has been at least 20% of WAR from 25 and under pitchers, at least 70% from those 30 and under, and at least 90% from everyone 35 and younger. Looking at the present period, it’s worth noting that, for the first time in 40 years, there have been 7 consecutive seasons with 75% of WAR coming from pitchers aged 30 and younger.

But how does the share of WAR by pitcher age compare to share of innings pitched by age? Those two quantities are illustrated below.

Pitching WAR and IP Share By Age Since 1901

They track closely because, regardless of age, there is a standard that major league pitchers must attain. And, it can be a very small difference between that standard and stardom or, conversely, between the standard and obscurity. We’ve all seen it – a pitchers loses a bit off his fastball or his slider doesn’t have quite the bite it once had and last year’s All-Star is suddenly back in the minors.

That said, while the WAR and IP shares are quite close, they aren’t identical. And, if you look closely, you’ll see that the IP Share bars are higher for the younger ages while the WAR Share bars are higher for the older ages. It’s that difference that I want to study. To do so, I’ve derived the metric WAR Contribution as:

WAR Contribution Equation

Thus, WAR Contribution, when calculated for each age, shows in percentage terms how much more or less WAR value was contributed by pitchers of that age relative to their share of innings pitched. A negative value means those pitchers had a lower proportion of WAR than of IP. Positive means the opposite.

Here’s what those result looks like, shown as vertical bars, with an overlay of the WAR per 100 IP for each age.

Pitching WAR By Age,Since 1901What are these results telling us? First, as with many investments, patience will be needed before young pitchers start to return positive dividends. But, once they do, those returns continue to grow through most of the rest of the pitchers’ career. Looking at the WAR per 100 IP line shows a value between 1.0 and 1.2 for most of a pitcher’s career, translating into a range of 2.0 to 2.4 WAR for the average pitcher in a 200 IP season.

Why is there such a big move up in WAR Contribution with pitchers in their late 30s? Intuitively, one might think the returns would diminish as pitcher performance declines with advancing years. What is happening, though, is selection bias. What I mean by that is that, as pitchers age, their “replacement level” rises. For example, a team may give 150 innings to a 22 year-old with a 5.78 ERA because it’s an investment in the future returns from that pitcher. There won’t be the same tolerance for a 37 year-old with that ERA who will be judged as not having positive future returns and will thus be replaced before he can accumulate those kind of innings. Thus, as pitcher age advances, and especially with the older ages, the bulk of the innings will be contributed by smaller numbers of mostly better pitchers.

Here are the same results, broken into different eras. Because we are looking at shorter time periods, there is more susceptibility to distortions at the margins due to representation of small numbers of pitchers and, thus, small proportions of IP. When the IP Share number is small, even small differences between it and the WAR Share number can result in big differences in WAR contribution, a mostly illusory result. With that caveat:

Pitching WAR By Age 1901-1919
The dead ball era shows fairly consistent results with the overall pattern. The dip at age 36 is most likely anomalous.

Pitching WAR By Age 1920-1945
Younger pitchers had particular difficulty facing the heavy hitters of the 1920s and 1930s, with positive results not being seen until age 30. While WAR results are normalized to the era, thinking in human terms, it was probably harder for young pitchers in this era if only because of the psychological effects of being pounded on by the likes of Ruth, Gehrig, Foxx, Greenberg and so many others.

Pitching WAR By Age 1946-1968
A return to a more normal pattern with positive WAR contribution starting in the mid-20s and reduced contribution levels for older pitchers. Pattern breaks may possibly be related to the juxtaposition of a high offensive era starting around 1950 and a low offensive era over the last 5 or 6 years of this period.

Pitching WAR By Age 1969-1992
Coming out of the bonus baby era, this period shows consistent WAR per 100 IP starting from the early 20s, probably the result of earlier application of selection bias in that only the very best pitchers are being given significant innings at a very early age, and few young pitchers get significant innings until “they’re ready”.

Pitching WAR By Age 1993-2013
This period “reverses” to some extent the selection bias at young ages seen in the preceding period in that young pitchers of all ability levels begin seeing their innings “managed” so that their workloads are now “artificially” controlled rather than being primarily dictated by ability levels. The result is a return of increasing WAR per 100 IP through the early 20s.

What may not be immediately evident from the above charts becomes clearer in the chart below.
Pitching WAR Per 100 IP By Age Range Since 1901
Sharing innings among more pitchers does yield improved pitching results overall. However, there can be too much of a good thing as that steady improvement in overall WAR per 100 IP has leveled off and even declined slightly since the late 1970s. What has driven this improvement? It would seem that has occurred primarily because of improved results for younger pitchers, probably due to some combination of more sophisticated player development and a more cautious approach to workload for those pitchers.

It may be worth noting that the trend lines for the different age categories are presently converging at about the 1.2 WAR per 100 IP level. That convergence was previously seen only in the mid-1950s and early 1990s. Presumably that would indicate optimal selection bias for pitchers of all ages in that there is a uniform level of pitching quality regardless of a pitcher’s age. Whether it really means that I will leave to your astute judgment.

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mosc
mosc
9 years ago

I giggled menically reading through this. Thanks Doug! Even threw in a moving average on there, way to flex some statistics muscle! I thought the total WAR by age would be a more aggressive shape. You tend to think of young pitchers being standouts and generally producing less as they get older. Your best guys can maintain their level for longer, but it always seems like losing to attrition. These graphs point a different picture where guys might need more time to figure things out than we think and we may be over-using younger arms at the MLB level. Very… Read more »

Hartvig
Hartvig
9 years ago

Much to digest here but that big spike in pitching WAR in the 36 to 40 age range during the 1920’s makes a log of sense with Walter Johnson, Pete Alexander, Dazzy Vance, Dolph Luque, Stan Coveleski, et al.

Artie Z.
Artie Z.
9 years ago
Reply to  Hartvig

In the 1920-1945 seasons, I wonder (1) how many innings the legal spitballers pitched during that time (particularly the 1920s), (2) the average age of those guys (I’m suspecting they were already established, so they were likely older pitchers), and (3) if they were even effective at all (some certainly were – Coveleski, for instance). I also wonder if some of the older, more established pitchers who were not legal spitballers were able to get away with a few things that the younger players couldn’t. I’m curious as to how different the picture would look (if at all) if the… Read more »

Hartvig
Hartvig
9 years ago
Reply to  Artie Z.

Great point: Red Faber was still pitching close to 200 innings (and effectively) at age 42 and Clarence Mitchell did the same thing as a 40 year old both in 1931, Grimes lasted until he was 40 & was the last legal spitballer in 1934, Urban Shocker was a mainstay on the powerhouse 1927 Yankees at age 36 (and would be dead within a year) and the best example was probably Jack Quinn- answer to many an oldest/youngest/connections question- lasted until he was 49 and pitched over 200 innings as a 44 year old in 1928.

birtelcom
Editor
9 years ago

Very interesting analysis, Doug. Your observation about selection bias and the natural reluctance of teams to give a regular turn to mediocre older pitchers had me curious which pitchers manage to defy the selection bias. I checked the Play Index for pitchers 35 or older with at least 162 IP and pitching WAR less than 2. In recent years, there are about two guys per year who qualify. Last season there were two pitchers who met the criteria: A.J. Burnett And Ryan Dempster. In 2012, there were Bruce Chen and Tim Hudson. In 2011, there were Livan Hernandez, Derek Lowe… Read more »

Artie Z.
Artie Z.
9 years ago
Reply to  birtelcom

I understand that teams may be more willing to put up with bad performances today by younger pitchers so that they benefit from future good performances, but are the rates that different for younger pitchers? Checking 2004-2013 for pitchers under 24 who had 162 IP and 2.0 WAR or less I get pretty similar numbers to what b’com finds for 35+: 2013 – 2 2012 – 5 2011 – 6 2010 – 5 2009 – 4 2008 – 4 2007 – 4 2006 – 2 2005 – 4 2004 – 4 That’s 40 seasons over a decade by 32 pitchers,… Read more »

Artie Z.
Artie Z.
9 years ago
Reply to  Doug

It breaks out a little bit differently using different thresholds as you suggest: Some results for 110+ IP and less than 1.35 WAR (which is the 2.0 WAR for 162 IP adjusted downward to 110 IP). Some of these seasons are on the 162 IP with less than 2 WAR lists as well: 35 and above – 45 seasons by 32 pitchers (Moyer leading the way with 4 seasons, and there are some GREAT pitchers on this list: Halladay 2012, Maddux 2008, Mussina 2007; in addition some really good pitchers like Leiter 2005, Wells 2007, Hudson 2013, and Jamie Moyer)… Read more »

mosc
mosc
9 years ago
Reply to  Doug

You know I take back my earlier comments about younger pitchers because you know what? They’re replacement players. Your typical team does not have enough pitching depth, anywhere near it, to avoid giving hundreds of innings to guys they’d generally much rather leave in the minors. As a result, you get guys who belong in AAA pitching in the majors routinely. Those guys shouldn’t be expected to do well, and for the most part they don’t. But they probably do as well as an older player not good enough to land on a 25 man roster anywhere who is hanging… Read more »

John Autin
Editor
9 years ago

Doug, this is cool stuff. I have to come back to this.

darren dreifort
darren dreifort
9 years ago

What I do not get is how this is better than traditional stats. Having pitched between 1994-2004 I find all this “new age” stuff to be utter garbage. Please excuse my ignorance but if all this stuff was out when I was pitching I could have been even a worse pitcher than I truly was.

mosc
mosc
9 years ago

Well I guess the first thing to understand is that the skillset required to throw a baseball 60’6″ with consistency, velocity, and movement may not be the same skillset required to understand statistical analysis. The second major point is baseball is often played by guys with long careers over long seasons over games with hundreds of pitches meaning things generally average out quite nicely making statistics that deal with these huge numbers essential. How would you evaluate a pitcher without knowing how many innings he pitched or a hitter without knowing how many at bats he had? Those are important… Read more »

Brendan Bingham
Brendan Bingham
9 years ago
Reply to  mosc

mosc: More and more players are getting to the majors via the college route. Surely some of them must have had some training in statistics, either as math students or as students in fields that lean heavily on statistical analysis (economics, psychometrics, epidemiology, etc). While your point, that baseball players know less about statistics than statistics guys, is generally true, it seems there must be at least a few major leaguers who know enough about statistical analysis to offer us “statistics guys” some meaningful insights about the current state of sabermetrics. I, for one, would greatly value that kind of… Read more »

mosc
mosc
9 years ago

I agree. There are several guys who understand statistics in the major leagues. Max Scherzer (university of Missouri) seems to get it. He was quoted several times last year through his Cy Young chase talking about how W/L records really didn’t matter (he had quite the win total). The Oakland system stresses walks for hitters and walk prevention for pitchers, a lot of guys who came up through there pitch with a more “new age” approach.

no statistician but
no statistician but
9 years ago
Reply to  mosc

Mosc:

There’s a third thing you (generally) have to accept:

Big league baseball players play baseball astronomically better than statistics guys, and whereas the ballplayers might be able to apply stats to their benefit, I doubt that most stats guys would stand much of a chance doing anything to improve their ball-playing abilities.

Artie Z
Artie Z
9 years ago

I think that’s a little harsh – plenty of people who do stats (or at least understand their value) played baseball at some level. There are plenty of stats people who could very likely greatly improve their ball-playing abilities with training – major leaguers train to improve their performance all the time. Would the statisticians become major leaguers – I would guess that would be highly unlikely. But the major leaguers are highly unlikely to become stats professors at a top 25 school – I really don’t see most major leaguers worried about the efficiency and consistency of estimators. I’m… Read more »

bstar
bstar
9 years ago
Reply to  Artie Z

I read an article sometime last year about Scherzer and his relationship with his brother. Apparently it was his brother (RIP) who was the stathead and taught Max about them.

Voomo Zanzibar
Voomo Zanzibar
9 years ago

@6 DD, You would not have likely been any worse, though you might have been paid a bit less. (That’s about as snarky a comment as you’re likely to see at this site. We’re one of the last civilized locales on the internet. Welcome to the discussion) The analysis in this article is a step or two beyond your everyday number crunching. Doug is attempting to chart historical trends in a bigger picture sort of way. The use of the stat “WAR” in itself requires a certain leap of faith if you are not already deeply steeped in this stuff.… Read more »

mosc
mosc
9 years ago
Reply to  Voomo Zanzibar

We can look at it another way if you want. Statistical analysis can tell us the ways Darren Dreifort was successful and the reasons why he was unsuccessful, on average. On the first level, we can look at hits, walks, strikeouts, and home runs while you were on the mound. Hits involve to a large extent your defense but the other three are almost completely your doing. The rate at which you walked opposing hitters was considerably higher than the league average, strikeouts were considerably higher as well, and home runs were around league average. The groundball rate has also… Read more »

Voomo Zanzibar
Voomo Zanzibar
9 years ago
Reply to  Voomo Zanzibar

DD, To continue… advances stats can be used for both positive and negative measures. For example, the ratio of 6 WAR to $64million equates to more than ten million dollars of Dodgers green for every win produced above “replacement level.” Now, looking at that stat, I can see why you think this is all “crap.” However, I found something you were great at. Hitting. 1.9 WAR as a batter In only 265 Plate appearances. Running a search at the baseball-reference play index, we discover that there are only SIX pitchers in all of baseball history who were more valuable with… Read more »

Voomo Zanzibar
Voomo Zanzibar
9 years ago
Reply to  Voomo Zanzibar

Described as a ratio, including all pitchers, regardless of Plate Appearances:

PA less than 140* times WAR…

Your career is one of only 43 in history that useful at the plate.

John Autin
Editor
9 years ago

Doug, I’ll suggest another factor in the generally negative WAR Contribution of younger pitchers — a sort of negative selection bias, by which teams minimize their returns from regression to the mean. What often happens when a young, unproven pitcher starts out poorly? They send him back to the minors. As with any small sample, some of those poor results are basically random, not reflecting the pitcher’s true ability. But those bad results are already banked. This is bound to cause some distortion in our picture of young pitchers’ WAR Contribution. How big it is, I couldn’t guess. Here’s what… Read more »