This Circle of Greats (COG) vote is not to induct anyone into the Circle. Instead, this round of voting will select three or more players who will be restored to the secondary ballot after having been previously dropped from eligibility.
In this vote you may include on your ballot any major league baseball player who:
– was born before 1981; and
– played a majority of his games, in a career of 10 or more seasons, since 1901 or compiled 20 WAR (as measured by Baseball-Reference) since 1901 (this condition does not apply to players born before 1920 who were barred from major league baseball on account of race); and
– has not been elected to the Circle of Greats; and
– was not among the main or secondary ballot holdovers for the last completed round of COG balloting (COG 1980 Balloting Part 3); and
– did not receive a Main ballot vote in the last completed round of COG balloting.
For this round of voting, you may vote for up to five (5) five players to cast a qualifying ballot. The players with the 3 highest vote totals, including ties, will be restored to the secondary ballot for the next round of COG voting. To assist you with your selections, career stats for the most eligible candidates are provided here (though you may vote for any qualifying player).
The deadline to cast your ballots in this redemption round is Sunday night, March 23rd at 11:59PM EDT. You can change your votes until 11:59PM EDT on Friday night, March 21st. You can keep track of the vote tally in this redemption round here: COG 2025 Redemption Round Vote Tally.
This is not my ballot, but this discussion actually began informally in this year’s Round 2, and I thought I’d make sure the players mentioned then are part of the discussion now.
Voomo mentioned five players: Joe Medwick, Ralph Kiner, Dizzy Dean, Goose Gossage, and Early Wynn — he then added David Cone during Round 3 discussion.
nsb mentioned Bill Terry and Rick Reuschel.
All these players seem interesting to me for various reasons — Reuschel’s candidacy troubled us for a very long time before he slipped off the ballots, and I think he’s a good example of someone who gets close when arguments are offered in favor, and then falls back because we all like to make new arguments each round. (I think we should consider a catalogue of links to the strongest posts supporting the long-timers on the ballots.) Voomo pointed out the luck-of-the-draw factor involved in Cone’s dropping off because he happened to encounter an unusually strong group of eligible competitors.
(I probably missed others’ early suggestions, and haven’t yet considered additional names to put forward myself.)
Here are some categories of possible candidatesBob Eno hasn’t mentioned, none of whom I am suggesting:
Fairly good hit/better fielding position players: Graig Nettles, Buddy Bell, Willie Davis, Keith Hernandez
Under the radar sluggers: Sal Bando, Larry Doby, Jim Wynn
Erratic Career Stars: Sherry Magee, John Olerud, Dwight Evans (The Accumulator)
Billy Herman, a category of itself
Tom Kaat, Jimmy John (Not to be confused with the sandwich chain): interchangeable pitching accumulators.
Jim Bunning (See B. Herman above)
Speaking of the sandwich chain, I just took a look at its B-R page and noticed this for the 1975 season: “Did not play – Eponymous Surgical Procedure”. I believe this is the only spot in all B-R stat records that is meant to elicit a smile.
There are a few intended chuckles in the transaction list on this page:
https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/f/ferrewi01.shtml
Nicely spotted, Voomo. According to the Bullpen article on Ferrell’s day, though, the transactions are, in fact, simply accurate reports. Ferrell was, indeed, traded for a comic actor to be named later, a washing machine, a hot dog, and so forth.
I’m curious about the batter he retired in his only pitching appearance.
Ferrell’s feat was mighty. He retired Rico Noel, a lifetime .500 hitter so fast on the base paths that his stolen base total was more than twice the number of his plate appearances!
Thanks. Looks like Noel belonged on a 1970s A’s team. Was used as a PR 12 times and scored 5 runs. He also had 5 stolen bases, though only one of those ended up producing a run. Since he was caught stealing twice, he may have been better off not running at all.
Looks like the Yanks agreed with you, Doug. (By my count, Noel played for 23 pro teams in organized baseball. Too bad the Ferrell incident seems to be the sole recorded highlight.)
Evans would be a good choice, except that he’s not eligible, having previously been inducted into the COG.
What can I say? At my age you forget things. I presumed he was like Nettles, a best man for a long time, but never married.
If you’re looking for an “accumulator”, Darrell Evans is available, only 8.5 WAR short of Dwight and owner of some fun facts, including:
– first 400+ HR man to hit all of them aged 24 or older
– oldest player (38) to post a league-leading 40+ HR season
Evans compiled 16.2 WAR (almost 25% of his career total) in two monster 7+ WAR seasons (1973-74), but needed the following 7 seasons (1975-81) to “accumulate” that same total again.
Darrell E was a favorite of Bill James at one time, but Olerud did as much in 1700 fewer PAs, given that his home run power was only average for the era. Sherry Magee, along with Fred Clarke, whom I forgot in my previous listing, are the only dead ball era position players left that might qualify for COG status, unless my memory has failed me there, too. Magee outdoes Darrell E and Olerud in a similar career arc vis-a-vis WAR and OPS+, but labored in obscurity for poor teams. Clarke was overshadowed by Honus Wagner on those powerful early Pittsburgh teams, and he, like the other great contemporary player-manager Frank Chance, often sat on the bench and let lesser players take his position on the field, diminishing his own stats.
NSB,
I am not 130 years old and I can’t swear to it but, I believe Magee may have been recognized for his ability since he was so talented and not to be ignored. On the other hand, yes, the whole trumpets and marching band thing for the guys on winning teams probably overshadowed Magee’s work. As a child I would read books about baseball history through the years and they were always/exclusively detailing the work of Mathewson, Tinker-Evers-Chance, Fred Merkle’s bonehead play, Wagner, Connie Mack’s A’s, etc.. during that era (1900-1920) No mention of Sherry. Apparently, Magee was ‘difficult’….
This kind of “winner worship” continued with stories of Pete Alexander (1926 WS) and Pepper Martin running wild (1931 or 1934?), Slaughter racing home while Pesky(?) held the ball
Paul, We probably read the same books. But I was always puzzled by one exception to your rule: Rabbit Maranville (mentioned on Voomo’s first list below). Although Rabbit played on two pennant winners, one famous (the Miracle Braves), his teams’ normal location was in the second division, and his batting stats were extremely weak (lifetime 82 OPS+; his value lay entirely in his skill at shortstop). Yet he was routinely featured as one the “greats” alongside Ruth and Cobb, and was elected to the Hall in 1954, as the books of our youth were circulating.
Maranville came in a close second for MVP (Chalmers Award) in 1914, losing out to his teammate Johnny Evers. That was his highpoint, and it’s tempting to see this as “winner worship” (although his .246 BA was accompanied by enough fielding strength to get him 5.0 bWAR). But what’s interesting was that the year before, as an unheralded rookie on a 69-82 5th place perpetual second-division team with a similar BA (.247 — and in that era, BA was what teams focused on), accumulating defensive stats that were just ordinarily good (his level of play translates to 1.8 bWAR overall), Maranville came in third in the MVP vote, just ahead of Big Six, who had 25 Wins for a pennant-winning team. (I don’t know: maybe if we’d been able to watch Rabbit play we’d understand . . . Maranville himself thought he’d become a player of interest because of his peculiar style of catching flies.)
That year, Magee’s Phillies finished second, 19 games ahead of Maranville’s not-yet-Miracle-and-perpetual-also-ran Braves. Magee, a recent BA titlist, batted almost sixty points higher than Maranville and with Deadball-Era power (53 extra base hits to 22; their OPS+ numbers are 138 vs. 83). But the rookie got 36% of the MVP vote and Magee was not even among the 27 players who received votes (16 had WAR lower than Magee).
The rap on Maranville is that writers just loved him: he was a witty talker and a heavy drinker — great copy. So even though he was generally on losing teams and a one-trick pony (close to Luis Aparicio without the stolen base profile, but Luis’s stats are significantly stronger), he showed up on MVP ballots all nine years that one was in the offing when he was a regular, and wound up in the Hall on an 82% BBWAA vote. Magee showed up with MVP votes only once in the four years he might have, despite have good years: 139 OPS+ on average.
The rap on Magee is that he was borderline psychotic. I came across this link in a search because I was sure Magee was an epileptic, and the article reminded me of the source of that claim: his teammate Hans Lobert. Whether he was or not, his conduct was more than “difficult.” He scared people. But I think nsb is right to suggest we take a close look at him.
As far as Maranville being the guy who entertained the sportswriters, perhaps that might explain Pete Rose over Joe Morgan (and Stargell and Bonds) for the NL MVP in 1973?
In similar fashion to Magee, Dick Allen led the LA Dodgers in WAR (and many other categories) as they finished a game behind SF. He didn’t get a single MVP vote. He hit .295 23 HR 90 RBI… I imagine the voters were expecting more?
Offensive leaders not yet in the COG
The Greybeards (most PA):
12046 Palmiero
12013 Visquel
11260 Marinville
11240 Brock
11231 Aparicio
11229 Staub
10917 Damon
10861 Tony Perez
10772 Max Carey
10737 Darrell Evans
Chicks Dig the Longball:
609 Sosa
583 Big Mac
569 Palmiero
493 McGriff
475 Stargell
473 Delgado
464 Nelson Cruz
462 Canseco
440 Giambi
414 Darrell Evans
The Dirty Uniforms (SB):
938 Brock
738 Max Carey
668 Willie Wilson
649 Campenaris
558 Brett Butler
557 Davey Lopes
550 Cesar Cedeno
509 Fred Clarke
506 Aparicio
495 Keeler
495 Milan
470 Rollins
465 Scheckard
461 Bobby Bonds
441 Sherry McGee
The Great Hitters (Batting Average):
0.364 Oscar Charleston
0.348 Turkey Stearnes
0.341 Bill Terry
0.341 Willie Keeler
0.330 Willie Wells
0.330 Heinie Manush
0.325 Earle Combs
0.324 Joe Medwick
0.323 Edd Roush
0.322 Sam Rice
0.321 Kiki Cuyler
0.320 Chuck Klein
0.320 Mickey Cochrane
0.319 Ken Williams
0.318 Earl Averill
0.318 Kirby Puckett
0.317 Zach Wheat
The Sluggers (.SLG):
0.616 Turkey
0.615 Charleston
0.588 Big Mac
0.564 Belle
0.548 Kiner
0.546 Delgado
0.543 Klein
0.537 Berkman
0.535 Willie Wells
0.534 Averill
0.534 Sosa
0.530 Ken Williams
0.529 Stargell
Hi Voomo, I want to comment on the Dirty Uniform guys.
Expectations about stolen base performance have changed a lot since I was young, and even more since the Deadball Era. There is a general consensus now that to be adding value a player’s SB success rate should be in the 67-75% range or higher. Although the balance of value is different depending on the out/base situation, anything lower than that range overall is likely subtracting rather than adding value. This was not the way SBs were understood in the past, where major attention was on the value of success, and the cost of failure was not emphasized (so a 51% success rate could be seen as adding value). When we discussed Minnie Minoso I noted that his 216 SBs marked him as a speed threat on the bases, but also that this was a mixed blessing because of his many CSs. Mixed indeed: Minnie’s success rate was only 61%. It may have been viewed as positive (by the press, fans, and by his managers as well), but it would be seen as losing value now.
So here’s Voomo’s list on non-Circle speedsters, with their success rates added. In two cases, CS were not compiled during their careers, so there is no figure. In the cases of Sheckard and Magee, the CS figures are so partial that we should probably ignore the rates (I’ve only calculated the rate for years where CS figures are available). Milan’s figure is also probably too sparse to use, although it’s more than a fragment; most CS figures are for his later (slower) years. Carey’s figure is not complete, but is substantial enough to consider representative. I’ve asterisked all those figures. (I’ve added Maury Wills; not sure why he was missing).
938 Lou Brock 75%
738 Max Carey* 80%
668 Willie Wilson 83%
649 Bert Campaneris 77%
586 Maury Wills 74%
558 Brett Butler 68%
557 Davey Lopes 83%
550 Cesar Cedeno 75%
509 Fred Clarke —
506 Luis Aparicio 79%
495 Wee Willie Keeler —
495 Clyde Milan* 66%
470 Jimmy Rollins 82%
465 Jimmy Sheckard* [48%]
461 Bobby Bonds 73%
441 Sherry Magee* [66%]
The gold standard here would be Rickey, whose 81% rate was on a base of 1741 attempts (1406 SB). I think it’s probably safe to say that Brett Butler’s SBs added very little, if any, value over all, though you’d have to look at the specific base/out situations to have a full idea. (Attempting to steal third with no one out and no force play is a bad gamble, even for a good runner; attempting to steal home with two out and no one else on can be a wise gamble with a good base stealer.) On this list, I think Wilson, Lopes, and Rollins stand out, and I’m always interested in taking a closer look at Aparicio, who I suspect is generally underrated.
I’m not a fan of Aparicio, but it has irked me a little to have seen from time to time praised heaped on Maury Wills for having rejuvenated the art of the SB, when Little Luis was there ahead of him by at least a couple of years. COG material? The guy was a lead-off hitter who had a .311 OBP. The lowest current OBP in the COG is that of Brooks Robinson at .322, another glove man, true, but for many years an offensive threat whose lifetime OPS+ was 105, vs Luis’ 83.
I can’t buy it.
Well, I’ll grant you all that, nsb. But let me offer some push-back. I don’t want to mount a campaign for Aparicio, but I think he’s closer to the threshold than you do, and worth some consideration.
First, I think Aparicio’s leadoff status shouldn’t be relevant: that placement is the manager’s responsibility, not the player’s. Second, his OBP needs to be considered in connection with his stolen base record. I don’t want to suggest any deep comparison with Brooks R, who is far above the CoG threshold. But Aparicio added a lot of bases by his speed, and while Brooks developed power and Aparicio had virtually none, those OPS+ figures do not register Brooks’s record of 28 SB in 50 attempts vs. Luis’s 506 SB in 642 attempts. Their offensive distance was not the gulf OPS+ portrays. I think oWAR figures provide a better comparison: Brooks leads with 47.7 (2.7/162G), but Luis is not left in the dust with his 42.2 (2.6/162G). What really sets Robinson apart is that he also outpaces Luis in dWAR, 39.1 (2.2) vs. 31.9 (2.0). (But bear in mind that Luis still ranks #6 all-time in total dWAR.)
Let me do a bit of pushing on the Wills contrast as well. When Aparicio “rejuvenated the SB,” he initially had lower totals than other contemporaries, such as Mays and Billy Bruton, but then, in the Go-Go Sox pennant drive of 1959, he jumped from totals in the 20s to 56, a level unseen in . . . 16 years. George Case and Wally Moses had totals that high or higher as recently as 1943, and Case had a number of very high SB years. Wills rose to 50 in 1960, one year after Aparicio (Wills’s first full season, in which he had about 20% fewer PA than Luis in 1959). Aparicio maintained his plateau for a few years, but what Wills did was to probe the SB levels of the Small-ball/Deadball era which were about twice as high. Not only did he steal 104 in 1962, he did so at an 89% success rate, above what Aparicio achieved with many fewer attempts. As you’ll remember, I’m sure, Cobb’s old record of 96 SB was at the time believed to have become untouchable because the lively ball had changed the game. Wills offered a different model of the game, and it is chiefly because of the ceiling he set that we saw Brock and Henderson aim so high (Rickey productively, Brock less so). While it’s a mistake to forget Aparicio’s role, the rejuvenations the two players accomplished were of different models from different eras.
Just an addendum: On the SB list, Vince Coleman actually should appear near the top: he had 752 SB with a rate of 81%. He qualifies for the CoG because his career extended over ten seasons, but he’s not a viable candidate because he compiled only 12.9 WAR in his tumultuous career.
Voomo:
Your lists have the virtue of bringing to mind, I think, many if not all of the issues that have informed COG arguments in the past, both pro and con, but mostly con—perhaps obviously, since these players, other than the Negro League stars, have all been considered in their time and found wanting.
The sluggers list, for instance, is top-heavy with suspects from the steroid era, guys who, one either suspects or knows, couldn’t have put up nearly such gaudy numbers without chemical assistance, and who don’t have the statistical credibility of a Bonds or a Clemens as to their pre-steroid performance. Without the steroid boost neither Sosa nor McGwire would have passed the 50 WAR mark. Palmiero? Who knows? But when he came up with the Cubs, he and Mark Grace were similar types vying for the first base job. The Cubs kept Grace, a noted critic of steroid use later on, and I can’t help thinking that minus steroids, Palmeiro’s career would have been more like Grace’s, with somewhat more power, but not nearly 400 home runs worth. Given his longevity, he might have produced over 50 legit WAR.
The high SB guys, with the exception of Bonds, Clarke and Magee, have the defect of falling into the 45-55 (Aparicio 56) range when it comes to WAR, despite mostly long careers.
This factor also comes into play with shorter career players—Terry, Keeler, Coombs, Averill, Kiner, et al—and a few who had big peaks like Klein and Keller (not on any of your lists, but—) whose careers were blighted by injury. There’s no satisfactory answer to the issue of how to assess such careers for the COG, just as there’s no satisfactory answer to the issue of assessing the extreme long career player (most often a pitcher—Early Wynn and Jamie Moyer come to mind) who accumulate WAR numbers simply by hanging on.
A new question: are we ready to wade into the minefield that Negro Leagues stats present? My own feeling is similar to that which I’ve stated above. There isn’t always a satisfactory answer to some situations. You can’t look at what we know about Josh Gibson without feeling that to omit him from consideration is a defect of the process and contrary to the aim of the pursuit. Does that reasoning hold good for Turkey Stearnes or Bullet Rogan, though?
nsb, With regard to your last question, which concerns Negro League players, I’m not clear myself. I notice that in the main post Doug created for this round he adds that the 10-year/20-WAR criterion that governs eligibility, “does not apply to players born before 1920 who were barred from major league baseball on account of race.” My previous understanding was that it did apply, but that we made an exception to the rule for Satchel Paige. The reason for the exception was that although Paige fell short of the 20-WAR threshold, the fact that he compiled about 10 WAR (124 OPS+) in the Majors after the age of 40 confirmed the reported quality of his performance prior to 1948. This is the form of the argument I’ve been making about Monte Irvin, although his selection would require no waiver of the rules. In both cases, MLB performance is a necessary proof of concept. (The argument for Minoso, which was surprisingly successful, concerned a calculation more comparable to the way we figure compensating WAR for WW2 service, which applies to Irvin more directly too.)
The need for a proof of concept seems pretty basic. Since none of us are students of the Negro Leagues we have no independent basis to assess the general level of quality that constituted average or “replacement value” in those leagues, particularly across eras, and so no ability to assess what the fragmentary stats represent without some form of individual translation to an MLB record. I don’t think we’re qualified to draw a threshold line for the CoG when it comes to Negro League players, just as the BBWAA is not tasked with making those judgments. They are referred to committees that presumably do have (or are advised by) that type of expertise.
If we had a larger number of HHS participants, it might make sense to try to build that competence by focused discussion on some relevant posts, dedicated to topics such as the significance of percentage gaps in Negro League / MLB offensive and defensive performance stats over the years. I don’t think we could do it with just a half-dozen bloviators, some in their dotage. Lacking that type of expertise, I don’t think we’re capable of extending the CoG mission in that way — I don’t think we can improve on the HoF votes in the way we can improve on the BBWAA votes. I’d rather we retained Satch as a singular exception.
Re: eligibility for Negro league players, rather than have a case-by-case decision on waiving eligibility rules, I thought I would just establish a rule.
Arguably, I could have been more generous by a few years on the birth date cutoff, but my reasoning is that opportunities available to Negro league players born before 1920 would entail major league service mostly or completely age 30+, thus severely limiting a player’s ability to reach either the 10 year or 20 WAR major league threshold.
FWIW, B-R has come up with WAR numbers for Negro league season, and counts them the same as major-league WAR numbers. Aside from the question of the quality of play in those seasons, the most salient consideration (in my view) readers should bear in mind is how short most Negro league seasons. For example, there have been 11 seasons in the modern era with a player reaching 3 bWAR in seasons of 50 games or less, two in the AL and 9 in the Negro leagues. I would draw two conclusions from that: that the eye-popping rate stats that would produce such WAR totals would very likely have regressed to the level of merely “outstanding” in a season of major-league length; and that the quality of players in the Negro leagues was likely much less uniform than in the majors, thus giving rise to greater opportunities than in the major leagues for the best of those players to outshine their brethren by such wide margins.
Doug, I don’t have any argument with the criteria you adopted. My point is entirely about our ability to make informed decisions. I’m really speaking only about myself.
As you point out, WAR is relative to the league. We’ve generally treated the AL and NL as equivalent (although they used to be far less mutually porous) and adopted a framework that equalizes the talent range in all seasons and eras, so that we treat relative quality as absolute quality. Otherwise, given a range of factors, the CoG would need to be overwhelmingly composed of players from recent eras, when performance standards had risen far beyond the pre-War era. Even so, we’ve recently had several discussions about the way high standards have shrunk the range between replacement-level and top-level players, lowering the realistic WAR ceiling, giving the CoG an unintended antiquarian bias.
Given the welter of talent levels of the various Negro Leagues at various times, and the sparse stats we have to deal with, I have no idea how to assess Negro League stats relative to CoG standards, and I wouldn’t feel right voting on those assessments, though I’d welcome a chance to learn more about the Negro Leagues by engaging in focused discussions about them and immersing myself in the stats and bios on the B-R site so that I could pretend to be knowledgeable and argue with nsb, Voomo, Paul, et al.
So I’d prefer we treat the Satchel Paige exception as a one-off, which, looking back at the string that resulted in his election in 2018, was an explicit and central argument for some of us who voted for him.
Powerball/March 15, 2025
12 28 33 36 54 05
That’s five pennants 1912, 1933, 1936, 1954, and a 1905 powerball for the NY Giants. Alas, NY failed in 1928 by a mere two games to the St Louis Cardinals.
Sorry, a little too much OCD here…..
The ’28 Giants were just a half-game behind on Aug 23rd, but then lost eight in row to fall to 6½ back on Aug 31. They then won 24 of 28 to stand one game back with the Cubs coming to town on the final weekend of the season. 35,000 showed up to see the Giants split a twin-bill to open the series, then only 15,000 the next day as the visitors bested Giants ace Larry Benton to force the G-Men to the brink of elimination, and finally only 2,000 witnessed the Giant denouement as the Cubs took the measure of New York’s other 20-game winner, Freddie Fitzsimmons.
Doug,
Thank you for the play-by-play and explanation of how it all played out. I believe some iteration of the late 1920’s NY Giants had a large number of eventual Hall of Famers…. Roush, Ott, Hubbell, Terry, Hornsby, Lindstrom etc…
I’m probably way off on those guys; just top of my “aging” head
The ’23 to ’29 Giants each had 7 HOFers, except for the 1928 team which had only 6. The ’28 Giants lost Grimes and Hornsby from the year before, and added a rookie named Hubbell.
Doug,
Thanks again. If I had to debate the ‘superior set” of HoF’ers, I’d probably go with 1927?
I was not aware of all those guys in the earlier years that were in the Hall…. some friends of Frankie Frisch in all the groups, for sure.
On the basis of the dialogue above between Bob and Doug, I’ve decided to cast a vote for Josh Gibson as a crying exception to the normal voting constraints for COG consideration.
While Gibson doesn’t have the highest lifetime WAR rating among Negro League greats, that is owing only to the fact that his playing days came when the seasons were shorter than those of Turkey Stearns, et al. Although the legend of his home run hitting prowess has always seemed to me to belong more in the realm of Paul Bunyan and John Henry and not to be trusted for accuracy, what can be trusted to a great extent are the records we do have. In his 12 full Negro League seasons, he led the league in that category 11 times. In the two years mid-career spent in Mexico he added 11 in 22 games and 33 in 94 games. His lifetime batting average is .373, accumulated while playing in the 1930s and 1940s, not the 1920s when high averages were far more common. In that respect he is similar to Ty Cobb, whose dominance over league performance in the nineteen-teens has always seemed phenomenal to me.
The comparison to Babe Ruth is, while predictable, still apt. Black ink flows for both and in most of the same categories—HRs, as mentioned, Josh 11 times, Runs 5 times, RBIs 7 times, OBP 7 Times. Slugging 9 times, OPS and OPS+ 8 times. WAR? 8 times.
Even assuming that some of the teams he played against weren’t manned at every position by genuine Major League talent, he could not have produced the results he did without being a giant among his fellow players, not just one year but year after year.
I’m not clear as to the voting rules for this redemption business, but my impression is that “up to 5” includes 1. If I need to add other candidates, let me know.
nsb, I’d be very surprised if there were not a general sense here that Gibson was CoG caliber — there’s a guy who has not the slightest need of a catcher’s bonus, but has one nevertheless. I don’t mean to oppose Gibson’s redemption/ultimate election. I do want to advocate for laying groundwork before we cross a line to new ground I think we’re unprepared to find our way on.
The case for Paige, which I supported, was that he was a unicorn: there was no one else in his class (significant and dispositive evidence of excellence in an MLB setting, with minimal CoG qualifications not met solely due to segregation). If we pursue votes on Gibson as the sole Negro League-only candidate for the CoG, I think it means we must be open to assessing the qualifications of any nominated Negro League-only candidate. My objection to that is that we aren’t qualified, and since the entire CoG enterprise rests on the ability of the HHS community to make good choices based on our informed reliance on both traditional and advanced stats, we shouldn’t undertake a task when we are not well informed.
I may be misrepresenting others. I only know that when I look at Negro League stats such as Gibson’s, I’m unable to call to mind the contexts of each season, the leading players whom he beat out for leadership in various categories, the relation to pennant pressures, and so forth, which is baked in (to varying degrees) to almost every individual MLB stat I encounter. I just look at those huge numbers and a table where black ink seems more common than any other. Saying No seems almost like an endorsement of segregation.
So what I’d suggest, if Doug is game and the rest of us (though few in number) agree to participate, is to devote some posts and strings to exploring the professional and statistical history of the Negro Leagues during 2025 and perhaps having a dedicated Negro League-only redemption round prior to next year’s CoG debates, so that our group has at least novice familiarity with the issues when we find Negro League candidates on the ballots in 2026.
Just a brief counter argument:
If we assume that, for example, the NNL of Gibson’s years was operating on average at a level of competence 80% of that shown by the AL and NL, Gibson’s WAR/ year drops from 10.5 to 8.4.
Here are some not quite random figures for comparison:
Ruth 10.5
Mays 8.4
Cobb 8.1
Aaron 7.0
Wagner 7.6
T. Williams 8.6
Gehrig 8.5
Mantle 7.4
Trout 9.2 but that’s partially an illusion.
Catchers:
Bench 5.6
Fisk 4.4
Cochrane 5.4
Carter 4.9
Dickey 5,1
Simmons 3.3
I’m not interested in assessing the Negro Leagues, and I doubt you should be either, since Sisyphus has already tried to do so and is still trying. My point is simply this: with Josh Gibson a league assessment is unnecessary. The evidence available about him is so overwhelming that to ignore it is to pretend to a senseless impartiality.
nsb, I don’t think the math can work that way. It’s not in question that Gibson is the most outstanding position player reflected in Negro League stats. The the question is replacement level, which is what WAR is relative to.
Given the demographics of the US, the white leagues had roughly nine times the overall talent pool available to Black leagues. By the time of Gibson’s career the white leagues had a well organized minor league system to filter and train-up natural talent to high performance standards. I don’t know the degree to which the Black leagues were able to be selective and performance enhancing to the same degree. It stands to reason that the Negro Leagues’ best players would have had CoG quality talent, but if there’s nothing to learn from closer analysis of the Negro Leagues, the only way to know how that talent would have performed in a pool of MLB players more extensively screened and trained is to have some sample of that performance.
A lot of super prospects in A-level ball don’t thrive in Triple-A, and some Triple-A prospects don’t thrive in the Majors. If the Negro Leagues were A-level, I don’t think we could make a strong case for Gibson on baseball grounds alone. If they were AAA (which I suspect may be right), then I think Gibson would be a no-brainer. But if they were Double-A level (which I think is pretty plausible too) then I’m lost. I could cast a vote on social justice grounds, but not on baseball grounds. In the cases of Paige and Irvin, I’m able to justify a vote on baseball grounds alone.
When I wanted to advocate for CoG candidates whose post-1901 records couldn’t get them over the line, I put some effort into learning about 1890s MLB and advocating for them on the basis of the quality of play surrounding their earlier seasons. I think that yielded some reasonable arguments and it was very interesting work. I’d be happy to join you and others in doing something similar to support Gibson’s case — it could be confined to the period from 1930-1948 to make it more feasible, just as I wound up treating only 1893-1900. Otherwise, I just couldn’t see casting a CoG ballot with his name on it or off it if he were a candidate.
Beyond the whole Negro League’s quality of play/depth question, Bill James made what appears to be the oversimplification that, ” if Mays, Aaron, Frank Robinson, and Bob Gibson are amongst the all-time greats, then their Negro League predecessors Oscar Charleston, Josh Gibson, Lloyd, Buck Leonard and Paige must be among the greatest ever” regardless of the level of competition. I have no idea how one quantifies that assessment to corroborate his conclusion.
James and his ilk often try to predict rookie performance based on things like PCL and International League/American Association performance versus how that translates to performance in MLB. It seems to me that the KBO and the Japanese Central and Pacific leagues would be a far better predictor of performance than the Negro Leagues. Should we put Sadaharu Oh in the COG? (just kidding). How about Lefty O’Doul? A lot of hitting (and some pitching) in the PCL and still the modern NL record for BA by an OF’er (.398)…..
As far as Sherry Magee, if we’re going to use WAR, where did his career WAR stack up at retirement? Should we consider that in evaluating these guys?
I suspect James’s point is simply that the very best players of a generation will be really good, regardless of the generation. So, one should expect the best Negro League stars to be on a level comparable to the best African-American players who followed them (or the best players, period, who followed them). Granted, James listed some all-time greats in his later group, so perhaps not quite at that level. But, even if they’re only 80% as good as a Mays or an Aaron, that’s certainly more than good enough for HOF caliber, and probably on a level superior to all but a handful or two of those in the Hall.
Using Doug’s list of Redemption Stats, I came up with the following lists of WAR rate figures for position players and pitchers (I hope I didn’t screw up my Excel table!). For position players, I cut off at 56.6 total WAR and 3.4 WAR/500PA, and for pitchers at 54.9 pWAR and 3.0 pWAR/162IP (the reasons for the cutoff points are below). Players are listed by rate (Doug’s list is sorted by WAR, and can be resorted many ways–thanks!–but doesn’t include WAR rates, which I like to use).
Position players
………………WAR/500PA……….Tot.WAR
Doby……………..4.1………………..56.8
Terry……………..4.0………………..56.6
Hartnett…………3.8………………..55.5
Edmonds……….3.8………………..60.4
Bando…………..3.7…………………61.5
Bo. Bonds……..3.6…………………57.9
Hernandez……..3.5………………..60.3
Magee…………..3.5………………..59.4
Clarke……………3.4………………..68.0
I didn’t consider Palmeiro McGwire and Sosa (PEDs). Five other players were at 3.4/3.5 on rate, but with lower total WAR (excepting Harnett, who has other advantages): Will Clark, Ventura, Aparicio, Jimmy Wynn, Chet Lemon. Lowering the cutoff to 50 WAR, the only added standouts on rate were Elmer Flick (4.1), Jimmy Collins (3.6), Joe Tinker (3.7) and Earl Averill (3.6). (Flick’s rate figure is fine, but 15.0 of his 52.7 WAR come before 1901, and that’s a battle I don’t recommend we fight again for Flick . . . maybe for the more substantial career of Clarke.)
Pitchers
………………pWAR/162IP…………Tot.WAR
Saberhagen…..3.7…………………..58.9
Cone……………3.4…………………..61.6
Appier…………..3.4………………….54.9
Shocker………..3.3…………………..55.1
Newhouser……3.3…………………..60.1
Steib……………3.2…………………..56.5
Reuschel………3.1…………………..68.1
Pettitte…………3.0…………………..60.7
Buehrle………..3.0…………………..60.0
Finley…………..3.0…………………..58.3
I meant the cutoff here to be 55 pWAR, but felt I couldn’t ignore Appier for a margin-of-error factor when his rate was so high. Lowering the cutoff to 50 WAR doesn’t add anyone as high as a rate of 3.20, though if you reach to 49.9 Roy Oswalt pops up at 3.6. (Footnote: At 45.6 pWAR you find Negro League star Bill Foster at a rate of 4.9, with more total pWAR than Josh Gibson has bWAR.)
I haven’t really done much thinking about my own picks yet, but this is where I’ll start tomorrow.
Hartnett is already a COG member. Glad to find that I’m not the only one who’s made that kind of mistake in this discussion. The COG list is long, and the eyes see only what they want to see some times.
Any gaffe you can make I can make better.
Here’s an argument for Bret Saberhagen, who surprised me by leading all potential pitching candidates in WAR rate by about 10%.
I compared Saberhagen to Dizzy Dean, whose very, very short career is, I presume, the reason why he isn’t in the CoG. His flame certainly burned bright enough for seven seasons to get him into the Hall despite the low total of 150 wins (Koufax is a reasonable parallel).
If we compare Saberhagen 1985-1991 with Dean 1932-1938 the resemblance (allowing for structural changes in the role of pitchers) is very close.
………WAR….per162……..W-L……….CG………ShO……..ERA+…….SO/BB
BS….39.2……..6.3…..100-67..599….62………..13………..130………..3.46
DD….41.9…….5.8……140-76..648…143……….24………..134………..2.70
Dean is superior in workload and W-L, but that is partly (or wholly) the result of the era and supporting team quality (~.550 vs ~.515). If Dean had a reasonable career outside those seven seasons I expect he’d be in the circle. However, here’s a quick partial comparison outside those seven seasons (the seasons aren’t consecutive so I can’t use the B-R totals function):
………WAR….per162 (approx)…..W-L…….ERA+ (approx)
BS…..19.7……….~4.0……………67-50………~120
DD……2.0……….~2.0…………….10-7……….~100
I suspect that if we had Dean with Saberhagen’s secondary career stats he’d easily be on the CoG ballot and perhaps in the Circle. Since Saberhagen and Dean are comparable in their core peaks, I think Saberhagen has a strong case, although he was one and done for the BBWAA.
Here’s an argument for Larry Doby, who leads all unredeemed position players in WAR rate (by PA).
When Doby first entered the CoG conversation in 2014 his WAR total was 47.2, because B-R did not include Negro League figures (I believe that revisions to WAR per se also boosted his total, which now stands at 49.1 for his MLB play). One comment noted that Doby was 23 when he started in the Majors, and so the impact of segregation on his career was not as profound as some others. There were no figures concerning his Negro League performance. He quickly slipped off the ballot (there was no secondary ballot at the time) along with Richie Ashburn. Ashburn has come back (more than once, I think). Doby never has.
Doby began to play in the Negro Leagues at age 18. He was still in high school and the following year he continued going to school (college) while doubling up with baseball. He played in half the Newark Eagles’ games, a second baseman then; B-R has him as the most productive position player on the so-so team, but it’s good to bear in mind he was 19 and going to school (with his primary sport basketball). After that season, Doby was drafted and spent 1944-45 in the military during the War.
According to materials gathered in Doby’s SABR bio, his early goal was not a career in the Negro Leagues: he wanted to become a PysEd teacher or coach. It was only when he learned while in the army that Jackie Robinson had signed a contract to play in the Dodgers organization that he decided to gamble on making the Majors. He played one full post-War season with Newark, now at age 22 and after two years away, and he led the league in OPS and OPS+. His productivity in the Negro Leagues was up at mid-season the following year when Bill Veeck brought him to Cleveland in early July 1947 as the first Black player in the AL, where he was used sparingly and almost solely as a pinch hitter, with poor results (he was still an infielder in his few defensive appearances).
Doby blossomed in 1948, now a good (not great) defensive outfielder, and during the period 1948-1956 his WAR/162G was 6.0 (though seasons then were 154G, and his season rate was 5.2, as he averaged only 140G). His career ended with a brief and initially gentle decline (1957-59).
I think it’s appropriate to make several compensatory adjustments in Doby’s case. Although his arrival in MLB at age 23 may seem early enough, he was actually a prodigy, able to hit at a 161 OPS+ rate as a Negro League regular at age 19. Segregation prevented him from committing to professional baseball when young, in addition to ensuring he wouldn’t get MLB-system training, and then two years of military service knocked out his skills development before he returned and emerged as a star. His MLB career was additionally fraught because of the pressures of his highly publicized role as a pioneer in integrated baseball. (I recall Bill Veeck’s regrets that he placed such a burden on Doby, whose introverted personality was not well designed to buffer those pressures.)
B-R now gives Doby 56.7 WAR for his entire career, with 7.6 coming from his Negro League play. Given his immediate post-WAR performance I think we can conservatively project his per-season rate of 5.2 as indicating a floor average of 4.0 for each of his two years in the military (ages 20-21) and 4.5 for each of first two post-War seasons (ages 22-23), for which he now receives a total of 5.3. That would mean an addition of 11.7 to his MLB total of 49.1; that is, a projected 60.8 WAR career. Bearing in mind that segregation delayed a full commitment to professional ball of any kind and then led to the enormous pressures that fell on Doby as the AL face of integration, it’s hard to believe that under neutral circumstances a player capable of leading his Negro League team in offensive WAR at age 19 would not likely have done far better.
I don’t actually understand how B-R calculates WAR/162G for either batters or pitchers. In looking at Doug’s off-ballot leaders I substituted WAR/500PA for hitters (a lazy approach; it should have been 502, meaning a qualifying season) and pWAR/162IP. But doing some calculations that turns out to be quite different for the B-R figures.
So here’s a list that compares our current Secondary Ballot candidates to some of the leading off-ballot candidates (bolded) vying for redemption (as we all are in this vale of tears!), using the 500PA and 162IP standards. I’ve listed those with identical one-decimal figures according to their more accurate values. Note that Irvin and Doby include B-R figures for Negro Leagues that I argue should be replaced by higher projected total WAR figures, but I haven’t tried to assess how that would affect rate figures. (Of course their total figures would be lower if we were measuring only MLB performance and not providing any compensation, and it appears their rate figures would be lower as well, Doby’s by perhaps 5% and Irvin’s by 10%.) The gaps between position players with 3.5 and 3.0 and pitchers between 3.2 and 2.0 are there because there are far too many off-ballot players to list.)
Position players
………………..WPA/500PA………Total bWAR
Doby……………..4.1…………………56.8
Utley………………4.1…………………64.5
Smith……………..4.0…………………64.5
Terry……………..4.0…………………56.6
Irvin……………….4.0…………………32.1
Boyer…………….3.8………………….62.8
Edmonds……….3.8…………………60.4
Bando……………3.7…………………61.5
Bonds……………3.6…………………57.9
Hernandez……..3.5…………………60.3
Magee……………3.5…………………59.4
………
Williams…………3.0…………………63.6
Abreu…………….3.0…………………60.2
Dawson………….2.8…………………60.2
Note that Fred Clarke just misses the 3.5 rate cutoff at 3.447, but has a WAR total of 68.0.
Pitchers
………………pWAR/162IP………..Total pWAR
Saberhagen……3.7………………….58.9
Cone……………..3.4………………….61.6
Appier……………3.4…………………54.9
Shocker…………3.3………………….55.1
Newhouser…….3.3………………….60.1
Drysdale…………3.2………………….67.1
Steib……………..3.2………………….56.5
……….
Sutton…………….2.0…………………66.7
As we are constantly reminded, bWAR and pWAR are just the beginning of the assessments we need to make when we focus on players for the CoG. But when I look at these figures I think the dynamic of the CoG system may require periodic reassessments of whether our past debates and votes are presenting us with the best options. (And this may be true of current Primary Ballot choices as well.)
Couldn’t resist extending this to the Primary Ballot candidates.
Position Players
………………..WPA/500PA………Total bWAR
Allen………………..4.0……………………58.7
Jones………………3.6…………………….62.7
Randolph………….3.5……………………65.9
Ashburn……………3.3……………………64.2
Guerrero…………..3.3……………………59.5
Helton………………3.3……………………61.8
Sheffield…………..2.8……………………60.8
Ortiz………………..2.7……………………55.3
Simmons…………..2.6…………………..50.4
Pitchers
………………pWAR/162IP………..Total pWAR
Papelbon………….5.2……………………23.3
Santana……………4.1……………………51.7
Coveleski………….3.3……………………62.0
Tiant………………..3.1……………………66.1
Sabathia…………..2.8……………………62.3
Lyons……………….2.7…………………..70.6
I have to conclude that either I’m making systematic errors, or B-R’s rate stats (/162G) are based on some different form of calculation. On rate stats, the relative order of the players should be identical regardless of the absolute parameters. On the pitchers in particular this does not hold. (I can understand it for Papelbon, since relief pitcher scales should probably be different, but B-R has Santana and Coveleski about equal in pWAR/162G . . . If anyone knows the reason for this discrepancy or sees an error I’ve made, please chime in!)
Vote:
Joe Medwick
Ralph Kiner
Dizzy Dean
Goose Gossage
David Cone
Interestingly I had only one of your five on the lists I calculated, Voomo. Turns out that Dean is somehow missing from Doug’s table (I wondered whether we’d also voted him into the Circle without my recalling) and Kiner fell below the cutoff I was using. I’d been studying both their records and should have had them in mind.
Here are the two WAR figures for your guys:
Kiner………3.8/500PA…..48.0 bWAR
Medwick….3.3/500PA…..54.5 bWAR
Dean………3.6/500PA…..43.9 pWAR
Gossage….3.7/500PA….41.6 pWAR
Kiner’s rate is a little above Boyer’s and helps his case, in my view. Dean’s rate is, of course, like Saberhagen’s. I think we have to think about late-era relievers differently, and I don’t think these numbers tell us much about pitchers like Gossage now.
Kiner would become the lowest WAR player in the CoG who was not touched by segregation, but he did start late due to the War. His career is almost all black ink, though. Kiner and Dean are very much alike in career shape.
Thinking more about Dean and his resemblance to Saberhagen, I added Koufax to see how the three matched up. All had impressive seven-year peaks:
……………….pWAR….per162IP……..W-L……….CG………ShO……..ERA+…….SO/BB
Saberhagen….39.2……..4.2…..100-67..599……..62………..13………..130………..3.46
Dean………..….41.9…….3.8……140-76..648…….143……….24………..134………..2.70
Koufax………….47.6……..4.3……137-60..695…….122………..37…………147…………3.73
These are really high per162IP peaks. For comparison, Walter Johnson’s best seven-year stretch has a rate of 5.5 and Christy Mathewson’s was 4.5. (Of course, their peaks were part of a mountain range, not surrounded by plains.)
Outside the peak years, Saberhagen exceeds both Dean and Koufax, with 19.7 pWAR, vs. Dean’s 2.0 and Koufax’s 5.2. (Koufax actually had a six-year peak with 46.4 pWAR and a 4.6 rate and only 6.7 pWAR outside that brief window.)
Since we’re discussing Dean and short career pitchers, we should probably also consider one Noodles Hahn. Hahn’s ranks since 1893 include:
-2nd (to Walter Johnson) for WAR thru age 25
-3rd (behind Joe McGinnity and Grover Cleveland) for WAR thru first six seasons of a career
I’ve added Hahn to your table.
……………….pWAR….per162IP……..W-L……….CG………ShO……..ERA+…….SO/BB
Saberhagen….39.2……..4.2…..100-67..599……..62………..13………..130………..3.46
Dean……..….….41.9…….3.8……140-76..648…….143……….24………..134………..2.70
Koufax………….47.6……..4.3……137-60..695…….122………..37…………147…………3.73
Hahn……………46.1……..3.8……127-92..580…….209………..24…………134…………2.40
Hahn’s .580 W-L% compares to .491 for his teams. The others played for teams that were well above .500.
Always a good time to consider Noodles! He’s really overlooked (except for the B-R home page, which seems to include his photo — the handsome one — among the featured ones with unusual frequency). The distinctive turn for Hahn is that his WAR outside those seasons was -0.1. He was done a couple of months after turning 27.
Hahn’s early departure probably had something to do with completing 92% of his starts (and also 92% of his relief appearances).
His SABR Bio is unfortunately on the meagre side, but it appears he had another career (as a veterinary doctor) that he was eager to pursue, so he didn’t spend much time trying to get his arm right. Which isn’t to say that he left the game entirely; Hahn kept a locker at Crosley Field for most of his adult life and was a frequent batting practice pitcher for the Reds well into his sixties.
Doug,
Hall of Fame nickname….as far as Hahn is concerned, Nap Rucker had a very similar career in the same era. Maybe we consider Rucker and Hahn? I’m very late with these suggestions….. 🙁
Medwick:
His peak was short, but during those years he was arguably the best position player in the NL not named Ott.
Kiner:
He led the league in HR his first 7 years.
In 1947, his 2nd year, Pittsburgh moved the LF power alley to 355 feet. So, I acknowledge that maybe Alvaro Espinoza might have hit 40 there. Voting for that black ink anyway.
Dean:
Best pitcher from age 23-27. One of the greatest characters.
Goose:
We have only acknowledged Mariano and Wilhelm out of the pen. Goose is right there.
Cone:
He was exceptional for a.long time. I think overlooked. And while I think WAR is a bit flawed for pitchers…. 7 seasons over 5 WAR…
In WAR and IP, Cone closely resembles three other pitchers, two in the CoG (Vance and Waddell) and one not (Newhouser). The cloud hanging over Newhouser is that his two best seasons were during the war. He was still really good for three years after the war, just not as good as he had been during the war. The W-L% of the other three are also very similar, with Cone’s a bit higher, likely not unrelated to Cone playing on better teams. Here’s the list.
Six other starting pitchers have similar WAR to the four above, but in a season or two (or three) more IP. I’ve ordered these six by career wins, because doing so creates three sets of paired careers involving a pitcher eligible for redemption and one not eligible because he’s in the CoG or currently on the ballot. As it happens, those pairs with the eligible player listed first (Pettitte/Sabathia, McGinnity/Marichal, Buehrle/Drysdale) are each highly similar in IP, W-L, W-L% and ERA+, so creates some interesting food for thought. Here’s that list.
I brought up Joe McGinnity as a comparable to Cone, and especially comparable to Juan Marichal. Turns out his almost 3500 IP career was only half of his story. Much like Minnie Minoso whom we discussed a few weeks ago, McGinnity’s career continued in the minors long after his major league career ended. In fact, he actually compiled slightly more IP in the minor leagues to surpass 7000 IP for his professional career.
McGinnity’s major league career ended at age 37, but he surpassed 250 IP in each of the next eight minor league seasons, including three times over 400 IP and two other seasons over 350 IP. He totaled less than 200 IP over the next two seasons (age 46-47) and it looked like he was done. But after three years out of the game, he comes back to log 170 IP at age 51 and 206 IP at 52. Takes a year off and then finally finishes his career with 89 IP at age 54. McGinnity died from cancer four years later at age 58.
According to his bio, McGinnity’s disappearance from the majors was voluntary. A handful of other players have followed a similar path, usually to take on player-manager roles. In Joe’s case he became team president and star pitcher for Newark, just across the river from his old job, and at age 41 extended his career by becoming a player manager for a succession of mid to lower level minor league teams. He had a 6-6 record in Dubuque at age 54.
Who was the last player, I wonder, to keep on playing regularly in the minors, not just awhile but for years, following a significant big league career?
With today’s salaries, various farm team arrangements, other restrictions, and general cynicism, I doubt the love of the game would be enough for roughly 100% of our current player base.
A nice post, nsb. Thanks for pointing to McGinnity’s SABR bio; it’s well worth reading (and thanks to Doug for looking into the Iron Man’s post-MLB career in the first place). He was a most unusual player and person.
I think that given the way that the Minors became increasingly incorporated into the MLB business structure from the 1930s on, the places to look for post-MLB parallels would be the rare independent league, like the Atlantic League, and foreign leagues, most obviously Japan. Obviously there’s considerable money involved with foreign professional leagues now, but even McGinnity wasn’t simply playing for the love of the game — he was playing executive roles and making (or hoping to make) good money doing so. (The “love of the game” alone wouldn’t really be enough for anyone in early middle age who wasn’t independently wealthy, I think. . . . Perhaps some Atlantic League ex-MLB players, since anyone with more than seven years in the Majors is probably independently wealthy by most standards, unless they spent profligately!)
No one I know of has played more or less continuously as long as McGinnity, but a number of MLB players have had sustained careers in Japan (here’s a Wikipedia list). Warren Cromartie seems to be a particularly interesting case. The Yomiuri and SF Giants both offered him contracts for his age-30 season in 1984 — he’s been a solid regular for seven years — and he decided to try his luck in Japan, where he played for seven more highly productive seasons. When he decided to return to the Majors for a season as a non-regular at 37, his 122 OPS+ was within a point of his earlier career high.
I don’t know if anyone would call it a “significant career” but oft-traded George Brunet pitched in Mexico for about 10 years till age 49.
Jigger Statz and Morrie Arnovich played a long time in the minors and Luke Easter hit a lot of home runs in the minors for many years after his major league career .
Thanks. As far as I knew Luke Easter was the last to do so, but Brunet antedates him by fifteen or twenty years. Statz and Arnovich came early and were only a pair of several, if not many. I don’t have time to dig out any names at the moment, and my memory is dying a slow death due to the aging process. OK, a quick look: Cedric Durst—everyone remembers him, right?—platooned in the bigs for five years and was on the 1927 Yankees, batted .375 in the ’28 Series. Then two years in St. Paul, followed by a dozen or so in the PCL, sometimes as player-manager.
Here’s my vote:
Doby
Terry
Saberhagen
Cone
Edmonds
My last slot was a toss-up between Edmonds and Bando. Edmonds looks very much like Reggie Smith and Bando looks a lot like Ken Boyer. Since I’ve voted for both Smith and Boyer to be on the Primary Ballot, I see both Edmonds and Bando as qualified CoG prospects, but there’s room for only one on my ballot here.
One thing this exercise has convinced me of is that the CoG threshold area is very crowded and likely to become more so as replacement-level standards continue to rise. I think we may not currently have the best set of threshold-level players on the ballots (including the Primary Ballot) and we should be looking more closely at how they compare to off-ballot choices with similar or better qualifications. We can only do that if HHS posters discuss the reasons they’re supporting the players they vote for — much more important for a single-digit voting pool than the old 50-person pool, where numbers minimized the impact of outlier votes (and full discussion would have been endless reading . . . like any single one of my posts).
Here’s my five:
Ralph Kiner
Larry Doby
Bill Terry
Willie Stargell
Lance Berkman
However I was surprised to see Charlie Keller was so high up on the list of OPS+.
Hall of Fame Ballot in 2009 – Cone’s only year
Rickey Henderson 94.8
Jim Rice 76.4
Andre Dawson 67.0
Bert Blyleven 62.7
Lee Smith 44.5
Jack Morris 44.0
Tommy John 31.7
Tim Raines 22.6
Mark McGwire 21.9
Alan Trammell 17.4
Dave Parker 15.0
Don Mattingly 11.9
Dale Murphy 11.5
Harold Baines 5.9
†Mark Grace* 4.1
†David Cone* 3.9
I’m not sure this is unusual, Voomo. Look at Saberhagen in 2007, his only year. Here are the top ten:
Ripkin 98.5%
Gwynn 97.6%
Goose 71.2%
Rice 63.5%
Dawson 56.7%
Blyleven 47.7%
Lee Smith 39.8%
Morris 37.1%
McGwire 23.5%
John 22.9%
Then come 10 more, starting with Steve Garvey and his 38.1 WAR (21.1%) till you finally get to #21:
Saberhagen 1.3%
Only 7 of the 20 above Saberhagen had more WAR; only 6 had a higher JAWS rank; only 3 had higher WAR7. But Bill James’s Monitor, which predicts HoF votes rather than HoF worthiness put Saberhagen just about where he wound up. The Hall voters of that era (and perhaps now) placed a lot of weight on cumulative totals and James knew it. I don’t really think this had to do with the competition.
I wasn’t expressing any particular opinion. Just giving context to what it looked like when he was overlooked.
Well, James’s Monitor certainly was surprised by Cone’s one-and-done finish.
For the 2025 Redemption Round, I’m voting for:
-Rafael Palmeiro
-Buddy Bell
-Tommy John
-Mark McGwire
-Rick Reuschel
Thanks!
Redemption is near! But it is unclear for whom. With hours remaining we have only five ballots (nsb, Voomo, Richard, opal, me) and a total of 21 votes, no one exceeding a count of 2:
2 Cone, Doby, Kiner, Terry
1 Bell, Berkman, Dean, Edmonds, Gibson, Gossage, John, McGwire, Medwick, Palmeiro, Reuschel, Saberhagen, Stargell
So far lot of conversation, not many votes.
Shoot – totally forgot about the deadline. Not much time to make any arguments for my picks. Going with:
1. Doby
2. Oliva
3. Edmonds
4. Medwick
5. Puckett
After an exhaustive search I find no statutory bar to offering arguments post-vote, Tuna. We’ve heard some arguments about Doby, Edmonds, and Medwick, but Oliva and Puckett are new to this string, and Oliva has never been discussed at any length. (Checking back, when he was eligible for election to the CoG in 2013 he received one vote out of 69 ballots cast).
I liked Oliva a lot when he was playing (those were days when batting average counted for a lot). I’d be interested to hear the thoughts that guided your vote for him.
Oliva and Puckett not only played for the same team, though several years apart; their offensive production was remarkably similar, and both were brought down, Oliva sooner, by physical debilities. Oliva’s congenital knee condition, leading to a series of operations that made him functional with a bat but not a glove, wasn’t as career destroying as Puckett’s vision loss, thanks to the fortuitous institution of the DH in 1973, giving him four extra seasons, but the magic was lost, and he got no extra WAR to pad his stats. His election to the Hall made me feel, for one of the few times, that the veterans committee made a credible pick.
He goes into the bin with Klein and Keller, in my mind, of careers that dwindled into mediocrity due to injury, and in the case of Keller and Oliva, a congenital weakness. Puckett’s carrier simply ended, but he had 12 full seasons by comparison to show his stuff.
Thanks for the prompt, Bob. I finally found a little time to respond this evening.
My main reason in voting for Oliva and Puckett is that I missed the opportunity to campaign for them when they originally became eligible for the Circle of Greats. I first discovered HHS in December, 2013, about a week after Oliva fell off the ballot amidst stiff competition and ten months after Puckett’s similar fate.
As nsb pointed out, Oliva and Puckett were remarkably similar in their offensive production. They showed up together in a couple older HHS posts. Graham Womack noted in 2014 that Puckett in 1988 and Oliva in 1971 were the only two players since 1918 to post an OPS+ of at least 150 with 25 of fewer walks. They also both made the list of the most hits in a player’s first 162 games. At the time of Doug’s post (June, 2016), Puckett was 13th with 215 hits and Oliva was 41st with 202.
Nsb also nicely addressed how both players’ careers, after a sustained peak, were dramatically altered. While we can’t build a case mostly on “what ifs”, we do occasionally wade into the waters of considering elements beyond a player’s control, whether missed opportunities due to segregation, military service, the reserve clause, or injury. I will simply say that both players were still near the top of their game before health changed their trajectories. Both were good bets to reach 3000 hits, with Puckett a near lock to do so. And their careers provide nice bookends: Oliva has one of the best WAR rookie seasons, while Puckett has one of the top final seasons.
Coming into 1964, the top two rookie bWAR seasons (post-1900 AL/NL) belonged to Joe Jackson (9.2) and Ted Williams (6.7). Both Oliva (6.8) and Dick Allen (8.8) surpassed Williams in their ROY campaigns. Sixty-one years later, Allen is still third on the list and Oliva is tied for ninth.
Oliva won his first batting title (.323) as a rookie, and led the league in runs (109), hits (217), 2B (43), and TB (374). He was an all-star each of his first eight seasons, averaging 5.3 WAR, with five top 10 finishes in MVP voting (and top 20 the other three years). Along the way he captured two more batting crowns, led the league in hits five times, and won a gold glove.
In the depressed hitting environment of his time, Oliva hit for a career .304 average (.313 pre-injury).
Puckett had a solid first two seasons, hitting a lot of singles, garnering 4.5 dWAR, and finishing 3rd in AL rookie of the year voting in 1984. But he had an 86 OPS+ with just 4 HR (none as a rookie). That changed in 1986. He already had seven round trippers by late April, when I watched him lead off four straight games with homers, capping a binge of eight HR in ten games.
From then on, Puckett was an all-star each of his final ten seasons. He won a batting title, led the league in hits four times, total bases twice, and RBI once (112 RBI in 108 games before the ’94 strike). He won six gold gloves, six silver sluggers, and had seven Top 10 AL MVP finishes. He led his team to two World Series titles, the first ending a 63-year franchise drought, and the second powered by his dramatic Game 6 eleventh inning home run.
My final recommendation comes from recalling the sheer joy of watching Puckett play so well and with such exuberance. He not only had that special quality of being able to lift up his teammates, he also seemed quite capable of (and comfortable in) doing the impossible. No matter the circumstance, if Kirby was in the lineup, you always felt your team had a chance.
What we need now, Scary, is a way to index this great brace of arguments so it’s easy to access next time we have a redemption round.
Final tally:
3 – Doby
2 – Cone, Edmonds, Kiner, Medwick, Terry
=================================
1 – Bell, Berkman, Dean, Gibson, Gossage, John, McGwire, Oliva, Palmeiro, Puckett, Reuschel, Saberhagen, Stargell
Thanks for participating.
Now get ready for the North American opening day, just three days away.
Again, off the beaten path…..yesterday, Mackenzie Gore of the DC Federales threw 6 one-hit innings with 0 BB and 13 strikeouts. The lone base runner ( a Kyle schwarber single) was erased on a caught stealing. His game score was 83 for the 6 innings. Is this a record for a 6-inning outing?
Any input is greatly appreciated. Thanks !!
Schwarber hit a single? Are you sure it was Schwarber? Even he seems to have been so confused that he thought he was a different player, one who could steal bases.
Schwarber has 29 games in his career with a single and an attempted steal. He went 18 for 29 in those steal attempts, including 3 for 4 last season.
Well, Doug, I’d write that those 29 probably represent all the singles Schwarber has ever hit in his extra-base-and-strikeout-heavy career — each one disorienting him in the same way — except you’d probably be a killjoy and cite facts again.
Tongue firmly in cheek here, but there may be something to your disorientation theory; when Schwarber has both a walk and a single in a game, he’s only 5 for 13 in stolen bases.
Schwarber currently ranks 63rd in career WAR among 68 players with as many walks as singles in a 4000 PA career. When he (likely) surpasses 5000 PA later this season, he’ll probably rank last in WAR among 54 players with that distinction in a 5000 PA career (Schwarber needs another 2.8 WAR in his career to move past Adam Dunn in that group).
Looks like Schwarber will likely remain in this club as he currently has 42% more walks than singles in his career. Only six other players currently have as high a ratio in a 4000 PA career.
Almost. Gore is tied for second behind Jose Berrios, who logged an 84 game score in this game, with 0 hits, 0 walks, 12 K’s and one hit batter for the Twins in the second game of the 2021 season.
The pre-expansion record is a 79 (currently T-22nd) by Hank Aguirre of the 1960 Tigers, who flummoxed the Yankees in this tilt.
Here’s the list.
Thank you !!
Lost in the hoopla surrounding Tyler O’Neill homering in his sixth straight opening day game is the quirk that he posted a 3-3-3-3 box score line, the first opening day n-n-n-n game with n of 3 or more. Five players have recorded a 2-2-2-2 game on opening day, including Madison Bumgarner.
Aaron Judge has put up two highly unusual box score lines in consecutive games. His 6-4-4-8 in the Yankees 20-9 win over the Brewers is one of six such games, while his 1-4-1-2 game the next day is just the eighth since 1901.
The Yankees’ 13 home runs over their last two games ties the record for most by a team when scoring 32+ runs over two games. Whose record did they tie? The Yankees, of course, in 1939 and 2020. Those 13 homers are one fewer than the record posted by the 1999 Reds for any two consecutive games.
Some over/under propositions to consider:
-100 MLB players using the torpedo bat by the All-Star break
-3 teams surpass 300 homers this season (same number of teams who have ever done so)
In my post on him from last season, I mentioned that Bowden Francis is on pace to become the first live ball era pitcher to allow fewer baserunners than innings pitched over the first 50 games of a career (min. 125+ IP). Francis allowed 5 baserunners over 6 IP in his debut 2025 start today to put him at 143 baserunners and 146.2 IP over his first 49 games. Hoping I haven’t jinxed him now.
With their 7-0 start, the Dodgers have tied the record for the longest win streak starting a season by a defending WS champion.
7 – 2025 Dodgers*, 1933 Yankees
6 – 1985 Tigers
For defending league champions, the list looks like this:
9 – 1918 Giants
7 – 2025 Dodgers*, 2015 Royals, 2003 Giants, 1933 Yankees
6 – 2011 Rangers, 1998 Indians, 1985 Tigers, 1920 White Sox
A fast start is also a pretty good predictor for a successful season. Here are the longest winning streaks to start a season by teams that became pennant winners, with WS champions italicized.
10 – 1955 Dodgers
9 – 1990 Reds, 1984 Tigers, 1944 Browns
8 – 1915 Phillies
7 – 2015 Royals, 1919 Reds
6 – 2011 Rangers, 2002 Giants, 1992 Blue Jays, 1981 Dodgers, 1967 Cardinals, 1948 Indians, 1918 Red Sox
The 14 teams in the above list represent 29% of all teams starting a season with a 6+ game winning streak. The five teams above starting with an 8 game or longer winning streak represent 31% of all such teams.
Your comments got me wondering about fast starts, so I looked up the two that I remembered that extended well into the season, Dodgers 1955 (Yes, I remember it. I’d been following baseball as a kid since the previous year, and actually saw the Dodgers play the Cubs in Wrigley that summer, my first experience at a big league park) and Tigers 1984. Both teams cooled considerably, especially in August, but won pennants by comfortable margins.
So then I decided to look up the starts of the teams who won the most games in a season, just as a control: Seattle 2001, Yankees 1998 and 1927, Cleveland 1954, Cubs 1906.
All but Cleveland had good starts and the Preguardians were at least 6-6 in April, but what stood out a mile and a half was what happened in Chicago in 1906. At the end of May the Cubs were playing mere .659 ball with a 1.5 game lead. For the rest of the season they played at an .806 pace, going a blistering 50-8 from August 1 to the finish line.
There have been some other epic runs late in the season, of course, but I doubt they match this one.
Indeed a tough finish to beat. The Miracle Braves, for example, were only 33-8-3 to finish their season, although their 68-19-4 mark from July 5th to season’s end could be one to beat over that long a span.
You mention the ’54 Indians were slow out of the gate. After a 3-6 start, they finished 108-37, including 55-16 after the A-S break.
The ’42 Cards split a twin bill with the Cubs on July 4, winning the second. That was the start of a 66-19 run, including two playoff wins. The ’14 Braves still shade them, though.
One further thought when considering the 1906 Cubs, 1954 Indians, and the Miracle Braves: The Cubs followed that 50-8 strong with a 2-4 Series; the Indians followed their 55-16 string with an 0-4 Series; while the Braves added 4-0 to their 33-8. By those measures, in percentage terms the 1914 Braves come out on top.
BTW, much as it irks me to mention it, the NY Giants went 39-8 to close the ’51 season. Add in their Series and they fall behind, but their streak should be in the mix; like the ’42 Cards they helped create the mythology of the hapless Bums.
Is anyone aware that there is a notice about a plugin problem with the High Heat Stats website showing up when the page opens? Doug?
I have such a notice.
I manage a WordPress site and these things occasionally happen without otherwise impairing the site. (Not every plugin is significant.) I’m sure Doug will take care of it and in the meantime the site’s obviously working. . . . How ’bout them Rockies!! Ryan McMahon is on pace to set the record for season K’s and might fall short of double digits in HRs, but he’s still in positive WAR territory.
Last season I rooted fiercely for the ChiSox — all season long it appeared they would be the first team in the two-league era to both lose more games than the ’62 Mets and have a lower winning Pct. Like the 2003 Tigers they somehow rallied sufficiently at the end to dodge that combo record, but at least they knocked off the first part. Now my heart is beating for the Rockies. But it’s early days . . .
Congrats to the Rockies on their 2-1 win Wed over the Braves to improve their record to 5-25. That’s one win better than the 1988 Orioles who stood at 4-26 after 30 games after an 0-21 start to the season.
By way of comparison, the 1899 Spiders were 7-23 after 30 games and 12-49 after 61 games (34 at home and 27 on the road). Cleveland then embarked on a 50 game (yes 5-oh, fifty) road trip, came home for 7 games (total attendance of 1200 for the home stand), then finished the campaign on a 36 game road odyssey (one of those contests was technically a home game but was played in St. Louis, so I’ll stick with including it in their road trip). For the season, 9-33 at home (incl. that St. Louis game) and 11-101 on the road. Makes their 8-85 finish a little bit more understandable.
Gotta ask, “How in the name of Ned Hanlon did they play 112 road games in a 154 game season”?
Did management just agree, “we stink but can’t draw flies”, so they played all road games?
That’s it exactly. Ownership decided it cost more to host a game than could be justified by the crowds they were drawing, and made the decision to stop playing at home.
The 7 game homestand between those two long road trips was played in Cleveland because both of their opponents (the Giants and the Boston club) had to be in Chicago the day after the Cleveland series, so sensibly declined to host the Spiders.
The singleton “home” game played in St. Louis was against the Colonels, who also elected to play their last 14 home games on the road. The Colonels were finishing their series against St. Louis and the Spiders were already in town as St. Louis’s next opponent so, after the Colonels and St. Louis played their final game, the Colonels and Spiders played a make-up game in the second game of a “3-team double-header”. The Spiders had played another 3-team DH two weeks earlier, stopping enroute from Chicago to Philadelphia to play a make-up game in Cincinnati before the Reds played another make-up game against the Colonels (who made a detour while traveling from Pittsburgh to Baltimore). Unlike the fans in St. Louis, the Cincinnati faithful at least got to see the home side in both ends of that twin-bill.
HHSers, our site is having problems right now, as you can see by the error messages at the top of the screen.
I am not able to compose or post new content right now, so I’ll just pass along a few thoughts about Saturday’s 4 HR game by Eugenio Suarez.
-Rarer than a perfect game, Suarez is the 17th and oldest player to achieve the feat. At game 1498 of his career, he also achieved the feat later in his career than anyone else. Pat Seerey (age 25) is the youngest player with a 4 HR game and Mark Whiten (game 425) the most precocious from the start of a career.
-Suarez is the second player born outside the US with a 4 HR game, and the second to do so in only four PA, following Carlos Delgado is both cases.
-Suarez joins Bob Horner (1986) and Lou Gehrig (1932) in homering 3 times off of the opposing starter in a 4 HR game.
-Suarez joins J.D. Martinez as the second D-Back with a 4 HR game. The 8 years between their two games are easily the fewest among franchises with two such players, following the Braves (32 years), Philles (40 years) and Dodgers (52 years).
-Suarez is the first player with a 4 HR game to have been a teammate of two other such players (Martinez and Gennett), and the first to have played in a teammate’s 4 HR game (Gennett’s). The only other 4 HR game teammates (I think) are Shawn Green and Carlos Delgado, teammates on both the Blue Jays and Mets. Players with a 4 HR game who played in a 4 HR game by an opposing player are Joe Adcock (Willie Mays) and Gil Hodges (Joe Adcock).
-Suarez is the first player with a 4 HR game in a losing cause. His 0.745 WPA is second highest in a 4 HR game, behind Pat Seerey. Seerey also holds 4 HR game records with fastest (40 games) from start of stint with new franchise (tied with J.D. Martinez), the fewest HR (19) in the same season, fewest career HR (86) and fewest career games (49) following his 4 HR effort.
-Ebbets Field and Connie Mack Stadium are the only ballparks to host a pair of 4 HR games. But, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Atlanta, Chicago and Milwaukee have all hosted a pair of 4 HR games in different ballparks (the last two also for different franchises).
Doug,
Thanks for the info – Suarez has GOTTA be the only guy with a sub – .200 batting average (~ .165) going into his big game. Whiten also the only switch-hitter?
Doug,
Sorry – Schmidt was 3 for 16 (.167) prior to the big event in his fifth game of the season. The story was that Gehrig flew out to deep CF at Shibe Park (440+ feet) in his last at bat?
Thanks for the subtle correction on Shibe Park. Not sure why “Connie Mack Stadium” came to my mind, as that rename didn’t happen until 1953, in tribute to the former owner and manager who retired at at the tender age of 87 following the 1950 season (the same year Mack’s sons took over the helm as principal owners). That tribute failed to keep the team in Philly, as the Mack sons bowed to pressure from Yankee ownership to sell the team to the owner of the Yankees’ farm team in Kansas City. After relocation to Missouri, the cozy relationship between the Yankees and the new A’s owner continued, with the A’s becoming something like a major league “farm team” for the Yankees.
The story about Gehrig’s final PA in the game seems very plausible, as his bases loaded sac fly advanced all three baserunners.
Doug, From his SABR Bio:
“Gehrig always liked hitting at Shibe. In fact, the only parks where he had hit more home runs were Yankee Stadium and Sportsman’s Park in St. Louis. In his first at-bat, Gehrig drove a George Earnshaw fastball over the fence in left-center field. In his second time up, he hit his second round-tripper against Earnshaw, this one a blast over the wall in right. In the fifth inning, he took the big right-hander deep a third time. It was the fourth time Gehrig had homered three times in a game, a new major league record.
Only two players had ever hit four home runs in a game: Ed Delahanty did it in 1896, and Bobby Lowe accomplished the feat in 1894. In Gehrig’s next at-bat, he joined the elite club by driving his fourth home run of the game, this one against reliever Roy Mahaffey. The Philadelphia fans, who were notorious Yankee haters, gave Gehrig a standing ovation as he crossed the plate.
In his fifth at-bat, Gehrig grounded out, but a six-run rally by the Yankees in the top of the ninth inning gave him a sixth at-bat and another shot for the all-time record. He drove a pitch to deep center field. Although it first appeared that the ball was headed for the center-field fence, Al Simmons leapt and made a remarkable catch, robbing Gehrig of a chance for a record fifth round-tripper. After the game, Gehrig told reporters, “I think that last one was the hardest ball I hit all day.”
Paul, I can see your response, but no one else can.
Best not to include a bunch of links in your posts, as those will be blocked pending approval. And, right now, the plugin error is preventing me from logging into the site and approving comments.
Site admin (it’s not me) will fix this (I hope).
Here is Paul’s post, minus the links.
From his SABR Bio:
“Gehrig always liked hitting at Shibe. In fact, the only parks where he had hit more home runs were Yankee Stadium and Sportsman’s Park in St. Louis. In his first at-bat, Gehrig drove a George Earnshaw fastball over the fence in left-center field. In his second time up, he hit his second round-tripper against Earnshaw, this one a blast over the wall in right. In the fifth inning, he took the big right-hander deep a third time. It was the fourth time Gehrig had homered three times in a game, a new major league record.
Only two players had ever hit four home runs in a game: Ed Delahanty did it in 1896, and Bobby Lowe accomplished the feat in 1894. In Gehrig’s next at-bat, he joined the elite club by driving his fourth home run of the game, this one against reliever Roy Mahaffey. The Philadelphia fans, who were notorious Yankee haters, gave Gehrig a standing ovation as he crossed the plate.
In his fifth at-bat, Gehrig grounded out, but a six-run rally by the Yankees in the top of the ninth inning gave him a sixth at-bat and another shot for the all-time record. He drove a pitch to deep center field. Although it first appeared that the ball was headed for the center-field fence, Al Simmons leapt and made a remarkable catch, robbing Gehrig of a chance for a record fifth round-tripper. After the game, Gehrig told reporters, “I think that last one was the hardest ball I hit all day.”
The name on this list that always puzzled me when I was young was Pat Seerey. The list was short then (five names: I remember feeling strange adding Colavito) and the names all prominent ones except for Seerey. I knew nothing about him and I discovered after reading Doug’s post today that about seven decades later I knew nothing more–just that he hit four HR in a game (one in extra innings) and had a brief career. Brief for a reason: in his four seasons as a regular he led the league in strikeouts every single year and has no other black ink to his credit. His career WAR is 4.1.
But reading his SABR biography I discovered he is a player worth knowing more about. He really fits in no box. He was 5’9″ and built like a fireplug, hit only 86 HR lifetime and was a mediocre fielder. Yet he seems to have inspired great fan enthusiasm wherever he went and fellow players showed him a lot of respect. In addition to his 4 HR game in 1948, Seerey also had a game at Yankee Stadium in 1945 that included 3 HR and a triple. I wonder (and I expect I’ll soon know the answer) how many players have had careers that included those two feats.
Seerey is 1 of 2 players with 15+ TB in each of 2 games, 15 in one and 16 in the other. Willie Mays is the other, also with 15 in one and 16 in the other.
Pat Seerey and Willie Mays are the only players with multiple games of 15+ TB. They each had 2 such games
One year removed from Seerey’s final major league season, he had drifted all the way down to A ball. He took full advantage of the competition and the thin Colordao air to post the totals below (click on the image to see clearly), with as many Runs, BB and RBI as Hits, and twice as many TB as Hits. Charlie Keller has the only like major league season of 100+ PA, with 36 Hits, 36 Runs, 36 RBI, 41 BB and 83 TB in 1947.
Bubba Trammell looks like a modern equivalent to Seerey. Didn’t strike out as much (and thus had a better BA), but quite similar otherwise (including a virtually identical 4.2 WAR). Click on image to see clearly.
Well, career stats are one thing, Doug, but their profiles as players seem very different. For example, 15% of Seerey’s 86 HR were produced in just five of his 561 games (with HR totals of 4, 3, and 2 three times). He was an explosive hitter, as comments from Bob Feller, Bill Veeck, and sportswriter Gordon Cobbledick in his SABR bio suggest. Cobbledick wrote this about the reaction to Seerey in Philadelphia, which was not his home stadium: “In Philadelphia the fans in the double decked left field pavilion adopted a ritual years ago by way of indicating their opinion that Pat was no ordinary ball player. When he stooped to pick up his glove as he took his position in left field, the fans would rise as one man, extend their arms above their heads and bow in a sweeping salaam. You had to see it to appreciate the impressive nature of the rite when performed by several thousand persons.” (This must have been when outfielders left their gloves in the field when their team batted.) Seerey’s nickname was “The People’s Choice” (a little less colorful than Dixie Walker’s Brooklynese version). He was also “Fat Pat,” because he produced his stats as a 5’9″ or 5’10” 200-220 pounder, while Trammell was 6’3″ 205 lbs.
One thing they do share, apart from career stat similarity: both had 4HR games, only Trammell’s was in AAA-ball.
Correcting myself, Suarez is the second player with 4 HR in a losing cause, following Bob Horner. Makes some sense that Suarez, Horner and Gehrig all homered 3 times off the starting pitcher, as all three games were close, with the Gehrig game only turning lopsided after a two out 9th inning grannie by Tony Lazzeri (the Yankees’ 7 HR were then a single game record, tying the mark set by the A’s in this 1921 game).
I’m impressed that we have so many new posters on HHS now that the WordPress plugin glitch is fixed! These new baseball fans will surely have a lot to offer.
My advanced linguistic skills (and those of my good friend Art Intelli) reveal that our new co-posters: produce diplomas for psychologists, lawyers, economists and any other professions at low prices; believe it is profitable to buy a diploma of education; argue that buying a document of higher education through a high-quality and reliable company gives a number of advantages to the buyer; advise that this decision helps to save time and serious funds; and inform us that we buy a university diploma at a favorable price by contacting a trusted specialized company. And coincidentally, they offer documents from universities located in any region of Russia!
Can’t wait to click on a link, get my PhD in sports management, with a focus on baseball general management, and make my case to the Rockies ownership! I wouldn’t pursue it if I weren’t assured that my degree will come from a trusted, reliable company, even though I suspect the Colorado may be ready to higher staff who have purchased their credentials from fraudulent outfits. This way I will really stand out!
As you can tell by all those new “fans”, we’re not fixed yet. We’ve just disabled the plug-ins (the spam filter among them) to allow us to log in and diagnose what the problem is.
Hopefully will be back to normal soon.
The Russians are Coming, the Russians are Coming ………………
(I want to add that only someone supremely qualified would understand the importance of typing “higher” for “hire.” (The edit function seems to have escaped during the page makeover.)