As football season gets underway, here’s a look at baseball’s version of the takeaway/giveaway margin. On the gridiron, the unit of measurement is turnovers and winning teams usually need to show a positive margin between turnovers forced (takeaways) and turnovers surrendered (giveaways). In baseball, the metric is more like points off of turnovers, as this post will consider unearned runs scored vs. unearned runs allowed, those runs being the “points” arising from errors forced and errors committed, More after the jump.
Here are this year’s leaders (through Aug 31) in Takeaway/Giveaway margin, that is unearned runs scored minus unearned runs allowed.
The Astros lead the way with the second best UER Scored and fourth best UER Allowed. The Dodgers, the other runaway league leader, have done things a bit differently with the second lowest UER Scored, but also (and more importantly) the lowest UER Allowed, an approach also favored by last year’s AL champion Indians, the only other team to score and allow fewer than 40 unearned runs. The Yankees are the runaway leaders in UER Scored but rank only third in UER Margin, owing to a UER Allowed total ranking near the bottom of the pack.
Surprises for me in this table include: the Orioles, with indifferent pitching but a lowish UER Allowed total; the Dodgers with so few unearned runs scored; and the D-Backs, challenging for a wildcard berth with the second worst UER Margin.
To provide some historical perspective here are the range of team UER Margin totals by season since 1913.
Today’s margins, both positive and negative, are nothing like what was seen 50 to 100 years ago. The reason, of course, is the decline in unearned runs as a proportion of total runs (blue line), a trend reflecting better athletes, better equipment and, in recent years, better technology that has been used to position players on the diamond for (hopefully) optimal defensive utility.
After about 30 years with little change in unearned run rates, these started to decline in the last half of the 1970s for the reasons alluded to, but also due to the increase in strikeout rates that continues, seemingly unabated, to this day. More strikeouts means fewer balls in play and fewer chances to commit errors that lead to unearned runs.
As would be expected, pennant winners have generally done well in takeaway/giveaway margin, especially in the years preceding divisional play, as shown below.
Almost every pennant winner recorded a positive or minimally negative takeaway/giveaway margin, and a number above +50 almost guaranteed a World Series berth. There are somewhat more teams that have a negative takeaway/giveaway margin compared to those with a positive total, reflecting the imbalance through most of this period of a few dominant teams but many more mediocre ones.
Since the inception of divisional play and a longer road to a pennant title, the chart looks a bit different (the post-season qualifiers are shown either as a pennant winner or by their regular season finish, but not both).
Some notes on the chart above.
- As was suggested by the first chart. the magnitude of the takeaway/giveaway margin has declined appreciably from the preceding period, reflecting a lower proportion of total runs that are unearned.
- As with the preceding period, pennant winners usually post a positive takeaway/giveaway margin but, with the declining magnitude of the margin (and, therefore, its significance), more teams reach the post-season with a negative margin.
- There is less skewing of the data to negative margins, likely reflecting more performance parity among teams in the divisional era.
The question that remains, though, is whether a good takeaway/giveaway margin is a cause or an effect of championship-caliber teams. To answer that question, I looked at the takeaway/giveaway percentage margin
being the difference between the percentage of runs scored that are unearned and the percentage of runs allowed that are unearned.
This approach looks at scoring and allowing unearned runs in each team’s own offensive and defensive context so that a positive result indicates a team that had a higher proportion of runs scored that are unearned than runs allowed, regardless of whether the absolute margin was positive. Similarly, a negative margin reflects a higher proportion of unearned runs allowed than unearned runs scored, regardless of whether the absolute margin is negative. Thus, if achieving a good takeaway/giveaway margin leads to team success, the same pattern observed for absolute takeaway/giveaway margin by successful teams should also hold for the percentage margin.
But, does it? Plotting team results for the same two periods as above shows this result.
No discernible pattern here with pennant winners mixed in more or less randomly with the rest of the teams, for both typical ( +/- 5%) and extreme results.
Similar story for the divisional era.
The one noteworthy aspect of this illustration is that the increase in playoff teams starting in 1995 has, probably unsurprisingly, produced a greater variance in this metric, with slightly more playoff teams in negative territory than positive. Teams with good offense and good pitching, but average or worse defense, can certainly make the post-season but will be hard-pressed to record a positive number in the percentage metric owing to allowed unearned runs representing a relatively large proportion of a smaller number of total runs allowed.
The results shown in the last two charts are suggestive of takeaway/giveaway margin being an effect of being a good team rather than a cause. That is, good teams are not good because they have a good takeaway/giveaway margin. Rather, good teams are likely to have a good takeaway/giveaway margin because they are good teams (much as can be said about good football teams).
For those who would like to take a closer look at the data, you can find it here. Note that in B-R’s P-I Split Finder results (the source of these data) a franchise’s current city abbreviation is used for all of the franchise’s seasons. This can lead to some surprising data like OAK 1917, for example, which, of course, is really PHA 1917.
Doug, I appreciate the extremely detailed work here (too detailed for my eyes in the final charts!). I’ve never seen these sorts of figures or thought about ways to measure the relationship between unearned runs and team quality, as opposed to fielding stats and team quality.
I have a couple of thoughts that you may be able to respond to. I’m not at all clear why the percentage margin is a better guide than the absolute margin. The percentage applied to runs allowed presumably tends to reflect the relative strengths of pitching and fielding, but not the absolute strengths, so a poor pitching team with a strong fielders will tend to have a lower percent than a strong pitching team with strong fielders, but it is, in fact, a weaker team. Applied to runs scored, a high percentage may correlate to many things, and can be skewed by a single outlier opponent whose fielding is exceptionally weak. Because these runs are truly “unearned,” at least in part, they are poorer indicators of team strength than earned runs. Can you clarify why you feel the differential percentage methodology is better than using absolute numbers, and perhaps why these calculations are better than using a measure such as Rtot (if you do in fact feel that they are)?
My other thought is that I can’t capture the logic behind your cause/effect conclusion at the close of the post. Could you spell out why you feel those last charts allow you to draw the distinction you do?
The reason for introducing the percentage margin metric was not because it’s a good or meaningful metric (it’s not). Rather, it was to test the hypothesis that a good UER Margin is an effect of having a good team, rather than a cause. That hypothesis is based on the perceived “built-in” advantages in posting a good UER Margin that good teams enjoy, namely:
– scoring lots of runs, which will usually include a goodly number that are unearned, based on having more men on base because of more balls in play and, therefore, more chances for errors
– giving up fewer runs, based on having fewer men on base, fewer balls in play and, usually, fewer errors
That reasoning may be all that would be required to justify the assumption that a good UER Margin is an effect of having a good team, but to demonstrate that I tried to remove those built-in advantages cited above with the percentage metric that, in theory, gives every team, weak and strong alike, a chance a posting a good number. If the result of the percentage metric was that nearly all the pennant winners were in positive territory, as was the case with the absolute metric, then maybe there is some causal relationship between UER Margin and winning. But, that wasn’t the case, as the results of the percentage metric were, as suspected, that pennant winners and non-pennant winners alike are as likely to be in positive territory as negative, lending support to the original hypothesis that there are built-in advantages for better teams to post a good number for absolute UER Margin (the meaningful metric that counts).
Ah – I see your reasoning now, Doug. Thanks for your patient response.
I should have done a better job of explaining in the post what I was trying to show.
I’ve updated the scatter charts to plot UER margins against winning percentage instead of against year. Should be a bit clearer now.
Yes, much clearer. Thanks, Doug!
In the very first chart you have MIN twice and WSN (my nats) not at all.
Sorry about that, kds. I’ll fix the chart.
The Nats are the first MIN on the chart with a +3 UER Margin.
The record for most runs allowed in a season with all of them being earned is held by Joel Piniero. In 2005, he gave up 118 run, all earned. The record “makes sense” since the Mariners were tied for the fewest errors in the majors that year (86).
What doesn’t make sense is the record he broke. In 1976, pitching for the Atlanta Braves, Dick Ruthven gave up 112 runs, all earned. That Braves team committed 167 errors, nearly twice as many as Piniero’s Mariners. Four other pitchers on that team gave up double digit unearned runs, including Bruce Dal Canton, who gave up 12 unearned runs in only 73.1 innings. (Ruthven threw 240.1 innings). The rest of the staff combined had 14.1% unearned runs which means that Ruthven “should” have had 16 unearned runs, instead of 0. I’m baffled as to how he lasted the whole season without giving up a single unearned run.
Maybe Ruthven just left no room for unearned runs: he led the league in earned runs surrendered.
I suppose the real way to answer the baffling question of how Ruthven dodged unearned runs is to look game by game.
The Braves committed no errors in Ruthven’s initial two starts, but there were two errors behind him in his third start, on April 21: an errant pick-off throw (by the catcher) and a two-out ROE; neither did damage. (I did notice that over his first five starts, Ruthven’s relief pitchers encountered four in many fewer innings. For example, on May 1, Ruthven was relieved after 6.1 IP with no fielding miscues behind him. The Braves promptly went on to commit three errors, two while Dal Canton was on the mound. Dal Canton’s adventures in the 8th are like a mirror image of Ruthven’s good fortune. He struck out the first two batters, but the second reached 1B on a passed ball, stole 2B and went on to 3B on an error on the throw, and then, after a walk, scored on a ROE. Dal Canton then got a GO double-play. So Dal Canton got 2 Ks, four outs, gave up only one walk, and was charged with an UER.)
The Braves’ next error behind Ruthven didn’t come till June 15 (!): a one-out single, the runner going to 2B on a LF miscue. Ruthven committed an error himself on the 24th, but the lead runner was thrown out trying to score, evening that out. However, on the 28th, there’s run that looks unearned to me. Lead off single/runner steals 2B and goes to 3B on an error on the throw. scores on SF. Don’t know why that was an ER (a HR followed two batters later, after an out).
The next error occurs on July 3 – a harmless two-out ROE. At this point, Ruthven is 10-8 with a great 2.68 ERA, and is chosen for the All Star Game (though he does not pitch).
Ruthven encounters a more typical Braves game on July 11, when they commit three errors behind him. However, all are bases-empty ROEs and do no damage. When Mike Marshall relieves him, the Braves commit their fourth ROE with runners on second and third, and Marshall reaps two UERs.
No errors till August 4 (!), when Ruthven pitches his best game of the season – a 1-0 walk-off shutout. The error is on an SB throw, the runner advancing to 3B (one out).
For a full month after that – six starts – the Braves commit no errors behind Ruthven (!!). Then, on September 5, they commit two: one is a ROE with two out and a runner at third (who does not advance); the second is on another SB throw, with the runner going to 3B and scoring on a single (which seems to me a potential UER – is this a matter of scorer’s judgment?).
On September 14, there is another ER I can’t explain. The Braves commit two errors behind Ruthven in the first. The initial error, a lead-off ROE, is erased by a CS. But the second occurs with two out and runners at first and third. The runner on first broke for second and the throw led to an error, allowing the runner at third to score. Now, it’s true that Ruthven walks the next two batters, and the error may have been charged solely because the runner was allowed to score, the scorer judging that there was no CS possibility if the play had been clean. In that case I suppose there’s an argument that the walks would have scored the run regardless. But I did not think that such future-based calculations was how ER determinations were made.
On September 25, there is another questionable ER: with one out and a runner on first, a single results in a CF error on the throw, allowing the lead runner to reach 3B, scoring an ER on a single that follows. (That’s a season total of four questionable ER, in my view. Maybe Ruthven’s high-ER/zero-UER season total had to do with hitting on the official scorers’ wives or something.) A later lead-off ROE is erased on a DP.
The final error Ruthven encountered was a bases empty ROE on October 1, as he staggered to the close of the season over his last 11 starts with a 1-8 record (team 1-10) and 6.99 ER/9, for a final ERA of 4.19 (vs. a league-average 3.50).
I think that’s a total of 17 team errors over 36 Ruthven starts and 240.1 IP. That’s 10.1% of the team’s season errors in 16.7% of its innings. Had the Braves fielded all year as they did behind Ruthven, they would have led the league in fewest errors, David would never have posted his question, and I would have spent the last hour and a half more usefully mowing the lawn.
If the run would have scored without the error, it’s earned.
The earned inning on June 28th, giving the pitcher the benefit of the doubt:
Single. –1/0 out, 0R
Runner steals second. -2-/0, 0R
Flyout to right -2-/1, 0R [at this point in real life, an unearned run has scored]
Groundout to second, -2-/2, 0R
2-run Homerun, —/2, 2R [that unearned runner would have scored on the homerun, so his run becomes earned]
Groundout to second, inning over, 2 earned runs scored [in real life, the inning ended here as well]
On September 5th, they decided that either the run would have scored on the single or the flyball to right that was the second out.
Good explanation, obs. I’ve managed to be a fan for almost 65 years without being clear on the way plays subsequent to the run in question scoring affect the scorer’s call. Your interpretation matches the B-R statement of the principle. I’m relieved to feel assured that no hanky-panky led to scorer prejudice.
In considering pitching records, I’ve always tended to view high UER totals as a negative for the pitcher, indicating some softness to his ERA. That’s not wrong, but, of course, the counter view has equal weight: Ruthven’s ERA is rock hard, but that’s precisely what raises it to a very mediocre 4.19.
Wow, that was above and beyond!!! Just send me your address and I’ll be right over to mow your lawn! 🙂
Thanks, David, but when I stepped outside to take a post-post break the crabgrass rose as one to flaunt their bouffant hairdos at me, and I let my mower loose on them faster than a presidential tweet.
Ted Wilks was the first pitcher to record a qualified season with no unearned runs allowed when he posted a 2.64 ERA in 207.2 IP for the 1944 world champion Cardinals. As a team, the Redbirds allowed 13.5% unearned runs, or 15.4% for all of their pitchers except Wilks (the latter number slightly better than the league average of 15.8%). Of the other Cardinal pitchers, Max Lanier allowed 16 UER in 224.1 IP, or 0.64 per 9 IP, while Blix Donnelly recorded 8 UER in only 76.1 IP, almost one per 9 IP.
At the other end of the spectrum is Phil Niekro, NL ERA leader in 1967. Despite his 1.87 ERA, Niekro managed only an 11-9 record in 207 IP, in part because his RA was almost a full run higher at 2.78 as 32.8% of Niekro’s allowed runs were unearned, the highest proportion in an expansion era qualified season. Joe Magrane (29.1% in 1988) has the highest rate since 1969, while Brandon Webb tops this century’s hurlers with 25.2% in 2004.
To diverge from the subject at hand for a moment, the once nearly unbeatable Dodgers are on the way to losing their 9th game in 10 outings. The new hot team is Cleveland with a twelve game winning streak.
I’m sure they’d start winning again if the schedule put them back home for a few games, in Brooklyn, where they belong.
The Brooklyn franchise joined the NL in 1890. From 1890-1957 the Brooklyn franchise played 10,254 regular season games. From 1958-today the “Brooklyn” franchise has played 9,544 regular season games. Unless they move some time soon (and I don’t think that’s happening given that they’ve drawn 3 million fans every year since 1996 except 2000 and 2011 when they drew 2.8 and 2.9 million), they’ll be more LA than Brooklyn fairly soon, even though it may not seem like it.
As for the Dodgers team name, they only played 4,337 regular season games under that name in Brooklyn.
Though I agree that if they played more games in NY they would get back to their winning ways. They are 7-0 against the Mets this year, outscoring them 57 to 15.
Forget the letters on the caps. In 1956, Brooklyn began playing home games in Jersey City and in 1958 they began playing even more of them in Los Angeles. It’s just a ploy to get The City to offer them a bigger stadium with parking. In my opinion, it’s getting old.
Old ploy, but carried out with conviction.
Speaking of Brooklyn, I happened to notice how closely Gil Hodges’ career stats match Adrian Gonzalez’s current marks.
Will see how far Gonzalez can move ahead over the rest of his career.
They eliminated the Sox from the AL Central race on Labor Day Monday.
Indians have been playing well but to be fair many of those games have been against the AAA Tigers and White Sox.
Diamondbacks have also won 11 straight with 4 of those victories coming against the once unbeatable Dodgers.
Doug:
Could you possibly identify the teams with the best and worst records in terms of takeaway and giveaway? I’m almost certain that the worst was the 1919 Athletics, although their W-L is not quite as bad as their 1916 predecessors. It’s interesting, to me at least, how that abysmal crew was transformed year by successive year into the juggernaut that won 411 games 1928-31. in 1920 Jimmy Dykes and Ed Rommel were added. In 1922 Joe Hauser and Bing Miller, 1923 Sammy Hale, 1924 Al Simmons and Max Bishop, 1925 Mickey Cochran, Rube Walberg, Lefty Grove, and the ancient Jack Quinn, 1926 Howard Emke and 18-year-old Jimmy Foxx, 1927 Joe Boley, 1928 Mule Haas and George Earnshaw, to form the starting lineup and major players of the pitching staff for the 1929 World Champs. A lot of commentary is given to the fact that near-has-beens Cobb, Speaker, and Collins played on the ’27-28 teams, and very little on how the turnaround from 36 wins to 107 really happened.
My money’s on the ’21 Phillies. (It’s equally amazing to watch how those sad sacks were transformed into a pennant winning team in under thirty years.)
epm gets the prize.
Here are the 10 best and 10 worst since 1913.
The 1919 A’s were -59 (96/155), tied for the 27th worst mark.
In my speech at the award ceremony, I will modestly credit my parents and teachers with encouraging my encyclopaedic knowledge of unearned run history. But in my tell-all best seller, I will confess that my ignorance of that history was complete before Doug’s post, which originally included a chart showing an egregious outlier in 1921.
Those Phillies actually finished with 51 wins and had some decent players on board. The 1916 A’s, two years from having a plus 74 margin, came in at -100. Interesting that among the ten best there are only 6 pennant winners and three world champs. 1914 must have been quite a year for this stat, by the way, with three of the top ten all time.
Stan Baumgartner on those 1921 Phillies recorded 20 UER in only 66.2 IP for a 2.70 UERA to go with his 7.02 ERA. For the month of July, he had a 5.19 ERA and a 5.19 UERA.
Baumgartner played his entire career in Philadelphia, with varying results:
– 6-11 with 76 ERA+ in 189 IP for the Phillies
– 20-10 with 137 ERA+ in 316.2 IP for the A’s
I’d never heard of Baumgartner before. Very interesting career; as his SABR bio indicates, unique for the 20th century. After playing for the two Philadelphia teams during the period 1914-26 (including a 5.1 WAR year in 1924), he wound up as the Inquirer‘s Phillies reporter (and a columnist for TSN) until his death in 1955. He was an institution in Philadelphia.
I don’t think you can ever run out of interesting baseball history you don’t know (I certainly won’t).
I love the part about Baumgartner, working his third inning of relief and having loaded the bases, striking out Babe Ruth to end the game and preserve a 5-4 win in front of a packed house attending a double-header. Said that one moment made all his career struggles worthwhile.
Speaking of Baumgartner, I notice that Madison Bumgarner has 3 wins and has hit 3 home runs. Wonder if any other pitcher has had more wins and as many home runs as wins this late in the season.
Doug, my (admittedly incomplete) search unearthed Jim Rooker, who had 4 wins and 4 homers for the Royals in 1969.
Thanks Daniel,
nsb, Thinking about your point concerning 1914, Doug’s charts are somewhat surprising. For example, we might expect the 1939 A’s, with a huge deficit of -95 UER, to have been likely to induce among the seven other teams one that had a surplus high enough to make the top-10 list, and indeed that is the case: the ’39 Yankees, with +77. The case is similar with the 1920 AL Yanks & A’s. Yet the 1921 Phillies created a far greater pool of surplus UERs for the other seven NL teams to divide, and none appears on the top-10 list.
Moreover, in 1914, the NL Braves and Giants, both top-10 teams, racked up a surplus of +161, which had to be balanced out by deficits among only six teams — yet no 1914 NL team made the bottom-10 list. And even more surprisingly, in 1915, the AL Browns and A’s, both teams with bottom-10 deficits, created a surplus pool of 169 for the other six teams to divide, yet none of the other six teams seized a share large enough to make Doug’s top-10 list.
You’re making some interesting points I hadn’t thought of. I’ll post the whole set of data in a spreadsheet so you can take a look. The link is here.
I’m working on a follow-up to find out which teams gained the most advantage or suffered the greatest disadvantage, Pythag-wise.
Doug, Your table offers more evidence that keys to deep forces of the universe may lie buried in baseball history.
Among the 35 worst teams in terms of UER margins, only two had records at or above .500. They are Chicago in 1914 and Cincinnati in 1917.
These two outlier teams had identical deficits of -61 UER.
Coincidence? Perhaps. But what are the odds?
And now look further and observe that these same teams also had identical W-L records of 78-76.
Coincidence? I think not!
I looked at the seasons 1901-12 to see if any other teams might have come close to the 1921 Phillies’ negative UER margin. The most promising candidate, as I see it, is the 1908 Cardinals, who committed 349 errors in their 154 games, allowing 223 unearned runs. Without play-by-play data, of course, we can’t know exactly how many of their 375 runs scored were unearned; my crude extrapolation puts the figure at 106. Their -117 UER margin thus places them solidly in second place behind the ’21 Phillies.
The 1908 Cards’ 349 errors committed sets a post-1900 single-season record by being 94 more than the second-highest NL figure for that season, the Reds’ 255 errors.
(My extrapolation places two of the 1908 pennant contenders, the Giants and Cubs, on Doug’s 10-best list, with UER margins of +77 and +68, respectively.)
According to an article on CBS Sportline, the Diamondbacks have had the lead or been tied for 98 straight innings. That’s just short of the record (102 innings) set by the 2002 A’s. The 1942 Yankees are in second place with 101 innings.
The Diamondbacks will go for the record tonight against the Dodgers.
Also, the Indians are the first team with 13+ game win streaks in back to back seasons since the 60-61 Yankees.
Cleveland joins a short list of teams with 12-game winning streaks in consecutive seasons (excl. wrap-around streaks across seasons).
– Athletics 1913-14
– Cubs 1927-28
– Yankees 1953-54′
– Yankees 1960-61
– Giants 1965-66
– Indians 2016-17
Honorable mention: the Orioles won their last 11 games of the season in 1970 and 1971, then swept the ALCS 3-0 in both seasons, then opened the WS 3-0 (1970) and 2-0 (1971). So, 17 and 16 game winning streaks in consecutive seasons.
The 1916 Giants had three 12-game winning streaks (the second and third streaks were separated by a single tied game), and the 1931 Athletics had two. Outside of those streaks (totaling 43 games) by the Giants, they were 45-64-3.
Those 1916 Giants streaks were noteworthy because the first was very long — 17 games — and all the games were road games, while the second and third are usually viewed as a single record-setting 26-game winning streak, with the tie being discounted (like a game with no ABs in a hitting streak). Those 27 games were all part of a single 31-game homestand.
In those days, when teams traveled by train, road trips were often marathon affairs, reflecting the economics of time and money of involved in slow travel. Naturally, homestands were often long too, and this pattern applied particularly to the eastern and western teams separately — that is, it was more likely that, say, the Giants would string together a set of away series against the Pirates, Reds, Cubs, and Cards (the four western NL teams) and then host those teams in return in a long homestand. So of the 27 games involved in the 26-game win streak, 19 consecutive ones (about 70% of the total) were against the four western teams (the Pirates and Cards came to town for six-game series’).
If you look at the 1916 NL standings, you’ll find that the four eastern teams were on top, within 7 games of one another, while the four western teams were also separated by seven games, but the best of them (the Cubs) was 19.5 games behind the worst of the eastern teams (the Giants). Quality aligned with geography, and geography aligned with scheduling.
The Giants were certainly hot that September, when the record streak occurred, but that month they were essentially 9-3 against eastern teams and 19-0-1 against the “minor league” division of the NL. The streak included only one game against the pennant-winning Dodgers (who took their season series with the Giants 15-7). The Giants that season were 60-27 against the western clubs and 26-39 against eastern clubs. In the Giants’ 17-game away-streak, the first 13 were all against the four western clubs with the final four against the Braves (then the Phillies broke the streak). The Giants entered that early season streak with a season record of 2-13, all against eastern teams.
Great analysis epm. Reminds me of the ’54 Indians, who went 89-21 (.809) against the sub-.500 teams, but were only 22-22 against the Yankees and White Sox. Caught up with them in the Series.
Yup. There’s a saying I’ve heard that a team can’t be great unless it beats the teams it’s supposed to beat, and the ’54 Indians certainly did that. Playing .500 ball with each of the real challengers was no shame; those were good teams, with high win percentages (.669 and .610). But those records were inflated by the unusual weakness of the five remaining teams (Boston was a “first division” team, 42 games out!), and that’s probably why the tremendous strength people saw in the Indians disappeared when they played the winners of the better-balanced NL (which, although itself unbalanced in a way almost parallel to the AL, was distorted only about 50% as much).
Of course, the Indians’ World Series wipe out could be attributed with equal cogency to Willie Mays’ glove and Dusty Rhodes’ bat.
Diamondbacks are now up to 13 wins in a row and Cleveland 14 in a row. Is this the first time that two teams have had streaks of that length at the same time?
The Braves had a 14 game winning streak from 7-26-2013 to 8-9-2013 and the Tigers had a 12 game winning streak from 7-26-2013 to 8-8-2013. That’s the longest I found. There has been a small number of partial overlaps.
From 5-27-53 to 6-14-53 the Yankees reeled off an 18 game winning streak. From 6-3-53 to 6-14-53 the Browns lost 14 straight. Both streaks ended on 6-16 when the Browns defeated the Yankees 3-1.
The curse of being noticed. Dodgers 1, Diamondbacks 0 after one inning in tonight’s game. Diamondbacks tied it up in the second, but . . ..
The Red Sox and Blue Jays played a 19-inning game yesterday. For both teams, it was their third such game in four years. Teams with 19-inning games in consecutive seasons, or more than one in the same season.
– Angels: 2013-14
– Athletics: 1971 (2), 1971-72
– Blue Jays: 2016-17
– Braves: 1920 (2), 1939-40
– Dodgers: 1919-20, 1920 (2), 1939 (2), 1939-40, 1972-73, 1989 (2)
– Indians: 1992-93
– Mariners: 1981-82
– Mets: 1973-74
– Padres: 1979-80
– Phillies: 1918 (2), 1918-19
– Pirates: 1917-18, 1979-80, 2011-12
– Red Sox: 2014-15
– Senators: 1967 (3), 1971 (2)
– Tigers: 1967-68
– White Sox: 1972-73
– Yankees: 1967-68
The Royals, D-Backs and Rays have yet to play their first 19-inning game, the Rangers and Nationals have not played one since moving to their new cities, and the Orioles and Giants last played such a game 50 years ago.